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To Members of the Forty-seventh General Assembly:
Under direction of House Joint Resolution No. 1023,
1967 regular session, the Legislative Council appointed a
committee to conduct "a study of the problem of governmental civil immunity with a view toward developing comprehensive legislation to define and limit the areas of immunity and to provide procedures for compensation to those
affected and to balance the public and private interest
involved." The report of this committee, is submitted
herewith.
The committee submitted its report and draft of the
proposed bill on September 23, 1968, at which time the
report was accepted by the Legislative Council for transmittal to the Forty-seventh General Assembly.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Representative C. P. (Doc) Lamb
Chairman
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Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your committee appointed to study sovereign
immunity in Colorado submits the accompanying report, containing a draft of suggested governmental
immunity legislation.
The committee's report indicates that there
is a need for legislative action to establish
guidelines for the waiver of sovereign immunity in
particular instances and to assure governmental entities of the opportunity to prepare for the newly
imposed liabilityo The legislation provides for
(1) procedural safeguards, (2) limitations on judgments, (3) the express enumeration of areas of liability, and (4) authority to obtain protection
through insurance.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Senator David J. Hahn,
Chairman, Committee on
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FOREWORD
Under direction of House Joint Resolution No. 1023, 1967
regular session,. the Legislative Council appointed a committee to
study the problems of governmental immunity with a view toward
developing comprehensive legislation to define and limit the
areas of immunity and to provide procedures for compensation to
those affected and to balance the public and private interests
involved. The members of the committee appointed to carry out
this assignment were:
Senator David Hahn, Chairman
Representative Thomas Grimshaw,
Vice Chairman
Senator Allegra Saunders
Representative James Braden

Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative

Ralph A. Cole
Charles Edmonds
Floyd Sack
Hubert M. Safran

To accomplish the purposes set forth in the study resolution, the Legislative Council Committee on Sovereign Immunity
held thirteen meetings from June 9, 1967 to September 19, 1968.
To aid the committee in its deliberations, representatives of
various departments of state government (Colorado Department of
Highways, Department of Insurance, Attorney General's Office,
Division of Local Government), representatives of various local
governmental entities, and representatives of the insurance industry, were consulted by the committee. In addition, two questionnaires were used by the committee to obtain comments and
suggestions from interested persons on the proposals the committee had under consideration.
Assisting the committee in the study were Mr. Bob Holt and
and Mr. Gene Cavaliere of the Legislative Drafting Office, who
provided bill drafting services, and Mr. Earl Thaxton, senior
research assistant for the Legislative Council, who had primary
responsibility for the staff worko

Lyle C. Kyle
Director

September 23, 1968
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIOOS
1. The legal doctrine_of sovereign immunity, as it has
historically devel~ped, expresses the idea that government is
immune from liability for injury or damage resulting from governmental activities, unless it consents to such liability. The
doctrine that the sovereign cannot be sued or held liable without its consent continues to be the rule, not the exception,·ln
the great majority of states.
2. The law of Colorado with respect to the sovereign immunity doctrine and the tort li'ability of governmental entities
can be summarized generally (although in oversimplified terms)
as follows: The state, counties, cities, and other subdivisions
of government are deemed immune from liability for the torts committed by public employees in the performance of governmental
functions, except to the extent that the immunity has been waived
or judicially found to be inapplicable.
3. The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been under
critical scrutiny for many years· -- by legal writers and scholars, jud~es, attorneys, and lay people. Most agree that the
grounds for exempting the state and other public entities from
suit and liability are neither logical nor practical. Nearly
every commentator who has considered the subject vigorously asserts that the doctrine must be abolished, _because it is inherently unsound, confusing, conflicting, archaic, "an anachronism
without rational basis that has existed only by force of inertia",
and has produced great injustice in the courts. The committee
agrees that there are many inconsistencies in the present la~ on
.the subject, thereby creating confusion and misunderstanding.
The doctrine has created certain situations of injustice. Citizens have been injured in their person and property by government
employees and, in many of these cases, no recourse against the.
government is possible. Where relief is available it is most
generally granted as a matter of discretion and there is no uniformity in either method or approach among the various subdivisions of government. This results in many instances of injustice
and inequity.
4. In the several states, including Colorado, .consent to
suit and liability has been given in many cases, and in a variety
of forms. This consent has taken the form of (1) private laws.
enacted as a matter of legislative grace, (2) general or limited
public legislation creating liability, (3) indirect liability
through such means as insurance, (4) liability of governmental
units under the court-made doctrine concerning proprietary and
ministerial functions, and (5) judicial abrogation of the doctrine, in whole or in part, by the courts, All of these forms of
assuming responsibility for governmental torts combine to support
the conclusion of the committee that there ls a trend toward gov-.
ernmental responsibility and away from governmental imm~nity.
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5. Widespread dissatisfaction with the doctrine and judicial impatience with legislative inaction have led fourteen
state courts to repudiate the doctrine in whole or in part. On
the other hand. many courts, in considering whether or not to
abolish the doctrine, have decided to leave the question to the
legislatures. It appears that a majority of those who have considered the-question, both those who favor and those who oppose
judicial abrogation of the doctrine. assume that the doctrine
should be abolished. The main debate is over the question whether the courts or the legislatures should do the job.
6. To date, the majority of the Supreme Court of Colorado has refused to completely· repudiate the .doctrine and reaffirmed the position tha.t any change in the rule should be a
legislative matter. Whether or not the Supreme Court of Colorado will refute, change or otherwise amend the rule of governmental immunity, is· of course, not knowno In several other states,
the courts also intimated that the doctrine was a legislative
matter. However, .in the light of.legislative inaction, these
same courts subsequently concluded that the initiative had to be
undertaken by court decision, and abolished the doctrine. A
change in the thinking of the Colorado Supreme Cou~t as a result
of decisions in sister stat~s, a change in the composition of
the court itself; or impatience by the court for· action by the
legislature, could result in a change of ~osition by the court.
In anr event, it was agreed by the committee that to wait for
judic al action is not a proper. solution. to the problems of sovereign immunity. The committee concluded that~ statutory solution to the problem was needed to give .d~rection and bring some
degree of consistency and uniformity to-the applicable statutory
and common law principles.. B_ecause the de~ermination of public
policy is particularly within the competence and experience of
the legislature, and in an attempt.to avoid th~ chaos which has
resulted in other states where .immunity has been abolished by
the judiciary before the legislature had·ac.ted, the committee
~oncluded that legislative action i~ nec~~sary and desirable. ·
7. The committ~e concluded that a~y proposed legislation
should eliminate the pres~nt inconsistency and arbitrary.distinctions that exist in the law_as it applies to the various units of
government. Any proposed legislation. should r_ef lecl the philosophy of the present trend to greatly restrict- the _doctrine of governmental immunity. More stress should be on the principle that
if there is fault there should be a remedy and that economic loss
resulting from the wrongful_ acts of government should be borne by
the community as a whole rather than imposed on one individual.
In addition, any proposed legislation should assure governmental
entities of the opportunity to prepare for any newly imposed liability and all liability should, be prudently managed and fiscally
controlled by the following provisions: (1) procedural safeguards, (2) statutory limitations on judgments, (3) the areas of
exposure should be expressly stated, and (4) power.should be
granted to obtain prot~ction through insurance.
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COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee recommends favorable consideration of the
"Colorado Governmental Immunity Act" included in this report.
The general plan of the act is to reaffirm governmental immunity
to suit and then proceed to carve out specific exceptions thereto. The committee felt that this approach would eliminate possible confusion by restating existing law in Colorado while .
opening up new areas of specific governmental responsibility as
deemed appropriate by the committee to satisfy the demands of
justice in a changing society.
·
The committee found that this approach would be the easiest to draft and would result in a clear, concise bill. In addition, this approach allows the most flexibility for future
change. Most important, however, is that this approach provides
a better basis upon which the financial burden of liability can
be evaluated in terms of the potential cost of such liability.
If the limits of potential liability are known, public entities
may plan accordingly, may budget for their potential liabilities,
and may obtain realistically priced insurance, for the risk is
more clearly defined and lends itself to more accurate assessment, which should result in lower premiums for the coverage had.
The language of the bill was patterned after the California Act of 1963 (Calif. Gov't Code Ann. § 810-996.6 ,LSupp. 196§7),
the "Utah Governmental Immunity Act" (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 to
34 L5upp. 196.27), other state acts, and the Federal Tort Claims
Act. The original draft of the bill has been changed and refined
to comply with specific recommendations as received from committee members, and to reflect unique Colorado circumstances as revealed by committee discussion. In some cases actual language
as suggested by committee members was incorporated into the bill.
The major provisions of the act are discussed below.
Declaration of Policy
The bill begins with a statement of policy to the effect
that the committee recognizes that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is, in some instances, an inequitable doctrine. That the
doctrine has created many situations of injustice by treating
governments differently than private persons is obvious. On the
other hand, there are many situations in which the nature of governmental activities and functions is not comparable to private
activities and responsibilities.
Public agencies necessarily engage in a broad spectrum of
activities having no private counterpart, which often involve
relatively high degrees of exposure to injury producing events,
and which the government cannot voluntarily terminate since they
are performed as a matter of public ·duty. Private persons and
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corporations, on the other hand, are ordinarily free to withdraw
from activities which entail undue risks of liability. These
differences suggest that it may not be wise to treat RUblic and
private entities alike for tort liability purposes. The committee has recognized this difference by declaring that the state
and its political subdivisions should not be liable for their
wrongs, in every instance, in the same manner as private persons
and corporations.
Definitions
Public entity. The definition of "public entity" is especially important because it determines the general reach of
the bill. This definition is intended to include every kind of
independent political or governmental entity in the state in order to avoid any questions as to whether certain units of government are excluded. The committee agreed that all units of
government should be treated similarly, for it appears to be unjust to make an individual's right to recover damages for injury
dependent on whether it was the state or some other political
subdivi~ion or governmental unit which was responsible.
Public Employee. This definition specifically recognizes
the policy decision of the committee to include in the scope of
the bill the officers of a public entity, whether elected or appointed. This assures that elected officials are included in the
term "public employee" as used in the act. In addition, employees and servants of the public ehtity are included under the
definition, Whether or not compensated.
The terms "whether or not compensated" raised difficult
questions for the committee. For example, a non-compensated employee could include county jail prisoners working on a county
road and welfare people engaged in public work· projects on a
very temporary basis. There are also.many volunteer workers who
perform duties for the public entities. The question posed was
whether or not a political subdivision should be liable for the
tortious acts of persons over whom it has such limited and transient control. If non-compensated individuals are not covered
by the bill,. liability for acts or omissions while performing
the non-compensated volunteer work would be upon them as individuals. This result may deter the performance of volunteer work,
which is essential to some types of functions. Because no substantial effect on the lawful operation of the public entity
could be demonstrated as a result of the inclusion of non-compensated persons in the definition of "public -employees", the
committee left the definition as it presently reads.
Injury. This definition merely defines_"injury"; it does.
not impose liability for an injury. The standards and conditions of liability for an injury are found in other provisions
of the bill. The purpose of the definition is t~ make _clear that
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public entities and public employees may be held liable only for
injuries to the kind of interests that have been protected by
the courts in actions between private persons.
Dangerous conditiQ,!!. The definition of "dangerous condition" defines the type of property conditions for which a public
entity may be held liable, but does not impose liability. Liability for a dangerous condition is imposed by the provisions of
Section 60 The types of property in which a dangerous condition
may exist inclu<;ie a npublic building 0 public hospital, jail, public highway, road or street, public facility located in any park
or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public water, gas 1 . sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming facility. 0
Those are the types of property for which immunity is waived under Section 6.,
When the physical condition of these facilities or the
use thereof constitute a risk to the public and the physical condition is proximately caused by the negligence of the public entity in constructing or maintaining such facility, a dangerous
condition e;,c1sts. The risk must be known or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been known before a dangerous condition can exist" If it is established that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature
that, in the exercise of due care, such condition and its dangerous character should have been discovered, then the risk will be
considered to have been known~
The committee concluded that there should be an exception
for the discretionary act of elanning or designinge If the physical condition of a facility is inadequate in relation to its
present use as a result of the planning or designing of the facility, a dangerous condition shall not be considered to exist.
Thus, the exercise of discretion in designing, as distinguished
from discretion in construction or maintenance, will" continue to
be immune from liability.
02eration. Sovereign immunity i~ waived in Section 6 (1)
(c) of the bill with respect to the operation of a public hospital or jail and in Section 6 (1) (g) with respect to the operation of any water, gasp sa.nitation 9 electrical, power, or swimm'Iiig facility. The term "operation" is defined. to mean the
negligence of a public entity or public employee in the exercise
and performance of the powersp duties_ and functions vested in
them by law with respect to the purposes of the above facilities.
The term "operation" is not to be construed to include a
failure to exercise or perform any powers, duties or functions
not vested by law in a public entity or employee. The term "operation" also does not include a negligent or inadequate inspection, or a failure to make an inspection, of any property, except
property owned or leased by the public entity, to determine
whether such property constitutes a hazard to the health or safe-
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tI
of the public.
t on activities of

Because of the extensive nature of the inspecpublic entities, a public entity would be ex. posed to the risk of liability for virtually all propertr defects
within its jurisdiction if this exclusion from the defin tion
were not granted.
Availability of Insurance - Waiver to Extent of Coverage
Secti~n 4 of the bill waives sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance coverage obtained by a public entity, whether
or not the entity would otherwise be liable or immune. If a public entity .obtains insurance to protect against liability for injury, then such public entity should be deemed to have waived the
defense of sovereign immunity as to the particular injury or injuries insured against and to the extent of the amount of insurance. If the defense of sovereign immunity would otherwise be
applicable to the entity, then the amount of recovery should be
limited to the amount Qf recovery against the insurer.
Scope of Immunity and Liability
Effect of prior waiver of immuniu. Section 5 of the bill
assures that the statute shall not be construed to narrow the
pre-sent common law on liability nor to -expand the present common
law on immunity. The statute is not to undo the present law,
unless otherwise specifically so stated in the billf' The section assures that the doctrine shall not be imposed in those·
cases where :1 t did n_ot exist before, unless the bill specifically
so provides~ ·
·
Determination of liability when immunity waived. Where
sovereign immunity ls abrogated as a defense under the bill, the
liability of t.he pub~ic entity shall be determined in the same
manner as if the public entity were a private person. Public
entities have all th~ defenses to an action at law that private
persons have, except the defense of sovereign immunity when that
defense is abr_ogated by the _bill ( see Section 7) • _
Sovereign immunity as a defense. The general rule of the
bill is that sovereign immunity is ret~ined, except as w~ived by
the bill or other p~ovisions of law. 'Thus, if sovereign immunity
is not waived by statutory provision, sove~eign immunity shall be
available to a.public entity as a defense to an action for injuries. This general rule is provided in Section 8.
Waiver of Immunity
Section 6 of the bill provides that the defense of-sovereign immunity will not be available to a public entity in those
areas specified. These are the general waiver provisions of the
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bill, other than Section 4 which waives sovereign immunity when
insurance is available. In all other cases, the defense of sovereign immunity applies. Under these waiver provisions the liability of the public enti.ty will be determined as if the entity
were a private person.
Automobile accidents. Immunitr is waived for an action
for damages resulting from the operat on of a motor vehicle owned
or leased by a public entity. There is an exception for emergen- ·
cy vehicles.
Hospitals and jails. Sovereign immunity is not available
as a defense to injuries arising from the operation of a hospital or a jail, or a dangerous condition existing therein.
·
Public buildings. Sovereign immunity is not available as
a defense to injuries caused by the dangerous conditions of public buildings.
Roads and highways. No public entity can avail itself of
the defense of immunity with respect to injuries arising out of
the dangerous condition of any paved highway or street. The
present rule of liability of municipalities is extended to counties and the state. The defense of immunity will remain for
injuries caused on unpaved roads and highways. The committee
concluded that this distinction between paved and unpaved roads
and highways is the most reasonable method of classifying them
for purposes of sovereign immunity waiver.
Public parks, recreational facilities, etc. The defense
of immunity is waived with respect to injuries resulting from a
dangerous condition of any public facility located in parks and
recreation areas and maintained by a public entity. A distinction is made between (1) injuries caused by negligence in the
construction, maintenance, failure to maintain, etc. of artificial, man-made objects (swing sets, buildings, etc.) and (2) injuries caused by the natural conditions of a park (the Flat Irons
in Boulder or the Red Rocks west of Denver). In other words,
ordinary negligence is sufficient to impose liability for injuries caused by the dangerous condition of artificial objects·. For
injuries caused by natural dangerous conditions, immunity is retained.
The committee concluded that if immunity were waived with
respect to injuries caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property the burden and expense of putting such proper~y
in a safe condition and the expense. of defending claims for injuries would probably cause many public entities to close such
areas to public use. It is desirable to permit the members of
the public to use public property in its natural condition. In
view of the limited funds available for the acquisition and improvement of property for recreational purposes, the committee
concluded that it is not unreasonable to expect persons who vol-
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untarily use unimproved property in its natural condition to assume the risk of injuries arising therefrom.
Water, sewer, trash, and other proprietary activities.
Sovereign immunity will not be available as a defense to an action for injuries resulting from the operation of activities
which are proprietary in nature, or a dangerous condition existing.therein. The liability of an entity when engage3 in these
activities will be determined as if it were a private corporation. These functions include, but are not limited to, the following: water, sewer, trash and waste· disposal, electric and gas
utilities. swimming pools, etc.
Defense of Public Employees
Section 10 of the bill provides that a public entity is
required to assume the defense costs of .its employees, whether
such defense is assumed by the public entity or not, when they
were acting within the scope of their employment and a claim is
brought against them for alleged injuries.
the public entity is also required to pay all judgments
or settlements of claims against its public employees in circumstances where the defense of sovereign immunity is waived as to
the public entity. The public entity, however, is not required
to pay the judgment where it is not made a party defendant in an
action and is not notified of the existence of the action within
fifteen days after the commencement of the action.
A public entity has discretion as to whether or not it
will assume the defense of its public employee~ This is necessary in order to avoid a conflict of interest situation. The
public entity is required, where it is made a co-defendant with
its public employee, to notify such employee whether or not it
will assume his defense. Where the entity is not made a codefendant, but is notified of the existence of the action within
fifteen days after it is commenced, it also has to notify the
employee of its decision.
If the public entity decides to defend the employee and
it is determined that the employee was acting within the scope
of his employment, the entity will be liable for the judgment.
If it is determined by the court that·the employee was acting
outside of the scope of his employment, the employee, subject to
an agreement with the entity, is required to reimburse the entity for reasonable attorney's fees. In addition, the entity may
not compromise or settle claims against its employees until it
is established that sovereign immunity has been waived.
When the entity fails or refuses to defend, it will be
liable to the employee for reasonable defense costs and/or the
&e~tlement or judgment costs if it i~ subsequently determined
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respectively that the employee was acting within the scope of
his employment and the claim arose out of circumstances wherein
the defense of sovereign immunity has been waived as to the public entity. If the court determines that the employee was not
within the scope of employment then the entity is neither liable
for costs of defense nor costs of the judgment or settlement.
Election of remedies. Section 11 of the bill provides
that any judgment against either a public entity or a public
employee shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the
claimant by reason of the same subject matter, against the other.
However, nothing will prevent the joinder of the public entity
or public employee of such public entity in the same action.
Compromise and Settlement - Payment of Judgments - Limitations on
Judgments - Authority to Obtain Insurance
Compromi~ and settlement. The administrative officers
of a public entity are vested with authority to compromise or
settle claims (see Section 12).
Payment of judgments. Pursuant to Section 13, a public
entity is required to pay any judgment to the extent funds are
available in the fiscal year in which the judgment becomes final.
The judgment may be paid out of any funds that are available to
the entity from (1) a self-insurance reserve fund, (2) funds that
are unappropriated for any other purpose, and (3) funds appropriated for the current fiscal year for the payment of judgments and
not previously encumbered.
If the judgment cannot be paid in full in the fiscal ye.ar,
in which it becomes final, the public entity is required to pay
the balance of the judgment in the ensuing fiscal year by levying a tax sufficient to discharge the judgment. In no event,
however, should the levy exceed ten mills, exclusive of existing
mill levies. The publi.c entity is required to continue to levy
such tax, not to exceed ten mills, but in no event less than ten
mills if such judgment will not be discharged by a lesser levy,
until the judgment is discharged.

Limitations on judgments. A limitation on the amount of
recovery that may be had when there is liability is set forth in
Section 14 of the bill. The state or other public entity may be
liable up to the maximum amount set forth in the sect.ion. The
maximum amounts that may be recovered are, for an injury to one
person in any single occurrence, the sum of $100,000~ and for
an injury to two or more persons in any single occurrence, the
sum of $3 1 000,000; except that in such instance, no p,erson may
recover in excess of $100 1 0000
The only time recovery may be had in an amount which·exceeds these maximum limits is when the public entity provides
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insurance coverage to insure itself or a public employee against
all or any part of its or his liability, and the insurance coverage is in an amount in excess of the maximum limits set forth.
In this instance, recovery may be had in an amount which exceeds
the maximum limits, but the amount of recovery shall not exceed
the limitations of the insurance coverage.
It is expressly provided that the limitations in the section shall not be construed to permit the recovery of damages in
an amount in excess of the amounts specified in the Ii Wrongful
Death Statute" for the types of action authorized under said
statute.
The section also provides that a public _entity is not to
be liable fo~ punitive or exemplary damages.
Authority to~obtain insurance. Pursuant to Sections 15
and 16 all public entities are expressly authorized to insure
themselves again&t liability. Likewise, all~ublic entities are
expressly authorized to purchase insurance to cover the liability of their officers, agents, and employees for torts committed
in the scope of their public employment. All p~blic entities,
in addition to being authorized to insure against any liability,
are authorized to insure against the expense of defending claims,
whether or not l~abili ty ·exists on such claims.
Public entities may insure either by purchasing commercial
liability insurance or by adopting a program of self-insurance
through the establishment of financial reserves, or by any combination of the two methods.
Public entities ~re authorized to purchase insurance only
from an insurer authorized to do business in this state and
deemed by the state purchasing agent, or the appropriate governing body of the public entity, to be responsible and financially
sound considering the extent of the coverage required.
The committ~e does not recommend at this time that all
public entities, other than the state, be required to provide insurance cdvering their- liability or the liability of their officers, agents, and employees. The st~te, however, is required to
provide insuranceo
Other Provisions
Notice - filing of claims. Under Section 9 of the bill,
any person claiming to h.,av~ suff e 7ed an inJury by ~ public ~rntity or an employee thereof is required to file a written notice
with the entity within -six months after the date the injury is
known or should have-been known by the exerc.ise of reasonable
diligence.· A clai-m for an injury is considered to accrue on the
date the injury is known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable =diligence. ·
xx.iv

The notice is to be presented to the attorney general when
the claim is against the state or an employee thereof. When the
claim is against any other public entity or an employee thereof,
the notice is to be presented to the governing body of the public
entity or the attorney representing the public entity.
Execution and attachment not to issue. Neither execution
nor attachment is to issue against a public entity in any action
or proceeding initiated under the provisions of the bill (see
Section 17).
·
Statute of limitations. There is a two-year statute of
limitations with respect to tor.t actions brought pursuant to the
provisions of the bill. An action based on tort is to be commenced within two years after the accrual of such action, or be
forever barred {see Section 9 (6) of the bill).
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Recommended Bill to Provide For
Governmental Immunity and Liability
in Colorado

A BILL FOR AN ACT
1

RELATING TO THE IMMUNITY OF THE STATE, ITS AGENCIES AND POLI-

2

TICAL SUBDIVISIONS, FROM ACTIONS AT LAW; PROVIDING EXCEP-

3

TIONS THERETO, FOR THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS ANO JUDGMENTS,

4

AND FOR THE PURCHASE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE.

5
6
7

8

Be it enacted!?:£ the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION 1.

Short title.

This act shall be known and may

be cited as the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act".
SECTION 2.

Declaration of policy.

It is recognized by

9

the general assembly that the doctrine of sovereign immunity,

10

whereunder the state and its political subdivisions are often

11

immune from suit for wrongs suffered by private persons, is,

12

in some instances, an inequitable doctrine; however, the gen-

13

eral assembly is cognizant of the fact that the state and its

14

political subdivisions are required to perform certain services

15

and functions, which cannot be performed by private persons or

16

corporations, ande therefore, the state and its political sub-

17

divisions should not be liable for their wrongs in the same

18

manner as private persons and corporations.

19
20

21

SECTION 3.

Definitions.

(1)

As used in this act, un-

less the context otherwise indicates:

(2)

"Public entity" means the state, county, city and
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l county, incorporated town, school district, special improve2 ment district, and every other kind of district, agency, in3 strumentality, or political aubdivision of the state organized
4 pursuant to law.

5

(3)

"Public employee" means an officer, employee, serv-

6 ant of the public entity~ whether or not compensated, elected,
7 or appointed, but does not include an independent contractor.

8

(4)

"Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to

9 or loss of p~operty, of whatsoever kind, and which would be
10 actionable if inflicted by a private person.
11

(5) (a)

"Dangerous condition" means the physical condi-

12 tion of. any public building, public hospital, jall, public
13 highway, road or street, public facility located in any park
14 or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public

15 water, gas, sanitation, ~lectrical, power, or swimming facili16 _ty, where the physical condition of such facilities or the use
17 thereof constitute a risk, known to exist or which in the ex18 ercise of reasonable care should have been known, to the health
19 or safety of the public and which condition is proximately
20 caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity
21 in constructing or maintaining such facility.

For the purposes

22 of this paragraph (5) (a), a dangerous condition should have
23 been known if it is established that the condition had existed
24

for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature

25 that, in the exercise of due care, such condition and its

26 dangerous character should have been discovered.
27

(b)

A dangerous condition shall not exist where the

28 design of any facility set forth in paragraph (a) of this sub29
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l
2

section is inadequate in relation to its present use.
(6) (a)

"Oper.ation" means the act or omi.ssion of a pub-

3 lie entity or public employee in the exercise and performance
4 of the powers, duties, and functions vested in them by law
5 with respect to the purposes of any public hospital, jail, pub6 lie water, gas, sanitation, power or swimming facility.
7

(b) (i)

8 elude:

The term operation shall not be construed to in-

A failure to exercise or perform any powers, duties, or

9 functions· not vested by law in a public entity or employee with
10 respect to the purposes of any public facility set forth in
11 paragraph (a) of this subsection; or
12

(ii)

A negligent or inadequate inspection, or a failure

13 to make an in~pection, of any property, except property owned
14 or leased by the public entity, to determine whether such prop15 erty consitutes a hazard to the health or safety of the public.
16

SECTION 4.

Availability of insurance - effect.

(1)

Not-

17 withstanding any provision of law or of this act to the con18 trary. if a public entity provides insurance coverage to in19 sure itself against liability for any injury, or to insure any
20 of its employees against his liability for any injury result21 ing from an act or omission by such employee acting within the
22 scope of his employment, then such public entity shall be
23 deemed to have waived the defense of sovereign immunity in any
24 action for damages for any such injury insured against subject
25 to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.

26

(2)

If the defense of sovereign immunity would be avail-

27 able to a public entity except for the provisions of subsec28 tion (1) of this section, then damages shall not be recover29
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l able in excess of the amount of the insurance coverage, and
2 shall be recovered from the insurer only.

The insurer shall

3 not be named as a party defendant.
4

SECTION 5.

Prior

waiver of immunity - effect.

The pro-

5 visions of this act shall not be construed to make available
6 the defense of sovereign immunity where such defense was not
7 available prior to the effective date of this act.

8

SECTION 6.

lmmunitv waived.

(1) (a)

Sovereign immunity

9 shall not be asserted by a public entity as a defense in an

10 action for damages for injuries resulting from:
11

(b)

The operation by a public employee of a motor ve-

12 hicle owned or leased by such public entity, except emergency
13 vehicles operating within the provisions of section 13-5-4 (2)

14 and (3),.C.R.S. 1963, as amended:

15

(c)

The operation of any public hospital' or jail by such

16 public ent~ty, or a dangerous condition existing therein;
dangerous condition of any public building;

17

(d)

A

18

(e)

A dangerous condition of any highway, road, or street

19 within the corporate limits of any municipality, or of any

20 highway which is a part of the federal interstate highway sys21

tern, the f ede.ral primary· highway system, and any paved highway

22 which is a part of the federal secondary highway system or any
23 paved highway which is a part of the state highway system.
24

(f)

A

dangerous condition of any public facility, except

25 roads and highways, located in parks or recreation areas and

26 maintained by such public entity: b~t, nothing in this para27

graph (f) shall be construed to prevent a public entity from

28 asserting the defense of sovereign immunity to an injury .
29
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1 caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property,
2 whether or not such property is located in a park or recrea3 tion area;

4

(g)

The operation of any public water facility, gas fa-

5 cility, sanitation facility, electrical facility. power facil6 ity, or swimming facility by such public entity, or a dangerous
7 condition existing therein.
8

SECTION 7.

Determination of liability.

Where sovereign

9 immunity is abrogated as a defense under section 6 of this act,
10 liability of the public entity shall be determined in the same
11 manner as if the public entity were a private person.
12

SECTION 8.

Sovereign immunity remains a defense - when.

13 Except as provided in sections 4 through 6 of this act, or
14 other provision of law, sovereign immunity shall be available
15 to a public entity as a defense to an action for injury.
16

SECTION 9.

17 limitations.

(1)

Notice required - contents - to whom given Any person claiming to have suffered an in-

18 jury by a public entity or an employee thereof shall file a
19 written notice as provided in this section within six months
20 after the date the injury is known or should have been known
21 by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
22

(2) (a)

23

(b)

The notice shall contain the following:

The name and address of the claimant, and the name

24 and address of his attorney, if any:
25

(c)

A concise statement of the basis of the claim, in-

26 eluding the date, time, place. and circumstances of the act,
27 omission, or event complained of;
28

(d)

The name and address of any public employee in-

29
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1 valved, if known;
2

(e)

A concise statement of the nature and the extent of

3 the injury claimed'to have been suffered;
4

(f)

A statement

of the amount of monetary damages that is

5 being requested.

6

(3)

If the claim is against the state or an employee

7 thereof, the notice shall be presented to the attorney general.

8 If the claim is against any other public entity or an employee
9 there.of, the notice shall be presented to the governing body of

10 the public entity or the attorney representing the public en11 tity.

12 ·

(4)

When the claim is one for death by wrongful act or

13 omission, the notice may be presented by the personal represent14 ative, surviving spouse, or next of kin, of the deceased.
15

(5)

For the purpose of this act, a claim for injury shall

16 be considered to accrue on the date that the injury is known or

17 should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
18

(6)

Any action based upon tort shall be commenced within

19 two years after the accrual of such action, or it shall be for20 ever barred.

21

SECTION 10.

22 judgments

or

Defensg of eublic emploxges - paI!!!ent of

settlements against public emploxeea.

(1) (a)

A

23 public entity &hall be liable for:
24

(b)

The costs of the defense of any of its public em-

25 ployees, whether such defense is assumed by the public entity
26 or not, where the claim against the public employee arises out
27 of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee
28 occurring during the performance of his duties and within the
29
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l scope of his employment: and
2

(c)

The payment of all judgments and settlements of

3 claims against such employee, except where the defense of sov4 ereign immunity is available to the public entity.
5

The provisions of subsection (1) of this section

(2)

6 shall not apply where a public entity is not made a party de7

fendant in an action and such public entity is not notified of

8 the existence of such action in writing within fifteen days

9 after the commencement of such action.
10

(3) (a)

It shall be within the discretion of the public

11 entity whether it shall assume the defense of its public em12 ployee, or does not assume his defense.
13

(b)

(i)

In the event that the public entity elects to

14 assume the defense of its public employee, such defense shall
15 be assumed subject to an agreement between the public entity
16 and the public employee:

17
18

(ii)

That such public employee shall reimburse the pub-

lie entity for reasonable attorney's fees in the event that

19 the court determines that the injuries did not arise out of an
20

act or omission of such employee occurring during the perform-

21 ance of his duties and within the scope of his employment; and
22

(iii)

That the public entity shall not compromise or

23

settle the claim unless and until it is established that the

24

defense of sovereign immunity is not available to the public

25

entity.

26

(c) (i)

In the event that the public entity elects not

27

to assume the defense of its public employee, and the court

28

determines~

29
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l

(ii)

That the injuries arose out of an act or omission

2 of such employee during the performance of his duties and with3 in the scope of his employment, the public entity shall be

4 liable to such public employee for h~s reasonable attor~ey's
5 fees in prosecuting his own defense. and, where applicable, in

6 bringing an action to establish that the injuries arose out of
7

an act or omission of such employee during the performance of

8 his duties and within the scope of his employment; and

(iii)

9

That the defense of sovereign immunity is or would

10 have been available to the public entity,_ the public entity
11

shall be liable to the public employee for any judgment or set-

12 tlement again$t such public employee.

13

(4)

Where the public entity is made a cio-defendant with

14 its public employee, it shall notify such employee in Writing
15 within fifteen days after the commencement of such action

16 whether it will assume the defense of such employee, and where

17 the public entity is not made a co-defendant, within ten days
18

after receiving written notice of the existence of such action,

19 but in no event, later than eighteen days after the commence20 ment of such action.
Judgment against public entity or public em-

21

SECTION 11.

22

ployee - effect.

23

shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant

24

by

25

ployee whose act o.r omission gave rise to the claim.

26

(l)

Any judgment against a public entity

reason of the same subject matter, against any public em-

(2)

Any judgment against any public employee whose act

27

or omission gave rise to the claim shall constitute a complete

28

bar to any action by the claimant by reaso~ of the same sub-

29
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l ject matter, against a public entity.
2

(3)

Nothing contained in the provisions of this section

3 shall be construed as preventing the joinder of any public

4 entity or employee of such public entity in the same action.
5

SECTION 12.

6 (1)

A

Compromise of claims - settlement of actions.

claim against the state may be compromised or settled

7 for and on behalf of the state by the attorney general, with

8 the concurrence of the head of the affected department, agency,
9

board, commission, institution, hospital, college, university,

10 or-other instrumentality thereof.

11

(2)

Claims against public entities, other than the state,

12 may be compromised or settled by the governing.body of the
13 public entity or in such manner as the governing body may des-

14 ignate.
15

SECTION 13.

Payment of judgments.

(1)

A public entity

16 or designated insurer shall pay any compromise, settlement or
17 final judgment in the manner provided in this section, and an
18 action pursuant to rule 106 of Colorado rules of civil proce19 dure shall be an appropriate remedy to compel a public entity
20
21
22

to perform an act required under this section.
(2) (a)

The state and the governing body of any other

public entity shall pay, to the extent funds are available in

23 the fiscal year in which it becomes final, any judgment out of
24

any funds to the credit of the public entity that are avail-

25 able from any or all of the following:

26

(b)

A self-insurance reserve fund;

27

(c)

Funds that are unappropriated for any other purpose

28 unless the use of such funds is restricted by law or contract
29
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1 to other purposes;
2

(d)

Appropriated for the current fiscal year for the pay-

3 ment of such judgments and not previously_encumbered.

4

(3)

If a public entity is unable to pay a judgment during

5

the fiscal year in which it becomes final because of lack of

6

available funds, the public eniity shall levy a tax, in a

7

separate item to cover such judgment, sufficient to discharge

8

such

9

such levy exceed ten mills, exclusive of existing, mill levies.

judgment in the next fiscal year; but in no event shall

10 The public entity shall continue to levy such tax, not to ex-

11 ceed ten mills, exclusive of existing mill levies, but in no
12 event less than ten mills if such judgment will not be dis13 charged by a lesser levy, until such judgment is discharged.

14

SECTION 14.

Limitations on judgments.

(1) (a)

The maxi-

15 m~m amount that may be recovered under this act shall be:

16

(b)

for any injury to one person in any single occurrence,

17 the sum of $100,000.00;
18

(c)

For an injury to two or more persons in any single

19 occurrence. the sum of $3,000,000.00; except that in such in20 stance, no person may recover in excess of
21

s100.ooo.oo.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of

22

this section, if a public entity prov~des insurance coverage to

23

insure itself against all or any part of its liability for any

24

injury. or to insure a public employee acting within the scope

25 of his employment against all or any part of his liability for

26 injury, and the insu~ance coverage is.in an amount in excess
27

of the limits specified in subsectio~ (1) of this section,

28 then recovery may be had in 'an amount not to exceed the limi-.
29
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l tations of insurance coverage.
2

(3}

Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit

3 the recovery of damages for types of actions authorized under
4 article 1 of chapter 41, C.R.S. 1963 as amended, in an amount
5 in excess of the amounts specified in said article.
6
7

8

(4)

A public entity shall not be liable for punitive or

exemplary damages under this act.
SECTION 15.

Authority for public entities other than the

9 state to obtain insurance.

(1) (a)

A public entity, other

10 than the state, either by itself or in conjunction with any one
11 or more public entities may:
12

(b)

Insure against all or any part of its liability for

13 an injury for which it might be liable under this act;
14

(c)

Insure any public employee acting within the scope

15 of his employment against all or any part of his liability for
16 an injury for which he might be liable under this act;
17

(d)

Insure against the expense of defending a claim

18 against the public entity or its employees, whether or not li-

19 ability exists on such claim.

20

(2) {a}

The insurance authorized by subsection (1) of

21 this section may be provided by:
22

(b)

Self-insurance, which may be funded by appropria-

23 tions to establish or maintain reserves for self-insurance
24

25

purposes;
(c)

An insurance company authorized to do business in

26

this state and deemed by the state purchasing agent, or the

27

appropriate governing body of the governmental subdivision, to

28 be responsible and financially sound considering the extent of
29
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1 the coverage required;
2

(d)

A combination of the methods of obtaining insurance

3 authorized in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection.

(3)

4

A public entity, other than th$ state, may establish

5 and maintain an insurance reserve fund for self-insurance. pur6 poses. and may include in the annual tax levy of the public
7. entity such amounts as are determined by its governing body to
8 be necessary for the uses and purposes of the insurance re9 serve fund, not to exceed ten mills.

In the event that a pub-

10 lie entity has no annual tax levy, it may appropriate from any
11 unexpended balance in the general fund such amounts as the
12 governing body shall deem necessary for the purposes and uses
13 of the insurance reserve fund.

The fund established pursuant

14 to this subsection (3) shall be kept separate and apart from

15 all other funds, and shall be used only for the payment of
16 claims against the public entity which have been settled or
17 compromised or j~dgments rendered against the public entity
18 for injury under the provisions of this act.
19

SECTION 16.

State required to obtain insurance.

(1) (a)

20 The state shall obtain insurance to:
21

(b)

Insure itself against all or any part of any liabil-

22 ity for an injury for which it might be liable under this act;
23

(c)

Insure any of its public employees acting within

24 the scope of their employment against all or any part of his
25 liability for injury for which he might be liable under this
26

27

act;
(d)

Insure against the expense of defending a claim

28 against the state or its public employees, whether liability
29
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1 exists on such claim.
2

(2) (a)

The insurance required under subsection (1) of

3 this section may be provided by:
4

(b)

Self-insurance, which may be funded by appropria-

5 tions to establish or maintain reserves for self-insurance
6 purposes;
7

(c)

An insurance company authorized to do business in

8 this state and deemed by the state purchasing agent, or the ap9 propriate governing body of the governmental subdivision, to
10 be responsible and financially sound considering the extent of
11 the coverage required;
12

(d)

A combination of the methods of obtaining insurance

13 .authorized in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection.
14

SECTION 17.

Execution and attachment not to issue.

15 Neither execution nor attachment shall issue against a public
16 entity in any action or proceeding initiated under the provi17

sions of this acte

18
19

SECTION 18.

is REPEALD AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read:

20

3-3-1.

21

(18)

22

state;

23
24
25

3-3-1 (18), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963,

Division of accounts and control - controller.

To issue warrants for the payment of claims against the

SECTION 19.

24··4-2 and 24-4-3, Colorado Revised Statutes

1963, are amended to read:
24-4-2.

Evacuation drill - district liability.

In the

26 event that said school district and the respective local civil
27

defense agency or authorities desire to perform an evacuation

28

drill for any or all school buildings, the board of education

29
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1 of said school district and its officers, employees and agents
2 participating therein shall be relieved of all liability, EX3 CEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY THE "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IM4

MUNITY-ACT", with regard to the accidental injury of any pupil

5 during $Chool hours from the time that the pupil leaves the

6 school building until his return to the building at the conclu7 sion of the evacuation drill.
8

24-4-3.,

Buses used ..

For drill or other evacuation pur-

9 poses as described in this article, buses and such other modes
10 of transport as are operated by the respective_ school district

11 for the transportation of pupils may be operated by the dis,

12 trict outside the boundaries of the district.

w!the~t-liahil-

13 ity 1 -Retwith~taA~iAg-aRy-ether-etat~te-te-the-eeAtraryT

SECTION 20.

14

29-6-4 (l),·Colorado Revised Statutes 1963,

15 is amended to read:
16

29-6-4.

Remedy for injury by a district.

(1)

In case

17 any person or public corporation, within or without any dis18 trict organized under this chapter, may be inj~riously affected
19 with respect to property rights in any manner whatsoever by
20 any act performed by any official or agent of such district,
21 or by the execution, maintenance or operation of the official
22 plan, and EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE "COLORADO GOVERN23 MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", AND in case no other method of relief is
24 offered under this chapter, the remedy shall be as follows:
SECTION

25

21.

36-2-4 (1) and 36-2-10 (1), Colorado Revised

26 Statutes 1963, are amended to read:
36-2-4.

27
28

(1)

Judgment against a county, how paid - tax levy.

When a judgment shall be given and rendered against a

29
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l

county of this state in the name of its board of county com-

2 missioners, or against any county officer 0 in an action prose3

cuted by or against him in his official capacity, or name of

4 office, when the judgment is for money, and is a lawful county
5

charge, no execution shall issue thereon, but the same may be

6 paid by the levy of a tax upon the taxable property of said
7 county~ and when the tax shall be collected by the county
8 treasurer, it shall be paid over, as fast as collected by him,
9 to the judgment creditor, or his or her assigns, upon the ex10 ecution and delivery of proper voucher therefor; but nothing
11

contained in this section shall operate to prevent the county

12 commissioners from paying $~l-er-aAy-~a~t-ef any such judgment
13

by a warrant 0 drawn by them upon the ordinary county fund in

14 the county treasury. ~revisedt-that-the

THE power hereby con-

15

ferred to pay such judgment by a special levy of such tax,

16

shall be h~ld to be in addition to the taxing power given and

17

granted to such board, to levy taxes for other county purposes.

18 h~t-the THE board of county commissioners shall levy under this
19

law eRly such taxes as they-iR-their-dieeretieR-may-~eem-eK,e-

20

aieA~-e~-Aeeessary1-aR~-aii-taKee-leviee-hy-a~therity-ef-this

21

eeetieA-shall-Ret-eKeeee~eAe-aRa-eRehaif-~er-eeAt~m-eft-the-aei-

22

ler-ei-aeeeseee-~re~erty-ier-eAy-eAe-fiseai-year1-and,-previeedT

23

i~r~herv-that-the-~ewers-hereiR-fiveA-te-the-eeare-ef-ee~ftty

24

eemMissieAere-shall-Aet-ee-eeRstrHes-as-re~~iriRg-saie-heare-te

25

levy-aRy-e~eeiai-taK-te-~ay-aAy-;~dgmeRt-~ftiess-ift-its-disere-

26 tieR-tke-eaia-hea~a-shail-ee-aeterM!fte~

SHALL BE SUFFICIENT TO

27

DISCHARGE SUCH JUDGMENT IN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR; BUT IN NO

28

EVENT SHALL SUCH LEVY EXCEED TEN MILLS, EXCLUSIVE OF MILL LEVIES

29
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l

FOR OTHER COUNTY PURPOSES.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

2 SHALL CONTINUE TO LEVY SUCH TAXESP NOT TO EXCEED TEN MILLS,
3 EXCWSIVE OF MILL LEVIES FOR OTHER COUNTY PURPOSES, BUT IN NO
4 EVENT LESS THAN TEN MILLS IF SUCH JUDGMENT WILL NOT BE DIS-

5 CHARGED BY A LESSER LEVY, UNTIL SUCH JUDGMENT IS DISCHARGED.

.£!aim& presented to board, when - how paid.

6

36-2-10.

7 (1)

Ail-elaimo-aR~-demaRas ANY CLAIM OR DEMAND held by any

8 person against a county shall MAY be presented for audit and
9 allowance to the board of county commissioners of the proper
10 county, in due form of law, hef8~e-aA-aetieR-iR-aRy-ee~~t-ehall

11 he-maiRtaiRahie-the~eeRy and all claims, when allowed, shall be
12 paid by a county warrant, or order, drawn by said b~ard on the
13 county· treasury, upon the proper fund in the treasury, for the

14 amount of such claim.

Such warrant or order shall be signed

15 by the chairman of the board, permanent or temporary, attested

16 by the county clerk, and when presented to the county treasurer
17 for registry, be countersigned by him; said warrant or order

18 shall specify the amount and value of the claim or service for

19 which it is issued, and be numbered and dated in the order in
20 which it is issued.
21

SECTION 22.

72-16-4 (1) (b) and (c), Colorado Revised

22 Statutes 1963, are REPEALED AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to
23 read:

24

72-16-4.

Amount

of

coverage - limitations.

(1) (b)

For

25 any bodily injury and property damage to one person in any

26 single occurrence, the sum of $100,000.00;
27

(c)

For any bodily injury and property damage to two or

28 more persons in any single occurrence, the sume of $3,000,000.00.
29
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l

77-10-1 (1) and (2), Colorado Revised Stat-

SECTION 23.

2 utes 1963, are amended to read:

3

77-10-1.

4 procedure.

(1)

Levy to pay judgment against municipality When a judgment for the payment of money shall

5 be given and rendered against any municipal or quasi-municipal
6 corporation of the state, or against any officer thereof in an
7 action prosecuted by or against him in his official capacity
8 or name of office. such judgment being an obligation of such
9 municipality, and when by reason of vacancy in office or for
10 any other cause the duly constituted tax assessing and collect11 ing officers fail or neglect to provide for the payment of such
12 judgment or fail to make a tax levy to pay such judgment, the
13 judgment creditor may file a transcript of such judgment with
14 the board of county commissioners of the county and counties
15 if more than one, in which such public corporation is situated.
16 Thereupon the county commissioners shall levy a tax AS PROVIDED

17 IN SUBSECTION (2) OF THIS SECTION upon all the taxable property
18 within the limits of such public corporation for the purpose
19 of making provision for the payment of such judgment. eaeh-year
20 after-the-fiiiA~-ei-s~eh-traAseri~t-~Atii-s~eh-~~S~ffleAt-is

21 i~liy-~aie 1 which tax shall be collected by the county treasur22 er and when collected by the county treasurer, it shall be paid
23 over, as fast as collected, by him, to the judgment creditor,
24 or his assigns, upon the execution and delivery of proper
25 vouchers therefor.
26

(2)

The power hereby conferred to pay such judgment by

27 special levy of such tax, shall be held to be in addition to
28 the taxing power given and granted to such public corporation
29
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l

to levy for other purposes.

The board of county commissioners

2 shall levy under this $8Ction eAiy such taxes as they-!A-thei~
3 Eliee!!'et4.eA-May-aeem- eMf}e<44.eftt-aRel-Ree esee F'f-: - -All-t,u<es--levieel

4 ey-the-autherity-ef-this-seetieA-~hall-Aet-eweees-th~ee-~e~
5

eeRt-eA-the-aei!eF.-ef-eseeseea-,re~erty-iA-s~eh-~~eiie-ee~,e~a-

6 tiens-fe~-aRy-eAe-fiseai-yea~~ SHALL BE SUFFICIENT TO DISCHARGE
7. SUCH JUDQAENT IN THE NEXT

FISCAL YEAR; BUT IN NO EVENT SHALL

8

SUCH LEVY EXCEED TEN MILLS, EXCLUSIVE OF MILL LEVIES FOR OTHER

9

PURPOSES..

THE BOARD OF COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS

10 LEVY SUCH TAXES, NOT TO EXCEED TEN MILLS,

11

SHALL CONTINUE TO

EXCLUSIVE OF fv\ILL

LEVIES FOR OTHER PURPOSES, BUT IN NO EVENT LESS THAN TEN MILLS

12 IF SUCH JUDGMENT WILL NOT BE DISCHARGED BY A LESSER LEVY, UN13 TIL SUCH JUDGMENT IS DISCHARGED.
14
15
16

SECTION 24.

89-1-25 (1), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963,

is amended to read:
89··1-25.

.Claims - payment - registry of warrants.

(1)

17

EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF

18

THE "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL

IMMUNITY ACT", no.claims shall be

19 ,paid by the district treasurer until the same shall have been

20 allowed by the board and only upon warrants signed by the

21 president, and countersigned by the secretary, which warrants
22 shall state the date authorized by the board and for what
23

purposes.

If the district treasurer has not sufficient money

24

on hand to pay such warrant when it is presented for payment,

25 he shall endorse thereon:

"Not paid for want of funds; this

26 warrant draws interest from date at six per cent per annum",
27

and endorse thereon the date so presented over his signature.

28

From the time of such presentation until paid such warrant

29
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l

shall draw interest at the rate of six per cent per annum.

2 When there is the sum of one hundred dollars or more in the
3 hands of the treasurer it shall be applied upon such warrant.
4

SECTION 25.

89-14-5 (4), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963,

5 is amended to read:
6

89-14-5.

General power- of board.

(4)

To sue and be

7

sued in its corporate nameo previ9ee 1 -that-this-~revi9ien-ehaii

8

Ret-he-eeAetr~ee-te-ee-a-waive~;-eM,rees-er-im~liea;-er-aAy-im-

9

m~Aity-ireffl-$~it-whieh-the-distriet-may-~eseese-hy-virt~e-ef

10 its-heiA~-aA-iAstr~meAtality~-er-~eiitieal-e~esivisieA-ef-the
11

12

state-ei-Sele~aaet

SECTION 26.

89-15-6 (4), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963,

13 is amended to read:
14

15

89-15-6.

Powers of the district.

(4)

To sue and to be

sued. aA8-he-a-~e~ty-te-s~its 7 -aetieAs-ene-~reeeedift~;-te-eeM-

16 meRee,-MaiAtaiR1-iAterveRe-iA 1 -eefeA~i-eem~remise1-terffliAate

17 ey-eettlemeRt-er-etherwise;-eAe-etherwise-~artiei~ete-iA;-eAe
18 te-eseHme-the-eest-aAe-eK~eRse-ef;-aAy-aAe-ali-aetieAs-eRe
19 ~reeeediA~e-new-er-he~eefte~-ee~HA-aRa-e~~ertaiAiA~-te-the-ais20

triet;-its-eea~e,-its-effieers 1 -e~eAte-e~-em~leyeee;-er-aAy-ef

21

the-eist~ietJs-~ewe~s 1 -~~iviie~es 1 ~imm~Aities;-ri~hts1-liahii-

22

ities;-Ae-ri~hte;-eisahilities-aAe-eHties;-er-eRy-sewe~e-ais-

23 ,esai-eystem,-ether-~~e~erty-ef-the-aist~iet-er-aRy-,re~eetT

24

SECTION 27.

25

amended to read:

26

99-2-9.

99-2-9, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

Liability of requesting jurisdiction.

During the

27

time that a policeman, deputy sheriff, or fireman of a town,

28

city, city and county, county, or fire protection district is

29
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l assigned to temporary duty within the jurisdiction of another
2 town, city, city and county, county. or fire protection dis-

3 trict, as provided in sections 99-2-4 to 99-2-8, any liability
4 whi.ch may accrue under the operation of

the doctrine of :r-e-

5 spondeat superior on acc6unt of the negligent or otherwise
6- tortious act of any sue~ police officer, deputy sheriff, or
7 fireman while performing such duty shall be imposed upon the
8

requesting town,. city, city and county, county, or fire protec-

9 tion district and not upon the assigning jurisdiction. ~re-

10 vieee;-that-RethiA§-eeAtaiRes-iR-thie-seetieA-ehall-ee-eeR11 st~~ed-te-impes~~aAy-llahility-~~eR-aRy-s~eh-~e~~eetlA~-~~rle-

12 aietieA-Aer-te-waive-er-aiieet-in-aAy-wey-the-eeetriAe-ef
13 severei~R-imm~Aity-with-res~eet-te-eAy-e~eh-;Yrls~ietieAT
14

SECTION 28.

105-7-27, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

15 amended to read:
16

105-7-27.

Escape - duty of sheriff - expenses~ · In case

17 of escape of any person lawfully committed to any jail of any
18 county in this state, it shall be the duty of the sheriff of
19 the county where such jail is situated, to pursue and recap20 ture such e_scaped person at his own expense •. NetRiR~-eeRiaiRea
21

lR-thia-eee~ien-s~all-he-~eRst~Yed-te-make-the-eeYRty~whe~eiR

22

sYeh-~ail-is-eit~ate~-liahle-ier-e~-eR-aeeeYR~-ei-the-esea~e

23

ei-aRy-~~iseAe~-eeMmitted-le-sYeh-~ali-freffl•&Aether-ee~nty,-er

24

by-a~the~ity-ei-the-YAited-States;-er-fer-the-esea~e-ei-aAy

25

f~~itive-frem-;~stiee~

26

negligence on the part of the keeper of the jail, or the guards

27

under his command, the county commissioners of the county where

28

such jail is situated may audit and allow to the sheriff the

In case of any escape without fault or

29

xlvi

l necessary expenses incurred in such recapture, if they deem it
2 best.

3

SECTION 29.

120-7-13, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

4 amended to read:

120-7-13.

5
6 men_i.

Obligation of state and state highway depart-

Ne-liahility-shall-attaeh 1 -either-te-~he-etate 7 -the-ee-

7

,artment-ef-hi~kway9-er-the-iAdlvi~Mai-memhers-ef-eaid-ae~art-

8

MeAt-ef-hi~hweys-ey-virtYe-ef-the-eeRstr~etieAy-reeeRetrYetieA1

9 maiRteAaAee,-im~revemeftt-e~-e~e~etieA-er-aAy-t~rA~!ke-er-s,ee~-

10 way-a~theriees-te-ee-eeA~tr~eted-~Aaer-thie-ertiele 7 -ether-thaA
11

IT SHALL

BE

the obligation of the state and the STATE depart-

12 ment of highways to apply the net income derived from the oper13 ation of any turnpike or speedway project to the payment of the

14 bonds authorized to be issued under this article in accordance
15 with the resolution of the STATE department of highways author16 izing their issuance.
17

SECTION 30.

124-2-17.

Claims against university.

EXCEPT

18 WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE
19 "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", the board of regents
20 shall audit all claims against the university, and the presi-

21 dent shall draw all warrants upon the treasurer for approved
22 claims; but before payment such warrants shall be countersigned
23 by the secretary, who shall keep a specific and complete record
24 of all matters involving the expenditure of money, which record

25 shall be submitted to the board of regents at each regular

26 meeting of the same.
27

SECTION 31.

130-10-1 and 130-10-5 (1) (a), Colorado Re-

28 vised Statutes 1963 (1965 Supp.), are amended to read:
29
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1

130-10-1.

J&qi9lative declaration.

This article shall

2 not be construed as a waiver er-rern,ai.atieA of the doctrine of
3 sovereign immunity, fi!1ft¼y-eGtahiishe~-ift•the-iaw-ef-thl9-~ttr4 ieaietlen,-hy-the-etateMef-Gele~e~e 1 -er-afty-~tate-ageftey 1 -er

5 eny-ef-ite·-~~iitlea:1-sttbc44.vieieAs, but is enacted to establish

6 an orderly and expeditious procedure to aid the general assem-

7 bly in th~ consideration and evaluation of THOSE tort claims
8 against the state WHEREIN THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
9 HAS NOT BEEN WAIVED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COLORADO GOVERN-

10 MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", AND seme-ef which the state should in

11 equity and good conscience assume and pay.

No liability for

12 any claim shall be imposed upon the state or any state agency
13 by a determination of the Colorado claims commission under the
14 provisions of this article unless the general assembly shall

15 have enacted legislation making a specific appropriation for
16 the payment of such claim.
17

130-10-5.

Petition for claim.

(l) {a)

Any person wish-

18 ing to present a claim against the state UNDER THE PROVISIONS
19 OF THIS ARTICLE shall file such claim with the chairman of the
20 commission in the form of a petition, in triplicate, contain21 ing the following information:
22

SECTION 32.

139-35-1 (1), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963,

23 is amended to read:

24

139-35-1.

Action - notice of injury.

(1)

No action for·

25 the recovery of compensation for personal injury or death

26 against any city of the first or second class or any town, on
27 account of its negligence, shall be maintained unless written
28 notice of the time, place and cause of injury is given to the
29

xlvili

l clerk of the city, or recorder of the town, by the person in2 jured, or his agent or attorney, within niftety-eay$ SIX MONTHS
3

and the action is commenced within two years from the eee~~-

4 ~eftee-ei-the-ae6i«eAt-eaYeiA!-the-iA~1t~y-·e~-~eatRir ACCRUAL
5

SUCH ACTION.

6 DATE THAT

AN ACTION SHALL

BE

CONSIDERED TO ACCRUE ON

OF

THE

THE INJURY OR DEATH IS KNOWN OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN

7 KNOWN BY THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE.
8

SECTION 33.

150-1-25, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

9 amended to read:
10

150-1~.. 25.

Claims - audit - payment - financial report.

11 EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE
12 "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", no claims shall be paid
13 by the district treasurer until the same shall have been al14 lowed by the board, and only upon warrants signed by the presi15 dent, and countersigned by the secretary, which warrants shall

16 state the date authorized by the board and for what purpose.
17 If the district treasurer has not sufficient money on hand to
18 pay such warrant when it is presented for payment, he shall
19 endorse thereon "not paid for want of funds, this warrant draws
20 interest from date at six per cent per annum," and endorse
21 thereon the date when so presented, over his signature, and
22 from the time of such presentation until paid such warrant shall
23 draw interest at the rate of six per cent per annum; provided,
24 when there is more than the sum of one hundred dollars or more

25 in the hands of the treasurer it shall be applied upon said
26 warranto

All claims against the district shall be verified

27 the same as required in the case of claims filed against coun28 ties in this state, and the secretary of the district is hereby
29

xlix

l authorized and empowered to administer oaths to the parties
2 verifying said claimst 'the same as the county clerk or notary

3 public might do.

The district treasurer shall keep a register

4 in which he shall enter each warrant presented for payment,
5 showing the date and amount of such warrant, to whom payable.

6 the date of the presentation for payment, the date of payment,

7 and the amount paid in redemption thereof, and all warrants
8

shall be paid in the order of their presentation for payment

9 to the district- treasurer.

All warrants shall be drawn payable

10 to the claimant or bearer, the same as county warrants.

SECTION 34n

11

150-2-29, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

12 amended to read:
· 13

150-2-29.

Warrants - interest - call.

EXCEPT WITH RE-

14 SPECT TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COLORADO

15 GOVERNMENTAL !~UNITY ACT", no warrants shall be issued except

16 upon a verified claim first audited and allowed by the board,
17 and each warrant shall be signed by the president and counter18

signed by the secretary with the district seal thereto affixed;

19 and if the district treasurer shall have insufficient money in
20 the general fund to pay any warrant when presented for payment,

21 he shall enter such warrant, with its number, amount, date,
22

and the name and address of holder, in a register kept for that

23 purpose, and shall indorse upon said warrant, •presented and
24

not paid for want of funds" with the date of presentation.

25 Such warrant shall draw interest at the rate of seven per cent

26 per annum from such date of prese~tation until called for pay27 ment.
28

~hen money sufficient to pay such warrant, or suffici-

ent to allow a credit of not less than one hundred dollars

29
1

l thereon shall be in the general fund, such treasurer shall
2 mail notice thereof to the holder of record at his address of
3 record, and interest thereon shall thereupon cease.

Warrants

4 shall be paid in the order of their presentation for payment.
5

SECTION 35.

150-4-37, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

6 amended to read:
7

l50-4-37e

Claims - audit - payment.

EXCEPT WITH RESPECT

8 TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COLORADO GOVERN-

9 MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 0 , no claim shall be paid by the district
10 treasurer until the same shall be allowed by the board, and
11 only upon warrants signed by the president and countersigned
12 by the secretary, which warrants shall state the date author13 ized by the board and for what purposes·.

If the district

14 treasurer has not sufficient money on hand to pay such warrant
15 when it is presented for payment he shall endorse thereon "Not
16 paid for w~nt of funds, this warrant draws interest from date
I.
h
17 at six
per cent per annum," and endorse thereon the date wen

18

so presented over his signature and from the time of such pre-

19

sentation such warrant shall draw interest at the rate of six

20

per cent per annum.

21

verified the same as required in the case of claims filed

22

against counties in this state, and th~ secretary of the dis-

23

trict is hereby authorized and empowered to administer oaths

24

to the parties verifying the said claims, the same as the coun-

25

ty clerk or notary public might do.

26

shall keep a register in which he shall enter said warrants

27

presented for payment, showing the date and amount of such war-

28

rants, to whom payable, the date of presentation for payment,

All claims against the district shall be

29
li

The district treasurer

l the date of payment, and the amount paid in redemption thereof,
2 and all warrants shall be paid in their order of presentation
3 for payment to the district treasurer.
4

5

All warrants shall be

drawn payable to bearer the same as county warrants.
SECTION 36.

Repeal.

Article 10 of chapter 13, 24-4-4 (2),

6 72-16-5, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, and 123-30-11, Colo7 rado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965), are repealed.
8

SECTION 37.

Effective date.

This-act shall take effect

Safety clau§e.

The general assembly hereby

9 on July 1, 1969.
10

SECTION 38.

11 finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for
12 the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and

13 safety.
14
15

16
17
18

19
20

21
22

23
24

25

26
27
28

29
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INTRODUCTION
What Is The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity?
The legal doctrine of soverei!n immunity. For various reasons of policy there have traditiona ly been a number of classes of
defendants upon whom the law has ctinferred immunity from liability
to a greater or lesser extent. Perhaps the most important and significant class of defendants upon whom the law has conferred immunity is government.l The legal doctrine of sovereign immunity
thus expresses the idea that government is immune from liability
for injury or damage resulting from governmental activities unless
it consents to such liability.2
Application of doctrine to all governmental entities. The
sovereign immunity rule has been applied not only to the federal

1.

"The immunity avoids liability under all circumstances, within
the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or
position of the government; it does not deny the grounds for
suit or cause of action, but only the resulting liability.
Such immunity does not mean that conduct which would amount to
a cause of action on the part of other defendants is not still
equally a cause of action in character, but merely that for
the protection of the government it is given absolution from
liability." Prosser, Torts,- 996 (1964).

2.

Much has been written, most of it critical, on sovereign immunity. The classic study is Borchard, Government Liability
in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25) and Government Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27}.
Other significant articles include: Blachly· and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 181, 182-84 (1942); Fuller and
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
437 (1941); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4
Ill. L. Q. 28 (1921); Jaffe Suits Against Governments and Officers, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1963); Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363 (1945); Price ·
and Smith, Municipal Tort Liability; A Continuing Enigma, 6 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 330 (1953); Repko, American Legal Commentary on
,
the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41
(1949); Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort,
19 Va. L. Rev. 97 (1932).

government and its agencies3 but also to the states,4 counties,5
municipalities,6 and other local governments and specialized governmental agencies, such as school districts and special taxing
districts.?

3.

Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 4, 5 (1924).
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b) and
related sections), the immunity of the federal government w~s
abrogated (with certain statutory exception~) in tort actions
for injuries caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any government employee acting within the scope of his
employment or office. See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753,
title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).

4.

Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1363 (1945), which briefly summarizes the highlights of
each state. For Colorado cases see: In re Constitutionality
of Substitute for Senate Bill No. 83, 21 Colo. 69, 39 Pac. 1088
(1895); State v. Colo. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 104 Colo.
436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939); Mitchell v. Board of Commissioners of
Morgan County, 112 Colo. 582, 152 P.2d 601 (1944); State v.
Griffith's Estate, 130 Colo. 312, ·275 P.2d 945 (1954); People
ex rel Kimball v. Crystal River Corp., 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d
429 (1955); Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609 (1960);
Berger. v. Dept. of Highways, 143 Colo. 246, _353 P.2d 612 (1960);
a.nd State v. Morison 148 Colo. 79, 365 P.2d 266 (1961). 81
C.J.S. States§ 130 1\1953).

5.

20 C.J.S. Counties§§ 215-221 {1940). County not liable for
torts in absence of statute. Board of Commissioners of El Paso
County v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 Pac. 184 (1893); Town of Fairla v. Board of Commissioners of Park Count, 29 Colo. 57, 67
ac. 5
901 ; M & M Oil Transp., Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners for Routt County, 143 Colo. 309, 353 P.2d 613 (1960).
County not liable for negligence of agents.or employees in absence of statute. Board of Commissioners of Pitkin County v.
Ball, 22 Colo. 125, 43 Pac .. 1000, 55 Am. St.• Rep. ·117 {1896);
Board of Commissioners of Lo· an Count v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290,
94 ac. 6 , 20 • . R. 5 2
920 ; Richardson v. Belknap, 73
Colo. 52, 213 Pac. 335 (1923); Liber v. Flor, l43 Colo. 205,
353 P.2d 590 (1960).

6.

See City of Hazard v. Duff, 287 Ky. 427, 154 S.W.2d 28 (1941);
Merrill v. City of Wheaton, 379 Ill~ 504, 41 N.E.2d 508 (1942);
City of Harlan v. Peareley, 224 Ky. 338, 6 S.W.2d 270 (1928);
Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265
(1957); Greenwood v. City of Lincoln, 156 Neb. 142, 55 N.W.2d
343 (1952); City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1,
351 P.2d 826 {1960).
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The. immunity rule was applied to the state of Colorado as
early as 1895 in the case of In re Constitutionality of Substitute
for Senate Bill No. 83, wherein the Colorado Supreme Court declared
that the state could not be sued, by saying:
We recognize the doctrine that, without
constitutional or legislative authority, the
state in its sovereign capacity cannot be
sued~ No such authority exists in this state.
This being so, no liability upon contract or
tort, if any, can be enforced against the
state in any of its courts.8
Local governmental entities have been extended the state's
sovereign immunity. Although local entities of government are, in
a sense, agencies of local self government, to a certain degree
they are also integral parts of state government, existing to administer state policies and programs. A state normally conducts
most of its government through its local governmental entities
over which, in the absence of constitutional provision stipulating
otherwise, it has control. Local entities are thus usually considered to be agencies of the state, deriving not only their existence and all their powers from the state, but also their immunity.9
Counties, in Colorado, have been traditionally thought of
as political subdivisions of the state for the purpose of carrying
on some of the "governmental" functions of the state. This traditional concept of county government, however, has changed somewhat over the years, and a county is now considered by many to be
a separate unit of local government.10 Thus the county has a dual

7.

See School Dist. No. 1 in Cit & Count of Denver v. Kenne ,
77 Coo. 429, 236 Pac. 10 2 1925; Newt O son Lumber Co. v.
School Dist. No. 8 in Jefferson Count, 83 Colo. 272, 263
ac. 7 3 19 8 ; School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver Pressed Brick
Co., 91 Colo. 288, 14 P.2d 487 (1932); School Dist. No. 1 in
GIT & Count of Denver v. Faker, 106 Colo. 356, 105 P.2d 406
1940 ; Tesone v. Schoo Dist. No. Re-2 in Boulder Count,
152 Colo. 59, 84 . d 8
9

8.

21 Colo. 69, 39 Pac. 1088 (1895).

9.

See Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812); Fuller and Casner,
supra note 2, at 438.

10.

See Governor's Local Affairs Study Commission, Local Government in Colorado: Findings and Recommendations,4 (1966); citing John C. Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, 16
(Denver: Sage Books, 1959).
-3-

character. In a legal sense it is a subdivision of the state and
acts as part of the state government performing functions on behalf of the state; but it is also a unit of local self government
and is declared by statute to be a "body corporate. 11 11
Theoretically, as arms of the state, counties are entitled
to the same immunity from suit as the state, but there are various
statutes (such as 36-1-1, C.R.S .. 1963 providing that each county
shall be empowered to sue and be suedf which might seem to abolish
county immunity. However, even though county immunity from suit
may be abolished by statute, county immunity from tort liability
is far from abolished in the eres of the court and counties are
held to be immune when acting n a. governmental capacity.12
Municipal bodies are also regarded as having a. dual character in Colorado. On the one hand they are subdivisions of the
state, endowed with governmental powers and charged with governmental functions and responsibilities. On the other hand they are
corporate bodies, capable of much the same acts as private corporations. Thus a municipality is at one and the same time a corporate entity and a government.13
The courts have attempted to distinguish between the two
functions by holding that insofar as they represent the state, in
their "governmental" or "public" capacity! the municipalities share
the state's immunity frorn- tort liability. 4 The factor which determines the liability or nonliability of a muni-cipality in cases
of this nature is the character of the duty performed, rather than

ll.

36-1-1, C.R.S. 1963.

12.

County Commissioners v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 Pac. 184 (1893).

13.

See Governor's Local Affairs Study Commission, Local Government In Colorado: Findings and Recommendations, 23-24 (1966),
citing Dillon, Municipal Corporations, sec. 237 (1911).; and .
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 10.03.12 (1949}.

14.

See City of Golden v~ Western Lumber & Pole Co., ·60 Colo. 382,
154 Pacd 95 (1916); Schwalk v. Connele· 116 Colo. 195, 179
P.2d 667 (1947); Cit~ of Sterlina v. ommercial Sav. Bank of
Sterlin§, 116 Colo.69, l8l P.2 361 (1947); Malvernia Inv.
Co. v. ity of Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951);
Cit! & County of Denver v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P .2d
110 (1957); Walker v. Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 649
(1955); Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d
110 (1942); Slomer v. City of Grand Junction, 144 Colo. 207,
355 P.2d 960 1960); City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142
Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960).
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the department, officer or agent of the municipality by whom the
duty is performed.
In the case of other political subdivisions, such as school
districts and special districts, the distinction between "gover~mental" and "proprietary" functions is likewise applicable. For
example, in School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver Pressed Brick Co., the
court held that, 11 a school di strict, • • • is an involuntary corporation created by the state in furtherance of its plan of public
and free education. It is a subdivision of the state, required by
statute to function as an instrument of g6vernment, and like a·
county, in the absence of express enactment to that end, is no more
liable for the omissions of its officers than the State. 11 15 On the
other hand, the court in Cerise v. Fruitvale Water & Sanitation
Districtl6 held that the district's operation of a sewer system involved activities carried on by the district in its proprietary
capacity, and thus the district was not immune from liability.
Limitation of doctrine to tort actions. In most jurisdictions the effect of the immunity rule has been limited, by statute
and/or judicial decision,17 to tort claims against governmental
entities; suits arising out of contract are usually permitted. A
"tort" is a civil, as opposed to a criminal, wrong arising from an
act other than a breach of contract and usually involves injury to
persons or damage to property.18
_
In Colorado, whatever immunity existed as to breach of contract actions against the state was judicially abolished in Ace

15.

91 Colo. 288, 14 P.2d 487 (1932).

16.

153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462 (1963).

17.

"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as
to any contractual obligation. 11 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5
(Supp. 1965); and see McCarthy v. State, 1 Utah 2d 205, 265
P.2d 387 (1953); Campbell v. Pack, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d
464 (1964) (dictum).

180

"Tort is a term applied to a miscellaneous and more or less
unconnected group of civil wrongs other than breach of contract for which a court of law will afford a remedy in the
form of action for damages. The law of torts is concerned
with the compensation of losses suffered by private individuals in their legally protected interests, through conduct
of others which is regarded as socially unreasonable." Prosser, Torts, 1 (1964).
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Service Inc. v. Colo. De t. of A riculture.19 This approach has a so een app ied to suits against ocal governments
for breach of contract, with the result that both the state and
local governments are no longer immune to contract actions.20
Thus the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be invoked by any
governmental unit as a defense to any contract action, regardless
of the type of function involved.
Governmental ro rietar distinction. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity, w th respect to loca governmental entities,
is not a hard and fast rule and it is clear that there is no absolute immunity from liability. The development of the law has
been in the nature of a series of inroads creating areas in which
local governments can be held liable for their negligent acts and
tortious conduct. The principal limitation and first inroad to
be made on the immunity doctrine was the court's attempt to distinguish between the "governmental" and "proprietary" acts of the
governing entity.21
Under the governmental-proprietary dichotomy, the first
relevant determination in the case of negligence by a local entity
is a characterization as to the nature of the fundamental exercise
which gives rise to th~ to~t. In effect, this determination resolves the question of whether immunity exists, or conversely,
whether liability is possible. Under this basic test, immunity
is accorded where the function is governmental and liability is

19.

136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).

20.

Spaur v. City of Greeley, 150 Colo. 346, 372 P~2d 730 (1962).

21.

See Antieau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities,
40 Ky. L.J. 131 (1952); Barnett, The Foundation of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions, 16 Ore. L. Rev.
250 (1937); Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1941); Smith, Municipal Tort
Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41 ( 1949). "Apparently the purpose has been to confine the protection afforded to only those
activities which have traditionally been considered 'necessary'
to government, and to exclude from coverage those activities
which are merely conveniently carried on by government instead
of by private enterprise. This nineteenth century dichotomy
was the judicial compromise struck between complete protection
of public funds and complete protection of individuals tortiously injured by government agents. Both the basis of the
distinction and its application which has been difficult and
artificial, have widely been regarded as less than satisfactory." Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of
Municipal Tort Liability, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942).
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imposed where it is proprietary. No tort liability attaches with
respect to the exercise of governmental functions because the
city performs such functions under powers delegat~d by the state
and under the same immunity enjoyed by the state. 2 On the other
hand, in the exercise of proprietary functions or the performance
of acts for the benefit of the corporation, a city stands on the
same footing as any private corporation as to its liability for
torts.23

22.

In addition to the cases cited in note 6 see Ramirez v. City
of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710, 42 A.L.R. 245 (1925);
Densmore v. Bermingham, 223 Ala. 210, 135 So. 320 (1931);
Lambert v. New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A.2d 923 (1943); Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 195 Atl. 571 (1937). For cororado cases see City & County of Denver v. Talarico, 99 Colo.
178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936), determining policy and character of
construction work to be done under legislative authority to
improve river channel; Malverina Inv. Co. v. City of Trinidad,
123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951) and City & County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931), adoption of
drainage system; Walker v. Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d
649 (1955), barricading street because it constituted hazard
and enforcement of ordinance in nature of police regulation
governing use of streets; Barker v. City & County of Denver,
113 Colo. 543, 160 P.2d 363 (1945), activities of fire department; Atkinson v. Cit & Count of Denver, 118 Colo. 322,
195 P.2d 977 1948 , abatement of nuisance pursuant to ordinance; Schwalk v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947)
and City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d
826 {1960), operation of hospital; Addinyton v. Town of Littleton, 50 Colo. 623, .115 Pac. 896 (1911 , failure to enact
or enforce ordinances or regulations; McIntosh v. City & County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936); police protection activities; City t County of Denver v. Maurer, 47
Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875 (1910), public health activities.

23.

One of the leading cases holding municipal corporations liable
when performing proprietary functions is Bailey v. Mayor of
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). See Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959);
Hooton v. Burley, 70 Idaho 369, 219 P.2d 651 (1951); Perry v.
Wichita, 174 Kan. 264, 255 P.2d 667 (1953); Bishop v. Meridan,
223 Miss. 703, 79 So.2d 221 (1955l; Grimesland v. Washington,
234 N.C. 117, 66 S.E.2d 794 (1951 ; Mitchell v. Meriden, 3
Conn. Cir. 498, 217 A.2d 487 (1965); Moloney v. Columbus, 2
Ohio St.2d 213, 208 N.E.2d 141 {1965); Lane v. Tulsa, (Okla.)
402 P.2d 908 (1965). See Repko, supra note 21, at 221;
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 53.23 (3rd ed. 1963).
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In the court's attempt to distinguish between these two
functions, no precise definition or satisfactory criteria has been
formulated to determine into which category a particular tort will
fall.24 Most jurisdictions have, however, set up some rather
vague general guidelines. It is generally thought that a governmental function is one vested for the administration of the general laws of the state. Another interpretation is that an activity
is governmental if it benefits society as ·a whole and cannot be
done by other segments of society.25 Under this test, an inquiry
is made to determine whether the entity was acting as the agent
of the state in furthering the state policy, or whether it was
acting primarily on behalf of the citizens of the community. Usually, activities in the area of fire protection, law enforcement,
education, health and general government, are governmental.26
Proprietary functions are usually thou9.ht of as those which
are carried out in a corporate or private capacity. Other tests
of a proprietary activity are whether it could be done in competition with a private activity, whether it is operated for profit,
or whether benefit accrues to something less than the whole of society.27 Public utilities, streets, sidewalks, bridges, sewers
and drains, ~ark and recreation activities and dumps are usually
proprietary, 8 but are governmental in some jurisdictions.29

24.

3 Davis, Administrative Law§ 25.07 (1958); McQuillan, Municipal Corporations§ 53.24 (3rd ed. 1963).

25.

See Parker v. Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966); ·
Irvine v. Montgomery County. 239 Md. 113, 210 A.2d 359 (1965);
Gassler v. Manchester, 107 H.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966);
Reeder v. Brigham City, 17 Utah 2d 398, 413 P.2d 300 (1966).

26.

See Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, 265 (1959),
for an extensive citation of Colorado cases holding that entities are immune from liability for the performance of "gov-ernmental" activities.

27.

See Davis, supra, note 24; McQuillan, Municipal Corporations
§ 53.23 (3rd ed. 1963).

28.

See Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, 265 (1959),
for an extensive citation of Colorado cases holding that entities are liable in the performance of "proprietary" activities.

29.

63 C.J.S., Mun. Corp. §§ 873 to 877. 28 Am. Jur., Mun. Corp.,
§§ 571 to 667.
The difficulty of the classification is increased when proprietary or governmental characteristics of
an activity are mixed and the confusion is multiplied many
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Needless to say, the courts have experienced great difficulty in distinguishing between the two functions, and at times
have probably been arbitrary in the manner of making the distinction. This distinction has been severely criticized by legal
writers.30 In addition, several jurisdictions have recognized

times by the plurality of cases in each state and by the
plurality of states. For annotations on a public entities'
liability or immunity with respect to torts in connection
with the operation of an airport, 66 A.L.R. 2d 634; tortious
injury in or about a building which is used for a governmental or proprietary function, 64 A.L.R. 1545; for performing
an autopsy, 83 A.L.R.2d 970; for damages in tort in operating a hospital, 25 A.L.R.2d 203; for negligence in insect or
vermin eradication operations, 25 A.L.R.2d 1057; damages
caused by burning from hot ashes, cinders, or other hot waste
material in public park, 42 A.L.R.2d 947; liability for torts
in connection with activities which pertain, or are claimed
to pertain, to private or proprietary functions, 101 A.L.R.
1166, A.L.R.2d 1079; liability for drowning on public premises, 8 A.L.R.2d 1254; liability insurance as affecting immunity from tort liability of governmental units, 68 A.L.R.2d
1437; maintenance of auditorium, community recreational center building, or the like, by public entity as governmental
or proprietary function, 47 A.L.R.2d 544; damages for carrying out construction or repair of sewers or drains, 61 A.L.R.
2d 874; operation of bathing beach or swimming pool as governmental or proprietary function, 55 A.L.R.2d 1434; operation of sewage disposal plant as governmental or proprietary
function, 57 A.L.R.2d 1336; operation of fire department vehicle, 82 A.L.R.2d 312; operation of garage for maintenance
and repair of government vehicles as governmental function,
26 A.L.R.2d 944; injury or death as result of nuisance created or maintained by public entity in governmental capacity,
56 A.L.R.2d 1424; snow removal operations as governmental operations, 92 A.L.R.2d 796; state's immunity from tort liability as dependent on governmental or proprietary nature of
function, 40 A.L.R.2d 927; liability in connection with the
destruction of weeds and the like, 34 A.L.R.2d 1210; constitutionality of statute which relieves public entity from
liability for torts, 124 A.L.R. 350; abrogation of state's
immunity from liability or suit as affecting immunity of public entities, 161 A.L.R. 367.
30.

"Manifestly, the distinction was unsatisfactory. It offered
no solid grounds for prediction, invited test litigation,
operated in a fortuitous and erratic fashion, and had little
relevance to either the social need for risk distribution or
the economic feasibility of shifting from the injured individ-
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the inherent unsoundness of this distinction and have discarded
it,31 or have abolished the distinction in the process of abrogating immunity for governmental functions,32 while several states
have accomplished the same by statute.33
Typical of court decisions across the country, Colorado
cases are lacking in clear and well defined guidelines.34 In
general, it can be said that an increasing number of governmental
entity activities are being classified as proprietary in nature
and therefore subject to tort liability.35 In addition, the traditional immunity of many governmental activities has been partially waived by statute, such as the 1949 statute which subjects
the state and its political subdivisions to liability for any injury or damage caused by the tortious operation of a governmentowned motor vehicle.36
.
Ministerial/discretionary distinction. A branch of the
rule of nonliability of public entities for torts in connection
with the exercise of governmental functions is the rule which distinguishes (1) ministerial duties from (2) legislative, judicial

ual to the public treasury losses due to serious injury."
Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability § 1.17, a_t
19 (1964}. In addition to the law review articles cited in
note 2, supra, see Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objection to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 Va. L.
Rev. 910 (1936); Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort Liability, 28 Vao L. Rev. 630 (1942); Green, Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355 (1944); Smith,
Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41 (1949); James,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units and their Officers, 22
Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 610 (1955).
31.

See Stone v. Arizona Hi hwa Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.
2d 107
963 ; Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72
S . E • 228 ( 1 911 ) .

32.

See Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962); Holtz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26,
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).

33.

Cal. Govt. Code§ 815 (Supp. 1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.02
(1963); Mich. Comp. Laws§ 691.1401-.1415 (1964).

34.

Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, 264 (1959).

35.

Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712 (1957).

36.

13-10-1, C.R.S. 1963.
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and discretionary functions. This distinction is important because the rule has developed that where a governmental duty or
function is ministerial, as distinguished from discretionary, the
public entity is liable for damages arising because of omission
to perform it, or for negligence in its execution.37
Although a comprehensive definition of the terms is difficult to state, ministerial acts are considered to be those performed on an operational level as opposed to discretionary acts
which are performed on a planning level.38 For an act to be discretionary there must be .an affirmative decision to act or not to
act rather than the negligent performanc~ of a course of action
already decided upon; discretionary acts involve a final determination of governmental policy or action, and are those acts in
which a public official has discretionary latitude and which acts
require personal deliberation, decision and judgment.39 Ministerial acts, on the other hand, amount to an obedience to orders or.
the performance of a duty in which the officer or employee is left
no choice of his own; acts which are purely administrative and
which do not involve the exercise of disc_retion.40
Thus, neither a government entity nor an employee thereof
is liable for the consequences of an affirmative decision made at
the planning level in the absence of a previously set course of
action.41 The general rule is that a public entity may be liable
for its negligence in performing ministerial acts and the test of
liability does not depend upon the governmental-proprietary distinction because the government may be liable for negligence at
the ministerial or operational level, even if the function performed is governmental. Ministerial acts also may give rise to

37.

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations§ 53.33 (3rd ed. 1963).

38.

Dalehite Vo United States, 346
Ed. 1427 (1953); Indian Towin
61, 76 s.ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48
States, 352 U.S. 315, 77 ·s.ct.
Cohen v. United States, 252 F.

39.

Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824
(1965).
·

40.

Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966), and
see Prosser, torts 780-781 (1964).

41.

For an exhaustive review of modern cases holding an employee
immune from liability for his torts resulting from the execution of discretionary power, see 3 Davis, Administrative Law
§ 26.01 (Supp. 1965).
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U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L.
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.
1955; Ra onier v. United
374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 1957 ;
Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966.

personal liability of the public employees.42 Colorado cases have
generally followed these distinctions in the imposition of governmental tort liability.43
The discretionary immunity rule and the grounds upon which
it is defended has been criticized.44. The Federal Tort Claims Act
contains provisions excepting the government from liability for
injuries arising from discretlonary ·acts,45 which provisions have
been narrowly construed, thereby broadening the government's liability.46 In light of the trend to abolish immtinity and grant
redress from injuries arising out of the culpable acts of governmental entities, it has been suggested that the state courts
should follow the federal interpretati~n of the discretionary immunity provision. Some have even suggested that the~e appears to
be merit in eliminating discretionary i~munity in most cases, because 11 the reasons for employee immunity for discretionary acts
are unconvincing when such statutory innovations as indemnifica-.
tion and limited liability are available to insulate employees
from personal risk. The pecuniary risks to governmental entities
are also reduced by the availability of insurance, the fact that
relief is often afforded by legislatures in spite of immunity, and
the trend toward spreading liability among those best able to bear
it. 11 47
1

•

42.

See, e.g., Spomer v. City of Grand Junction, 144 Colo. 207,
355 P.2d 960 (1960). For a discussion of the liability o~
public employees for ministerial acts, see 3 Davis, supra, at·
§ 26.02.

43.

Schwalk v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947). The
Colorado Claims Commission statute (130-10-1 et seq, C.R.S.
1963, as amended) was amended by Chapter 280, 1967 Session
Laws, to expressly provide for the recognition of the discretionary immunity rule.

44.

Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Dama9e Action~
77 Harv. L. Rev. 209, 223 (1963); James, Tort Liability of·
Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 u. Chi. L. Rev. 610,
654-55 (1955); 3 Davis, Administrative Law§ 25.13 {Supp. 1965);
Note, the Discretionary Immunity Doctrine in California, 19
Hastings L. J. 561 (1968).
·

45.

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

46.

See American Exch. Bank v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th
Cir. 1958) (planning level discretion ends with initial decision to act); Cohen v. United States, supra, note 40 (failure
to follow recommendations to confine prisoner not discretionary)· Jemison v. Dredge Duplex, 163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala.
1958~ (planning and construction of canal not discretionary).

47.

Note, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act:
Utah L. Rev. 136 (1967).

u.s.c.
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§ 2680

(a).

An Analysis, 120

Nuisance exception. Another important rule that has developed in relation to the sovereign immunity doctrine is that a
person injured as a consequence of governmental activity can recover in tort, notwithstanding the immunity doctrine, if the injury resulted from a nuisance. The rule is generally recognized
that a municipality or other public entity is liable to the same
extent as a private corporation for injuries resulting from the
creation or maintenance of a nuisance.48 Many ordinary negligent
torts, for which sovereign immunity would otherwise be a complete
defense, may be found to be within the scope of a nuisance.
Many cases have distinguished between nuisances which cause
property damage and those causing personal injury.49 But ordinarily, nuisance liability for personal injury occurs in the same
manner as for property injuries.50 If a municipality invades private property and creates a nuisance there, it ~ay be liable for
maintaining a nuisance on the theory that it is a taking of property without just compensation. Thus, the nuisance doctrine has
been used as an auxiliary remedy where the doctrine of inverse
condemnation is insufficient to supply complete relief.51
In Colorado 1 it has been held that a municipality is liable
for damages for unlawful abatement of a public nuisance.52 Unlawful abatement occurs when in fact there is no nuisance or when the
method of abatement is excessive. Likewise, municipal officials
have been held liable in damages for wrongful abatement of an alleged nuisance.53 Sovereign immunity is no defense in a damage
suit against a municipality for wrongful abatement of an alleged
nuisance. Where property abated by a municipality is not in fact
a nuisance, a municipality is liable on the theory that it must

48.

Cal. Law Revision Comm'n. A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity 225 (1963); Kentucky Legislative Research Cornm'n. Governmental Immunity, Research Report No. 30, p. 28 (1965); McQuillin1 Municipal Corporations§§ 52013 1 53.49 (3rd ed. 1963).

49.

See cases collected in 56 A.L.R. 2d 1409, 1419 (1957).

50.

Rhyme, Municipal Law (Wash. D.C.:
Law Officers, 1957), p. 741.

51.

Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 48, at 230.

52.

McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 colo. 281, 244 Pac. 1017

53.

Houston v. Walton, 23 Colo. App. 282, 129 Pac. 263 (1912);
Gaskin v. People, 84 Colo. 582, 272 Pac. 662 (1928).

Nat. Institute of Municipal

(1926).
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grant compensation for private property that it has taken for public use.54 The issue has arisen as _to the possible liability of~
municipality for failing to exercise its power to abate a public
nuisance. The Colorado Supreme Court has generally refused to
hold a municipality liable for its refusal to abate an alleged
public nuisance.55.
In these cases, in other words, the courts have employed
the nuisance rationale as a technique for retreating from governmental nonliability for negligence.56 The practical consequence
of the development of the "nuisance exception" has been to cut
down the area of governmental immunity. This technique has been
criticized as introducing a substantial degree of uncertainty and
confusion into the law,. thereby tending to invite unnecessary
litigation.
Intentional torts. A voluntary act which willfully harms
another or an injury substantially certain to follow from a voluntary act will constitute an intentional tort. Generally there is
a definite tendency to impose greater responsibility upon one
whose conduct was intended to do harm. Apart from the "nuisance
exception", it appears to be the settled law in most states that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity extends to intentional torts
as well as those involving negligence, and that a governmental
agency is not liable for the wilful torts of its employees and officers.57 The governmental-proprietary distinction has been applied in this area and most public entities are usually liable for
intentional torts of their employees when acting in the course and
scope of proprietary activities. In their gove~nmental capacity,
however, public entities have generally been declared immune from
liability for injuries sustained as a consequence of intentional
torts, such as wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and
battery, malicious prosecution, wrongful destruction of personal
property, and other types of intentional torts.58

54.

See note 52, supra.

55.

Luxford v. City and County of Denver, 65 Colo. 355, 176 Pac.
833 (1918); Addin~ton v. Town of Littleton, 50 Colo. 623, 115
Pac. 896 (1911); Cit and Count of Denver v. Rist~u, 95 Colo.
118, 33 P.2d 387 1934. For a general discussion of the liability of municipalities for nuisances, see Nuisance Control
in Colorado Municipalities, Colorado Municipal League (Sept.
1966), p. 8.

56.

Prosser, Torts 779 (2nd ed. 1955).

57.

Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, p. 231 {1963).

58.

Ibid.
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Several states have abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity with reference to both intentional and negligent torts,59
and any exception thereto must be founded either upon statute or
compelling considerations of public policy. It may be noted that
this rule is somewhat at variance with the general trend of legislative policy which has not relaxed the principle of sovereign immunity as to intentional torts.60 The usual legislative approach
has generally reflected the view that the public officer or employee who commits an intentional wrong should be solely liable
for his misconduct, and his employer should be immune.61
In drafting legislation which waives tort immunity, there
always exists a problem of whether the government should accept
responsibility for the "intentional'' torts of its employees. As
indicated above, the usual legislative approach is to maintain immunity for injuries from the intentional torts of officers and employees4 However, an officer charged with false imprisonment or
wrongful arrest or other intentional tort~ is usually only performing the duties of his job .. If he exceeds the ordinary bounds of
negligence, subjectively going a degree further, the governmental
unit may be relieved of liability and the officer held answerable;
or if there has been no acceptance of liability for general negligence by the entity, a sympathetic court might become more inclined
to find an intentional tort. In the exercise of the vast powers of
government by fallible individual officers and employees. unusual
risks of harm to private interests will inevitably result. Whether
the risks. are characterized by "negligence" or ''intent" is, in this
context, only one amon9 many factors which require appraisal in
deciding the ultimate issues. Those issues are fundamentally pol-

59.

Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).

60.

E.g., it is provided that the jurisdictio~ of th~ ~olorado
Claims Commission shall not extend to claims 11 arising out of
alleged assault, battery, false imprisonme~t, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel o 7 slander,
mi~representation deceit, fraud, interference with contractu~l rights, or i~vasion of the right of privacy." 130-10-1
et seqo, C~R.S. 1963, as amended.

61.

This approach is reflected in the Federal Tort ~l?ims Act, 28
u.s.c. § 2680 (h), which provides that the provisions of the
act shall not apply to "any claim arising out ?f.assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest! malicious P:osecution abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights." See also Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann~ § 63-30-11 (2) (Supp.
1967), for similar provisionso
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icy questions as to who should properly bear the loss -- the injured person, the public officer or employee, or the taxpayers as
a whole.62
Bases for nonliabilit~ other than sovereign immunity-. The
common law has articulated ot er theoretical grounds for nonlia-bility of public entitiesi which may simply be corollaries to or
hybrid forms of the immunity doctrine or may be independent of the
doctrine. The existence of these grounds of nonliability thus deserve consideration in t_he development of a legislative program
relating to sovereign immunity, so that whatever expressions of
legislative policy emerge will take them into account.
The common law bases for nonliability other than sovereign
immunity axe twofold: (1) the inapplicability of the doctrine of
respondeat superior to torts of a public officer who is acting as
a servant of the law; and (2) the inapplicability of respondeat
superior to torts of public employees who are acting ultra vires.63
Each of these two lines of common law development will be discussed separately and in connection with each other.
Public entities generally fall within the ordinary rule
that the superior or employer must answer for the negligence of
his agent or servant in the course of his employment. In order
to hold a public entity liable in damages because of the tort of
one alleged to be its servant, it must appear that-the latter was
a servant of the public entity at the ti~e of the alleged tort.64
An exception to this general rule has developed which holds that
the relation of master and servant does not exist so as to render

62.

Kentucky Legislative Research Comm'n, Governmental Immunity,
Res. Report No. 30 (1965), p. 27, citing Cal. Law Revision
Comm'n, supra note 57, at p. 236.

63.

Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, p. 273 (Jan. 1963) o

64.

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 53.66 (3rd ed. 1963),
The rule has been stated in this manner: The common law rule
that the master is liable for wrongful injury inflicted by
his servant acting within the scope of his employment is generally applied in imposing tort liability upon municipalities.
Thus tort liability may be imposed upon the municipality if
it and the tortfeasor • • • occupy a master-~ervant relationship; if the wrongful act causing the injury is within the
scope of the tortfeasor's scope of authority and employment;
and if the wrongful act was committed in connection with a
proprietary function or other municipal function which under
applicable principles of municipal tort law does not immunize
the municipality from tort liability. Rhyne, Municipal Law
§§ 30-11 (1957).
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the public entity liable, if the tortfeasor is an officer or employee of the state, or one whose office and duty was created and
declared by public law, since in carrying out his responsibility,
he was acting as an agent and servant of the law rather than of
the public entity. For their torts, such officials are personally
liable, but the employing entity is not.65 Thus a public entity
is not liab!g for the acts of its personnel performed as servants
of the law.
No precise rule has been laid down as a test to determine
whether persons are, as a matter of fact, the agents or servants
of the public entity, or servants of the law. The general test
concerns the power to control. The right to control the action of
the person doing the alleged wrong, at the time of and with reference to the matter out of which the alleged wrong sprung, which is
the general test of the relationship of master and servant, governs, at least to some extent, in determining whether a public entity is liable under the rule of respondeat superior. The right
to discharge or terminate the relationship is also important.67
The problem of determining who is a servant of the entity
and who is a servant of the law has practical relevance since it
directs attention to the somewhat unique nature of certain types
of public employment. Today certain public officers and employees hold their positions pursuant to direct statutory authority,
and exercise duties which are prescribed and limited almost exclusively by statute. Although the entity in and for which they
function may pay their compensation and provide the physical facilities essential to carry out their responsibilities, they
sometimes are wholly or partially independent of control and direction by the governing body of the entity. In certain instances, therefore, unusually difficult questions may arise in
attempting to identify a particular public entity as the responsible employer for the purpose of applying the doctrine of respondeat superior.

65.

See Meek v. City of Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30
(1929); City of Denver v. Peterson, 5 Colo. App. 41, 36 Pac.
1111 (1894). Note that officers of the city are agents of
the state when performing governmental functions and hence
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.

66.

The officer in turn is not liable for the acts or omissions
of subordinates, whether appointed by him or not, unless he,
having the power of selection has failed to use ordinary care
therein, or unless he has been negligent, or has directed or
authorized the wrong. See Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353
P.2d 590 (1960).

67.

McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 64,
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§

53.66.

Another continuing limitation upon the tort liability of
public entities, outside of and separate from the sovereign immunity doctrine, which must be taken into account,·is the doctrine
of ultra vires, which is the.principle that a public entity shall
not be liable for the torts of its employees or officers committed
outside the scope of their authority, or for its own torts in connection with an act -which is wholly beyond the scope of the power
of the public entity.68 Ultra vires as a defense is apparently in
full force in Colorado.69
When the doctrine of ultra vires and the doctrine of respondeat superior -are considered together, it is often necessary
to determine whether the act in question by an.officer is within
the scope of the officer's power and is not ultra vires. Conceivably, every unauthorized act by an officer could be classified as
ultra vires, thus relieving the enlity of liability. Therefore,
the courts have held that even if the act is unauthorized, if it
is within the broad scope of the employment and authority of the.
tortfeasor, the city is liable.70 If the act is entirely beyond
his scope of authority, the city is not liable, and the plaintiff's
only remedy is the personal liability of the officer involved.71
History Of The Sovereign ·Immunity Doctrine
"The King can do no wrong." Although modern scholars are
not in unanimous agreement on the exact origin and meaning of the
sovereign immunity doctrine, it is generally agreed that in western political theory the doctrine began as an outgrowth of the
common law theory, allied with the divine right of kings, that
"the King can do no wrong," together with a feeling that it was
necessarily a contradiction of his sovereignty to allow him to be
sued as of right in his own courts. Since the King was divine it
was impossible for him to commit a tort; hence, if there was error, it was obviously fault on the part of the King's agents, but

68.

McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 67, § 53.60; Cal. Law Revision
Comm' n, op. cit. supra note 63, · at 242; Note, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the Feasibility of Judicial Abrogation, 35 u. Colo. L. Rev. 541 .(1963). _

69.

Town of Idaho Springs v. Filteau, 10 Colo. 105, 14 Pac. 48
(1887).

70.

See Norton v. City of New Bedford, 166 Mass. 48, 43 N.E. 1034
(1896).

71.

See Doyle v. City of Sandpoint, 18 Idaho 654, 112 Pac. 204

(1910).
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never the King himself. Consequently, the King was immune from
suit and the torts of his inferiors could not be imputed to him.72
Origin of sovereign immunity in the United States. The
basis of the legal concept of sovereign immunity in the United
States has been traced by most legal scholars and courts to the
English case of Russell v, The Men of Devon.73 In that case an
unincorporated county was relieved of liability for damages which
were occasioned by the disrepair of a bridge. Several basic arguments were advanced in support of the decision: (1) to allow the
suit would lead to "an infinity of actions•• ; ( 2) there was no
precedent for such suit; (3) only the legislative body should impose liability on government; (4) the community was unincorporated
and thus did not have funds out of which to pay for the damages;
and (5) although there should be a remedy for every wrong, a more
applicable rule is that "It is better that an individual should
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience. u74
The first case in the United States which adopted the doctrine of the Russell case was the Massachusetts case of Mower v.
Inhabitants of Liecester,75 in which immunity was granted even
though the county involved was incorporated and did have funds

72.

For an historical consideration of immunity in the United
States, see Blachly & Oatmen, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A comparative Survey, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob.
181, 182-96 (1942). "The maxim that 'the King can do no wrong'
became fully developed by this time, and has since continued
in force . .
~
Not only can the King do no wrong, but he
cannot authorize a wrong, since a wrongful act is regarded by
law as the act of the one who authorized it." Id. at 183-84.
For a reevaluation of the basis of tort immunity, see Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments & Officers, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(sovereign immunity), 209 (damage actions) (1963).
a

73.

2 T. R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).

74.

Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. For an analysis and evaluation of the Russell case, see Maffei v. Incorp. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959); Muskopf v. Corning
Hospital Dist., 55 Cal_2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Stone v.
Arizona HiAAhway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963);
S anel v.ounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 1962. These reasons as a justification for the
existence of the doctrine are disparaged in Borchard~ Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. l (19261.

75.

9 Mass. 247 (1812).
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available to pay damages. Following the Mower decision, the rule
of local governmental immunity eventually became established in
nearly all states.76 The immunity doctrine was aDplied to the
United States in the case of Cohens v, Virginia,77 wherein Chief
Justice Marshall made his authoritative pronouncement that "The
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or
prosecuted against the United States; • • • "78
There have been several justifications for the doctririe's
~xistence in the United States. One is.that the King (now the
state) can do no wrong and is thus not responsible for his torts.79
Another, attributable mainly to Mr. Justice Holmes, who was perhaps
the chief philosophical proponent of the doctrine in modern·times,
speaking in the case of Kawananakoa v, Polyblank, is that "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practic·al ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.«80 State courts have based immunity on the rationale that either the legislature had been substituted for the king or on grounds of public policy, and these
justifications have been reaffirmed by both the federal and· state
courts.
Regardless of what may have been the.historical origin of
the sovereign immunity doctrine, there now ex~sts~ and has existed,
a strong public sentiment against the policy of permitting an individual to sue a state without its consent. This sentiment is,
of course, reflected in the eleventh amendment to the United States·
Constitution, adopted in 1798, which forbids to an individual the
use of the federal judicial process to sue a state. Alexander
Hamilton, speaking of the state's sovereign immunity in Number 81
of the Federalist said• "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without .
its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice
of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the
Union." Slmilarly, Chief Justice Taney in the 1857 case of Beers

76.

Vanlandingham, Local Governmental Immunity Re-examin.ed, 61
N.W.U.L. Rev. 246 (1966). For a summary of the law in each
state, see Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the
States, 20 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363 (1954).

77.

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).

78.

Ibid.

79.

Russell v. Men of Devon, supra note 73.

80.

205 U.S. 349, 27

s.ct.

526, 51 L.Ed. 834 (1907).
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v. Arkansas,81 said: "It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued
in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission.1182
There was one abortive attempt to change the rule when the
question of a state's immunity from suit came before the United
States Supreme Court a few years after the ratification of the
Constitution in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia.83 The Supreme
Court held that a state might, without its consent, be made a defendant in a suit in a federal court brought by a citizen of
another state. The result of this decision was a clamor by the
several states for an immediate amendment to the Constitution to
assure the states their sovereign immunity. The result was the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution which removed any doubt as to the right of a private person to sue a state
in the federal courts by providing that, "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."
Later, the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment was extended by interpretation to include suits brought by a citizen
against his own staten Thus the Eleventh Amendment has in effect
given states immunity against suit by all individuals in the federal courts. Suits against state officials based on acts in
excess of their authority,8 4 and acts in pursuance of an unconstitutional statute,85 are suits against the officer in his individual capacity and are thus not prohibited by the Amendment. But if
the state is the real party in interest when suit is brought
against the officer, then there is immunity. Of course. the state
can always waive immunity and voluntarily submit to suit.
Origin of sovereign immunity in Colorado. As early as 1875
the Colorado Supreme Court had held that a municipality was immune
from tort liability for its acts or omissions and/or the acts or
omissions of its employees or officers.86 Counties in Colorado

81.

20 Howo (61 U.S.) 527 (1857).

82.

Id. at 529.

83.

2 U.W. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793).

84.

Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891).

85.

Osborn v~ Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824).

86.

Daniels v. City of Denver, 2 Colo. 669 (1875).
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had been held immune in ·1893 •.87 The doct.rine of sovereign immunity for the state, that the state cannot be sued without its consent, was the rule adopted in 1895.88 School districts and other
special districts have been held to be immune when acting in a,
governmental manner.89 The present status of the doctrine with
respect to the governmental entities in Colorado will be examined
in more detail later in this report.90 It is sufficient to say,
however, that the doctrine has become firmly established in Colorado law, except in certain situations where specific statutory
waiver of immunity has been made,91 or where a court has determined that the entity was acting in a proprietary r~ther than a
governmental capacity and thus was subject to liability.92
Criticism of the doctrineo Despite its medieval origins,93
and notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine had rather unstable
beginnings, the doctrine became firmly established both in the.
common law·of the country,94 and in the statutes of-the·several
states.95 Today most legal writers and scholars agree that the
stated grounds for exempting the state and other public entities
from suit and liability are neither logical nor practical.96
Nearly every commentator who has considered the subject vigorously
asserts that the doctrine must go.97 Nevertheless, sovereign immunity continues to be the rule, not the exception. However, 1n
nearly all of the states, consent has been given, to a greater or

87.
88.

County Comm'rs v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 Pac. 184 (1893).
In re Constitutionality of Substitute for Senate Bill No. 83,
Colo. 69, 39 Pac. 1088 (1895).
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89.

School Dist, No. 28 v, Denver Pressed Brick Co., 91 Colo. 288,
l4 P.2d 487 (1932).

90.

See notes 101-189, infra, and related discussion in text.

91.

See notes 147-189, infra, and related discussion in text.

92.

See notes 120-146, infra, and related discussion in text.

93.

See note 72, supra, and related discussion in text.

94.

See note 190, infra, and related discussion in text.

95.

See notes 191-229, infra, and related discussion in text.

96.

See note 2, supra.

97.

See Davis, Administrative Law§ 25.0l (3rd ed. 1958).
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lesser extent, and in a variety of forms.98 In addition, there
now appears to be a trend toward judicial abrogation of the doctrine in the state courts.99 In view of this trend, state legislatures are beginning to formulate legislation to deal with the
problems of sovereign immunity.100

98.

See notes 191-229, infra, and related discussion in text.

99.

See notes 317-342, infra, and related discussion in text.

100.

See notes 295-310, infra, and related discussion in text.
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PRESENT STATUS OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
AND LIABILITY IN COLORADO -PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING CLAIMS

The Common

Law

in Colorado

The stateft Colorado~ unlike many states, has no constitutional provision prohibiting suit against the state. However, the
common law rule that the state cannot be sued was adopted by the
Colorado Supreme Court as the general rule in Colorado in the
first and leading case of !fl re Constitutionality of Substitute
for Senate Bill No, 83, generally known as the Benedictine Sisters

case.IOI

1

Most cases dealing with state immunity are understandably
based on tort actions. But presumably the doctrine of immunity
was in force in Colorado as to both tort and contract claims
against the state when Ace Flaing Serv, Inc, v. Colo, Department
of Agriculture,102 was decide. In that case the court abolished
whatever immunity existed as to breach of contract actions against
the state and the case is generallr recognized as a judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity in Co orado with respect to contracts
to which the state is a partr• On the heel of the Ace Flyin~ c·ase
came Colorado Racing Commiss on v, Brush Racin~ Association, 03
which was an action against the Racing Commlss on for refund of
breakage. The suit was allowed, the court saying that "In Colorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject for discussion
by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this
court."104 This language suggests a complete judicial abrogation
of the doctrine in Colorado, but as will be seen later, this language was meant to apply only to contract actions, not tort actions.105

Io1. 21 Colo.

69,

39

Pac. 1088 (1895).

102.

136 Coloo 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).

103.

136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).

104.

Id. at 284, 316 P.2d at 585.

10~.

For
the
see
ity

a general discussion of the immunity and liability of
state of Colorado under the sovereign immunity doctrine,
Note, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the Feasibilof Judicial Abrogation, 35 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 531 (1963).
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Due to the fact that the state cannot be sued, much litigation has involved the question of whether the suit was against
the state, or was actually against some other entity or department. In Alfred v~ Esser,106 the plaintiff 1 sued members of the
state board of stock inspection for conversion of plaintiff's
cattle. The court held that the action was not a claim against
the state and was proper. But in Parry v. Colo. Board of Corrections,107 the court disallowed a garnishment action under an execution of a judgment against the board, finding it to be a claim
against the state.108
There is no positive way to prognosticate whether the court
will invoke immunity when suit is against a state department. The
statutes sometimes provide a starting point, however. For example,
120-7-13, C.R.S. 1963, which refers to the State Highway Department, states that 11 No liability shall attach, either to the state,
the department of highways, or the individual members of said department of highways by virtue of the construction, reconstruction,
maintenance, improvement or operation of any turnpike or speedway
authorized to be constructed under this article .. ~"109 In Mitchell
v. Board of County Commissioners,110 the court cited section 1 of
article VIII of the Colorado constitution, which provides for the
establishment of state institutions, and said that it applied to
the highway department, finding the department to be an agency of
the state. The implication seems to be that all agencies created
under the authority of this section of the constitution are immune,
absent consent to suit.
106.

9l Colo. 466, 15 P.2o 714 (1932).

107.

93 Colo. 589

108.

Claims such as this of the architects are claims against the
state. They can only be paid by legislative appropriation,
and a suit to force their collection otherwise be the nominal defendants who they may, is in fact a suit against the
state which is the real party in interest •.••
No statute authorizes such an action as this against either
the state or the board. It is suggested that a legislative
appropriation has been made to pay this claim •••• We fail
to find it ..•. Id. at 592, 28 P.2d at 252.

109.

See Mitchell v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 112 Colo. 582, 152 P.
2d 601 (1944), where the court said, "Clearly the highway department is nothing more than an agency of the state and as
to actions against it stands in the·state's shoes."

110.

Ibid. For additional cases upholding the doctrine that no
liability attaches in tort actions for injuries sustained by
plaintiff which are proximately caused by the negligence of
servants of the state or its agencies, see Faber v. State of
Colo., 353 P.2d 609 (1960), and Berger v. Department of High-·
ways, 353 P~2d 613 {1960).

0

28 P.2d 251 {1933).
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In State v. Colorado Postal Tel.-Cable Co.,111 plaintiff
sued for consequential damages suffered when the state made certain improvements to the physical plant of the state hospital.
The court first·held that section 15 of article II of the Colorado
constitution (taking property without just compensation) did not
apply, as it was applicable only in eminent domain proceedings.
The court then referred to Board of County Comm'rs v. Adler,Il2
in which it was held that a county was liable under similar circumstances. But the court in Colorado Postal refused to allow the
suit against the state because in the Adler case a statute allowed
the suit against the county and the oniy question there was liability, whereas here, no consent by the state to be sued was shown.
"Read in the light of its facts the Adler case is authority for
the proposition that liability on the part of th~ state in the instant case exists; but it is not authority for the proposition
that the state can be sued to enforce its liability."113 Thus the
wierd circumstance has developed of the defendant being found liable, but the court denying recovery because the plaintiff cannot
sue.
The injustice of the above rule has apparently been recognized by the court, for it has subsequently allowed recovery in
particular circumstances. In Boxberger v, State Highway Department.,114 which involved an action against the state to rescind a
deed transferred by the plaintiff to th~ state, the court allowed
recovery, basing its decision on section 15 of article II of the
Colorado constitution. The injustice of a holding for the department must have prompted the court to state:
The rights of a citizen remain the same
whether they collide with an individual or
the government, and judicial tribunals were
wisely established to correct such matters
without the individual being relegated to
the position of no other remedy except to
appeal to a legislature, maybe to no avail,
as all the people, or the citizens, are, in
fact, the sovereign under our desi~able form
of government.115

111.

164 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d

112.

69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621 (1920).

481 (1939).

113. State v. Colo. Postal Tel.-Cable Co,, 104 Colo. 436, 444, 91
P.2a 481, 484 (1939).
114.

126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952).

115.

Id. at 441, 250 P.2d at 1008-09.
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The limitation of the Boxberger case comes from the language, "This is not an action in tort, nor is it one to impose
liability upon the state, nor for the recovery of money that would
finally come from the funds of the state treasure • • • • "116 This
language suggests or implies that the court will approach the immunity problem differently where there is· a possibility of a burden being cast upon the funds of the state. The court's concern
for state funds was later borne out by State-Highway Department v.
Dawson.117
In Dawson, the court allowed recovery of an agreed
price for gravel taken from lands of the plaintiff over a plea of
sovereign immunity by the department, saying that since funds had
been ear-marked and set aside, no additional burdens would be
cast on the funds of the state.118
A discussion of immunity as applied to suits against the
state or its departments leaves one with the feeling that the
court· is striving to achieve some judicial abrogation of the doctrine. The trend appears to be to limit immunity whenever possible, to deal with the problem on a case-by-case basis, and yet not
to say "the doctrine of sovereign immunity is hereby abolished. 11 119

The counties. Theoretically, as arms of the state, counties are entitled to the same immunity from suit as is the state.
But Colorado Revised Statutes§ 36-1-1 (1) (b) (1963) provides
that each county shall be empowered to sue and be sued, seemingly
abolishing any county immunity by statute.120
However, county
immunity from suit is far from abolished in the eyes of the court.

116.,

Id. at 440, 250 P.2d at 1008.

117.

126 Colo. 490, 253 P.2d 593 (1952).

118.

Distinguishing the case of Mitchell v. Bd. of Count Comm'rs,
112 Colo. 582, 152 P.2d 601 1944 , which was re ied on by
the defendant. In Mitchell, an action brought by a landowner against the highway department, the court denied recovery
because any judgment would have to be satisfied from the
funds of the department, thus creating an additional burden.

119.

Note, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the Feasibility of
Judicial Abrogation, 35 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 536 (1963).

120.

But see Count Comm'rs v. Cit of Colorado S rin s, 66 Colo.
111, 180 Pac. 30
919 . See a so § 36- -4, C•• s. 1963,
which provides that when there is a judgment against a county, no execution shall issue, but it is to be paid by levy
of a tax on the taxable property of the county;§ 13-10-1,
C.R.S. 1963, which provides for liability for tortious operation of vehicles by employees of the state, county or city;
e 13-10-2, C~R.S. 1963, which provides a dollar limit on liability;§ 13-10-3, C.R.S. 1963, which provides for acquisition of insurance to cover liability.
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The first Colorado case to recognize and follow the general
rule of immunity for counties was Countv Comm'rs v. Bish.121
In
that case the court said that "The rule that counties are not liable for torts in the absence of statute, is universally,recognized.
And the great weight of authority is in favor of the conclusion
that when a duty is imposed by statute, the county is not liable
for failure to perform iti in the absence of express provision,
creating such liability. 11 22 The holding of the Bish case has
subsequently been upheld and relied upon.123
.
.

As the Bish case and subsequent cases have pointed out,
counties are immuiie from liability for the torts of their employees. But are the officers and employees individually liable for
their torts? The general rule in· the United States is that officers who exercise discretionary functions are immune from liability for their negligence or other unintentional torts, but are
liable for the breach of performance of mere ministerial duties.124
It appears that Colorado follows the general rules as to individual liability of county or other public officials.
In the Miller case,125 the plaintiff sought to hold the
county and its officers individually liable for the death of her
son in a fire in the county jail •. It was held that a county commissioner was not individually liable for failing to make a per-

121.

l8 Colo. 474, 33 Pac. 184 (1893).

122.

Id. at 475, 33 Pac. at 184.

123.

See Board of Comm'rs of Pitkin County v. Ball, 22 Colo. 125,
43 Pac. 1000, 55 Am. St. Rep. 117 (1896); Town of Fairplar
v. Board of Comm'rs of Park Count~, 29 Colo. 57, 62 Pac. 52
( 1901) ; Mi 11 er v. Ouray Electric ower and Light Co. , 18
Colo. App. 131, 70 Pac. 447 (1901); Board of Comm'rs of Logan
Count v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621, 20 A.L.R. 512
1920; Richardson v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 Pac. 335
1923; Newt Olson Lumber Co. v. School Dist., 83 Colo. 272,
263 Pac. 723 (1928); School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver Pressed
Brick Co., 91 Colo. 288, 14 P.2d 487 193 ; an Sc wa
v.
Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 1947.

124 ..

See David, The Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 260, 368 (1939); Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort
Liability, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 201 (1956); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 263 (1937}.
Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials,
12 Fordham L. Rev. 130 (1943).
·

125.

Miller v. Ouray Electric Power
131, 10 Pac. 447 (1902).
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&

Light Co., 18 Colo. App.

sonal examination of the county jail, although a statute expressly
provided that he do so, because the duty was owed to the public at
large and not to any particular individual. The court there said
.. If the contention of the plaintiff be the law, then each individ:
ual commissioner would be liable in like actions to this because
of damages suffered by an individual by reason of alleged defects
~n a public highway or in a county bridge, or in any public build-.
ing, or in the public grounds in which it might be situate. To
so hold would tend in the large counties of the State • • • to
bring about . • • the literal abrogation of the office of County
Commissioner, for no sane man would assume the position with such
a liability attached." 126 The court was asked to overrule.this
decision in the Belknap case. 127 involving a suit against the
county commissioners for failure to construct guard rails. However, the court adhered to the rule laid down in the Miller and
Bish cases, and said, "It would be inconsistent to relieve counties from liability and yet hold the officers liable. 11 .128
Limitations were placed on the Miller and Belknap rule in
the case of Schwalk v. Connely.129
There the court said, "The
doctrine of respondeat superior, applicable to.the relation of
master and servant, does not apply to a public officer as to
render him responsible for the acts or omissions of subordinates,
whether appointed by him or not, unless he, having the power of
selection has failed to use ordinary care therein, or unless he
has been negligent, or has directed or authorized the wrong."130
However, the plaintiffs or employees in the Schwalk case did not
fall within the exceptions.
This was the status of the law when Liber v. Flor131 was
decided. The court, in Liber, adhered to the rule laid down in
the Schwalk case, and held that while the county itself could not
be held liable in tort for the alleged negligence of its agents,
the individual defendants, though concededly members of the board
of county commissioners, might be liable if they were the actual
tort-feasors or if they had been negligent in supervising acts of
subordinates or had directed or authorized the wrong. Thus, if
the individual defendants were the actual tort-feasors or if the

126.

Ibid ..

127.

Richardson v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 Pac. 335 (1923).

128.

Ibid.

129.

116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947).

130.

Ibid.

131.

143 Colo. 205, 353 Po2d 590 (1960).
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evidence is such as to bring- their acts within the Schwalk rule,
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. This rule has been
severely criticized and t t is claimed that "There is no valid
reason why a county should not be respomdb.le under the doctrine
of respondeat superior for the acts of its agents. To say-that
the county is not liable because the state is not liable is absurd and unrt?al .. , , • " 132
·
The traditional common law distinction between governmental
and proprietary functions has been .applied to counties in Colorado. Thus a county will be liable for an injury occasioned by the
exercise of a proprietary function and i~mune.when the activity
is governmental in nature.133
· The municipalities .. Munid.pa1ities, like the counties, have
also been held to be immune when acting·in a gove:rnmental capacity
and liable when acting in·a proprietary capacity.134
The first
case holding that a munlcipality is immune from.liability was Daniels v. City of Denvernl35
An inroad on municipal immunity was
made in Spaur v. City of Greeley,136 a case involving a contract
of bailment which the city breached. The court held that since
Ace Flying Serv. Inc 1 137 had held that the state is no longer immune to contract actions, the local government units are not immune either. Thus the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
invoked as a defense to any contract action by any governmental
unit, regardless of the type of function involved •. Yet the court

132.

Note, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the Feasibility of
Judicial Abrogation, 35 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 540 (1963).

133.

See Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, _265 (1959)~

134.

See note 14 supra; Banks, Municipal Tort Li.bility in Colorado, 6-13 {1961). The following activities have been held
to be proprietary functions in Colorado: nonfeasance or
misfeasance in the construction, maintenance or repair of
streets or sidewalks; construction and maintenance- of sewers
and drains; operation of parks and recreational facilities;
operation of a cemetery; trash collecting; operation; of a .
dumping ground; decorating a municipal building for Christmas; maintenance of a municipal building. The following
have been held to be governmental functions for which no
liability lies: operation of the health, police and fire
departments; failure to adopt or enforce an ordinance; issuance of bonds; abatement of a nuisance; installation of
traffic zone markers.

135.

2 Colo. 669 (1875).

136-

150 Colo. 346, 372 P.2d 730 (1962).

137-

136 Colo. 19, 314 P52d 278 (1957).
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has refused to abolish tort immunity. In City and Count* of Denyer y, Madison,138 the court distinguished those cases w ich repudiated immunity as to contract actions, and stated that if
immunity as to tort actions was to be abolished, it had to be done
by the legislatureo
School districts and special districts. The governmental
and proprietary functions are applicable to the -law of immunity
from liability with respect to special districts and school districts.139 ~or example, for proprietary activities see Cerise v.
Fruitvale Water & Sanitation Dist.,140 and for governmental activities see School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver Pressed Brick Co.141
In the recent case of Tesone v. School Dist. No. RE 2,Ia2 the
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the defendant
school district, as a subdivision of the State of Colorado, is immune from liability under the previous court pronouncements in the
Madison casel43 and in Liber v. Flor.144
The plaintiff in error
admitted that such holdings constituted the law in Colorado, but
urged that these cases be overruled. This the court refused to do
and affirmed the judgment, citing the Madison case, wherein it was
said, "It is not within the province of the judicial branch of
government thus to change long established principles of law.
This is the function of the legislature. 0 145
The court declared
that "In no opinion of this court has it ever been held that the
rule on nonliability of a government agency for the negligent acts
of its servants in the performance of governmental duties, 11 has in
any degree whatever been modified, discarded or minimized. 146
Summary. The present general rule in Colorado with respect
to the sovereign immunity doctrine, as developed in the common law
through judicial interpretation and application, is that the state,
counties, cities and other political subdivisions of government
are deemed immune from liability for the torts committed by pub-

1386

142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960).

139.

See note 7, supra.

140.

153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462 (1963).

141•

91 Colo. 288, 14 Po2d 487 (1932).

142.

152 Colo. 596, 384~ P.2d 82 (1963).

143.

142 Colo. 1, 351, P.2d 826 (1960).

144.

143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960).

145.

142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960).

146.

152 Colo. 596, 384 P.2d 82 (1963).
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lie employees in the performance of their duties, except to the
extent that the immunity has been judicially found to be inapplicable, i.e., the entity was engaged in the performance of a proprietary activity. In effect, .this means that tor~ actions can
be successfully prosecuted against governmental entities only if
the injury complained of arose out of the performance of a "proprietary" activity as distinguished from a "governmental" one.

The Statutory Law in Colorado
In addition to being liable for injuries ar1s1ng out of
"proprietary" activities, the governmental erititie~ in Colorado
are also liable to the extent that the immunity has been waived by
statute or consent to suit and liability is granted by the General
Assembly& To correctly ascertain the ~tatus of the present Colorado law on the doctrine it is necessary, in addition- to determining what the common law rule is (.as discussed above), to determine
whether any statutes exist which waive immunity and impose liability on the public entities or otherwise modify or reaffi~m the
common law rules,.
Accordinglr the Colorado statutes were surveyed with a view
to determining ll the extent to which the statutory law provides
for liability of the public entities (see Table II). and (2) the
extent to which the statutory law provides immunity for the public
entities (see Table III)~ Although some relevant statutes may
have been overlooked, the survey presents a fair picture of the
extent to which the Colorado General Assembly has provided for
liability and immunity of public entities.
Statutory consent to std t.. The Colorado statutes. contain
many provisions which purport to subject various agencies of the
state as well as various political subdivisions to suit in the
courts. In most cases the statutory language indicates simply
that the particular entity "may sue and be su~d." A list of sec-.
tions so providing and the particular entities to which they apply is found in Table I.
If the doctrine of sovereign immunity were deemed to be
based solely on the absence of a remedy against the state, statutory consent to suit would appear to connote a waiver of immunity.
However, the issue of liability is distinguishable from that of
the remedial devices available to an injured person. Most courts
have not found in such language a substantive right implying a
correlative liability on the part of the particular public entity.
The granting of consent to the bringing of an action against the
public entity is regarded not as a waiver of substantive immunity
but simply as a remedial technique for administering such liability as might exist under the law. Thus while such a statute may
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subject the entity to the process of the courts~ it does not in
itself make the entity liable for its wrongs.14, ·
If the entity is ·legally li~ble, such consent implies that
judgment may be entered against it; but if it is not, the implication is equally clear that judgment will be,entered in the entity's favor. Permission to sue simply constitutes a procedural
remedy; it does not determine the substantive result~ This conclusion is made clear by the express provisions in 3-2-7, C.R.S.
1963, which state that language granting state agencies the power
to sue and be sued" • • • shall be construed as procedural and
remedial and shall not be construed as extending, conferring, or
granting such agencies any substantive powers, duties, or functions, nor . • • be construed as granting permission to sue the
sovereign state of Colorado or any agency thereof."
From this analysis, it would appear that.without a consent
statute, an injured person might not have a remedy even if the entity were otherwise liable pursuant to a legislative enactment.
Indeed, some acts relating to public entities contain· no statutory
language, expressly or impliedly, consenting ·to suit against the
entity. If it is assumed that such absence.of-consent to suit
·
precludes enforcement of tort liability which exists pursuant to
statute or common law, situations cofJ:d arise in which liability
may exist without a judicial remedy. 8 The implication is that
an injured person seeking redress against a public entity by means·
of a civil tort action must be prepared to establish, not only
that liability exists on the part of the entity, but also that
consent to suit against the entity has been granted.
If it is assumed, on the other hand, that the courts will
hold public entities subject to suit in tort despite the absence
of any statutory consent, the only question then presented is
whether the entity is otherwise liable. Many courts could reach
this conclusion by viewing an omission of this type, when viewed
against a background of consistent legislative policy-of granting
the procedural and remedial right to sue, as the product of legislative inadvertance and hence disregarded in favor of applying
the general legislative policy.
·
The approach of the General Assembly in granting to part~cular entities the power to sue and be sued and not granting this
power to other and similar entities, and the various approaches
which may be taken by the courts in applying these consent statutes or the absence thereof, leaves this area of the law sufficiently doubtful and uncertain to suggest the desirability that
such doubts be eliminated and clarified by appropriate legislation.
147.
148.

Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee, Utah Legisla-.
tive Council, p. 21 (Dec. 1964).
.
State v. Colo. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d.
481 (1939).
-33-

TABLE I

Statutory Provisions Authorizing That Governmental
Entities "May Sue and Be Sued11
;.,

I

Governmental Entity

Colo. Rev. Stat. 1963
3-2-4 to 3-2-7

State agencies -- provisions are procedural and remedial and not construed
as granting permission to sue sovereign.

5-5-6

Airport authority

16-1-3

Colorado School for Deaf and Blind

36-1-1 ( 1) ( b)

Counties

36-16-4

Cemetery districts

47-2-8

Drainage district

47-12-28

Grand Jun~tion drainage district

80-1-6

Industrial Commissi:on

89-1-11

&

15

Waterworks district

89-3-14 ( 3)

Metropolitan district

89-4-11 ( 3)

Improvement district in cities and towns

89-5-12 (3)

Water and Sanitation district

89-6-14 ..( 3)

Fire Protection district

89-12-14 (3)

Metropolitan Recreation district

89-13-6 (3)

Metropolitan Water district

89-14-5 (4)

Hospital district -- expressly maintains
immunity

89-15-6 (4)

Metropolitan Sewage Disposal district

92-28-10

Mine Drainage district

100-6-5

Oil and Gas Conservation district

123-25-24

School district

123-30-1

School district
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TABLE I
(Continued)
Colo. Rev, Stat. 1963

Governmental Entity

124-5-1

Trustees of the state colleges

124-9-1

Colorado School of Mines

124-11-2

State Board of Agriculture

124-20-4 ( e)

Colorado Higher Education Assistance
Authority

128-1-8 (11}

Soil Conservation district

139-31-1

Cities and towns

139-62-5

Urban Renewal Authority

150-1-13

Irrigation Districts of 1905

150-2-13

Irrigation Districts of 1921

150-4-9

Internal Improvement District

150-5-13

Water Conservancy District

150-7-5

Colorado River Conservation District

150-8-5

Southwestern Water Conservation District

150-10-5

Rio Grande Water Conservation District

Ch. 36, Sec. 21 (5),
1966 Session Laws

Metropolitan Stadium District

Statutory immunities and liabilities of the state. The
state is specifically made liable for injuries caused by the negligent operation of government-owned vehicles to the extent of the
limitations provided for in the statute as follows: bodily injury
liability limited to $10,000 for each person and $20,000 for each
accident; and property damage liability limited to $5,000 for each
accident.149

149.

13-lO-l et seq., C.R.S. 1963.
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The state is made liable for all personal and property
damage caused by acts done, or attempted, under color of the civil
defense act of Colorado with procedures for the presentation of
...,--cl~ti1Jl_$ ::md methods of providing compensation setXOrtn~150 However, the state is apparently liable only to the extent of the
compensation provided for in the statute.151 The state is also
made liable for any or all property damage caused by wild game
protected by the game and fish laws of the state.152 Procedures
for the handling of these claims are established in§ 62-2-31,
C • R. S . 1963 .
The state department of public health, its officers and employees are specifically declared to be immune from liability for
any injuries occasioned by the administration of its duties under
the provisions of the statute on rabies control.153 In addition,
no person, acting in good faith under any order of court directing that a person be held in custody or be held for confinement,
examination, diagnosis, observation, or treatment, and not acting
in violation or abuse thereof, shall be liable for such action.154
Officers of the military forces, when exercising discretion
or when following lawful orders and in the performance of a duty,
and who are engaged in mob control shall not be liable for any act
done while on such duty.155 The state, the state department of
highways, its officers and employees shall not be liable for injuries occasioned by the construction, reconstruction, maintenance,
improvement, or operation of any turnpike o~ speedway authorized
to be constructed.156

C.R.S.

150.

24-3-1,

1963.

151.

24-1-10, C~R.S. 1963.

152.

62-2-31 et seq., C.R.S. 1963; see Colo. Legislative Council
Committee on Game, Fish and Parks, Memo. No. 3, Game Damage
Claims, Awards, Arbitration, and Control {Sept. 20, 1967);
Colo. Game, Fish & Parks Department, Instructions and Procedures for Reporting Game Damage and Filing Game Damage
Claims; Attorney General, State of Colorado, Opinion No.
66-4015, Sept. 12, 1966.

153.

66-23-13, C.R.S. 1963.

154.

71-1-24, C.R.S. 1963.

155.

94-1-45, C.R.S. 1963.

156.

120-7-13, C.R.S. 1963.
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Statutor immunities and liabilities of cities and counities and counties, 1 et estate, are 1a e or nutles caused by the negligent operation of government-owned motor
vehicles.157 The county, its officers and employees are specifically held to be immune from liability for any injuries in connection with the administration of a county dog licensing law,158
for injuries caused by civil defense activities, except to the
extent of compensation provided for in the statute,159 and for or
on account of the escape of any prisoner from the county jail.160
The operation of a city or county airport is declared to be a
governmental function and it is implied that citJes and counties
will be immune from liability for its operation.161 Finally, it
is declared that the town treasurer or a city council member shall
not be liable for loss of public funds by reason of the default or
insolvency of the depository.162
ties.

Denver charter amendment 1967 • Pursuant to Section 1 of
Article XX of the Co orado Constitution, the City and County of
Denver was created as a home rule city. Under the constitutional
provision, the City and County of Denver may sue and defend, plead
and be impleaded, in all courts and places, and in all matters and
proceedings. However, prior to 1967, the City and County of Denver applied the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity under
which it could not be held liable for injuries sustained as a result of the performance of governmental activities. On February
7, 1967, the voters of the City and County of Denver adopted an
amendment to Denver's Charter which effectively waived the defense
of sovereign immunity. The amendment reads as follows:
Denver Charter - Article IX, Section
C6,8-l. In all suits or actions brought
against the City and County of Denver
jointly with any of its officers or employees charging tortious acts of said officers and employees committed in the regular course of their employment, the City
and County of Denver shall not avail itself

157.

13-lo-1, C.R.S. 1963.

158.

36-12-4, C.R.S. 1963, as amended.

159.

24-1-10, C.R.S. 1963.

160.

105-7-27, C.R.S. 1963.

161.

5-4-1, C.R.S. 1963; 5-5-7, C.R.S. 1963.
139-39-7 ( 5) ' C.R.S. 1963.

162.
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of the defense o:r governmental immunity
and shall be liable· in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private employer under like circumstances and pay
all final judgments rendered against the
said City and County of Denver.
Denver Charter - Article 1x Section
A9.4-2. The City and County of 6enver·
shall be liable for the acts or omissions
of the members of the classified service
of the police department within the scope
of their respective offices, in tort, in
the same manner and to the same extent as.
a private employer under like circumstances,
and said city and county shall pay or indemnify such ~ember for the payment of
any final judgment rendered in any such
suit or action wherein said city and county is a defendant or third party defendant,
and whereln it is found by the court or
jury that the act or omission complained of
was within the scope of the office of said
member. No notice of injury or claim shall
be required in actions brought against said
city and county under the provisions of
this section.
Statutory immunities and liabilities of districts. It is
declared that a school district shall not be liable for injuries
caused by school evacuation drills orb~ the use of buses in the
exercise of civil defense activities.163 The statutes also provide for a remedy for the recovery of damages to property caused
by acts done by a conservancy district.164

c.R.s.

163.

24-4-2, 3,

164.

29-6-4, C.R.S. 1963.

1963.
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TABLE II
Statutes Providing For Liability
Of Governmental Entities

C.R.S. 1963
13-10-1

Liability for injuries caused by the negligent
operation of government vehicles. Bodily injury liability limited to $10,000 for each·
person and $20,000 for each accident. Property damage liability limited to $5,000 for
each accident.

24-3-1

The State is liable for all personal and property
damage caused by acts done, or attempted, under
color of the civil defense act of Colorado, unless there is wilfull misconduct, gross negligence, or bad faith on the part of any agent of
civilian defense.

29-6-4

Provides remedy for the recovery of damages to
property caused by acts done by conservancy
districts.

35-5-8

Sheriff is subject to action for damages to party
aggrieved by his neglect to make due return of
any writ or process delivered to him to be executed.

62-2-31

The State is liable for all or any damages done
to the real or personal property of any person
by any wild animal protected by game and fish
laws, such damages to be determined and paid as
provided in sections 62-2-31 to 62-2-38.

99-2-9

During the time that a policeman, deputy sheriff,
or fireman of a town, city, city and county,
county, or fire protection district is assigned
to temporary duty within the jurisdiction of
another town, city, city and county, county, or
fire protection district, any liability which
may accrue under the operation of the doctrine
of respondeat superior on account of the negligent act of any such police officer, deputy
sheriff, or fireman while performing such duty
shall be imposed upon the requesting town, city,
city and county, county, or fire protection district and not upon the assigning jurisdiction;
provided that nothing in this section shall be
construed to impose any liability upon any such
requesting jurisdiction nor to waive or affect
in any way the doctrine of sovereign immunity
with respect to any such jurisdiction.
-39-

TABLE III
Statutes Providing For Immunity
Of Governmental Entities
C.R.S. 1963
36-12-4

The county commissioners, county employees, or any
person enforcing the provisions of county dog
licensing laws shall not be held responsible for
any accident or subsequent disease that may occur in connection with the administration of a
dog licensing law.

66-23-13

The health departments, their assistants and employees, the state department of public health,
health officer, or anyone enforcing the provisions of the statute on rabies control shall not
be held responsible for any accident or subsequent disease that may occur in connection with
the administration of the provisions of the
statute on rabies controlo

5-4-1

Operation of airport or other air navigation facility declared to be a governmental function,
exercised for a public purpose and matters of
public necessity.

5-5-7

Airport authority declared to be a political subdivision of the state, exercising essential governmental powers for a public purpose.

24-1-10

State and political subdivision declared to be immune from liability for injuries caused by civil
defense activities, except to extent of compensation provided for in the statute.

24-4-2

School district not liable for injuries caused by
school evacuation drills in exercise of civil
defense activities.

24-4-3

School district not liable for injuries caused by
the use of busses in the exercise of civil defense activities.

71-1-24

No person, acting in good faith under any order of
court directing that a person be held in custody
or be held for confinement, examination, diagnosis, observation, or treatment, and not acting
in violation or abuse thereof, shall be liable
for such action. No action for false arrest or
false imprisonment shall be brought against any
-40-

TABLE III
(Continued)
peace officer or sheriff who, in good faith,
takes a person into protective custody under
section 71-1-3. No action based on the fact or
act of filing a petition shall be brought ~gainst
a person who, in good faith, files a petition or
otherwise acts under section 71-1-4 or section
71-1-5; but a person who wilfully causes, or who
conspires with or assists another to cause, unwarranted hospitalization or confinement under
the provisions of this article shall be liable
in damages to the person so hospitalized or confined.
82-7-6

Benefits of unemployment compensation shall be
deemed to be due and payable only to the extent
provided in this chapter and to the extent that
moneys are available therefor to the credit of
the unemployed compensation fund, and neither
the state nor the department shall be liable for
any amount in excess of such sums.

94-1-45

The commanding officer of any of the military
forces, engaged in the suppression of an insur~
rection, the dispersion of a mob or the enforcement of the laws shall exercise his discretion
as to the propriety of firing upon or otherwise
attacking any mob or other unlawful assembly;
and, if he exercises his honest judgment thereon, he shall not be liable in either a civil or
a criminal action for any act done while on such
duty. No officer or enlisted man shall be held
liable in either a civil or criminal action for
any act done under lawful orders and in the performance of his duty.

105-7-27

County not liable for or on account of the escape
of any prisoner from the county jail.

112-2-16

State not liable to settlers of desert land for
failure of contractors to complete work according to construction contract with the state.

120-7-13

No liability shall attach, either to the state,
the department of highways or the individual members of the said department of highways by virtue
of the construction, reconstruction, maintenance,
improvementi or operation of any t~rnpike or
speedway auth9rized to be constructed.
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TABLE III
(Continued)
139-39-7 (5)

No liability of town treasurer or city council

member for loss of public funds by reason of
the default or insolvency of depository.

Claims Procedure_in Colorado
Colorado claims commission. The Colorado Claims Commission
was established by 130-10-1 et seq., C.R.S. 1963 (1965 Supp.), as
amended. This statute was adopted in 1965 and took effect on July
1, 1965, and applies only to claims occurring after July 1, 1963.
The statute was amended in 1967 by chapter 280, 1967 Session Laws.
The commission is composed of John P. Proctor, CPA, State Auditor,
chairman; Con F. Shea, State Controller; and Robert Bronstein,
State Budget Di.rector. The commission was established to create
an orderly and expeditious procedure to aid the General Assembly
in the consideration and evaluation of tort claims against the
state. 165 It is declared that the article shall not be construed
as a waiver or repudiation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
firmly established in the law of Colorado, by the state of ColQrado, or any state agency, or any of its political subdivisions.166
The statute, in essence, provides that any person claiming
injury to his person or property or loss of life caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of a state agency, or of a
state employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment, may (except as to claims specifically excluded) file his
claim with the commission which shall consider each claim, and
make findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition
thereof. Within five days after the convening of the next regular
session of the General Assembly the commission shall make its report by filing its records, findings and recommendations with the
chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee. Either committee of the General Assembly may: (1) approve the claim as recommended or modify the
claim and present it to the General Assembly in the form of an appropriation bill; or (2) present a bill authorizing the claimant
to sue the state; or (3) deny the claim and take no action at all.167

i65.

130-10-1, C.R.S. 1963 (1965 Supp.), as amended.

166.

Ibid.

167.

130-10-5, 7, 8, C.R.S. 1963 (1965 Supp.), as amended.
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claims:

The jurisdiction of the commission does not extend to
(b) Based upon an act or omission of
a state employee exercising reasonable care
in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid; or based upon the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty involving the
determination of policy for a state agency on
the part of a state employee or state agency,
whether or not the discretion involved be
abused;
(c) Based upon an act or omission of a
state employee for which insurance coverage
is provided under the provisions of article
16 of chapter 72, C.R.S. 1963, or under any
other statutory provision;
(d) For injury to or death of an inmate
of a state penal institution;
(e) Arising out of the care or treatment of a person in a state institution;
(f) For damages caused by the imposition of a quarantine by the State;
(g) Arising out of alleged assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel or slander, misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, interference with contractual rights,
or invasion of the right of privacy;
(h) For which a remedy is provided or
which is governed specifically by other statutory enactment, or for which an administrative hearing procedure is otherwise established
by law.168

Claims experience. From the effective date of the statute
to January 9, 1967, a total of 21 claims amounting to $1,111,019.49
had been filed with the commission, as detailed in Table IV of thi~
report. Of the 21 claims filed, 11 claims totaling $1,031,428.52
were filed alleging damages as a result of the d~str~cti~n_ of prop-

168.

130-10-4 (2), C.R.s. 1963 (1965 Supp.), as amended.
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erty by the flood of June 17 and 18, 1965, occasioned by the destruction of Clay Creek Oum and Reservoir in Prowers County, which
was constructed by the Depc.rtment of Game, Fish and Parks • .t69
The results of the commi~sion activities for 1966 are summarized as follows:170
I.

Claims Pending - awaiting hearings or additional information:
l.
2 ..

3.
4o

5.
6.

II.

Arapahoe Basin, Inc.
E~ B. Ketchum, d/b/a Canon Vegetable Growers
Elnora Z. Steele
George and Georgia Hoopes
Alexander Thiele
Earl Sanders

Claims rejected by the Commission for lack of jurisdiction:

1.

2.

III.

66-10
66-12
66-15
66-16
66 ... 19
66-20

66-1

66-14

Ralph E. Doney
William H. Dawson

Claims on which the Commission hereby submits recommendations to the General Assembly:
1.

2.

That the General Assembly pass appropriate relief
bills for;
a)

66-2 - Janet R. Meneley - a bill in the amount
of $20,000.00 to compensate for the death of
her husband in a highway accident.

b)

66-21 - Jerald C. Rich of $174.19 to compensate
in his automobile stolen
Buckley Field Honor Camp
Reformatory.

a bill in the amount

for the loss of items
by "trustees" of the

of the Colorado State

That the General Assembly pass appropriate bills
waiving the defense of sovereign immunity and permitting the following claimants to sue for damages
alleged to have been suffered as a result of the
failure of the Clay Creek Dam in Prowers County;

169.

Report of the Colorado Claims Commission, January 7, 1967.

170.

Ibid.
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66-3
66-4
66-5
66-6
66-7
66-8
66-9
66-11
66-13
66-17
66-18

Darrel E. and Ruth B. Sawyer
James M. Smith
Carrie F. Hall
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.
Lamar Farms (a partnership) and Brent and
Gary Hofmeister, (Minors)
William Walker
Richard I. and Bertha I. Moss
Lamar Canal and Irrigation Company
Wesley Sage, d/b/a Plains Outdoor Advertising Company
Cecile and Amelia Thombleson
Fort Bent Ditch Company
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TABLE IV
Claims Filed With Colorado Claim~_Commission - July 1, 1965 to Decamber 31 1 1966*
Docket

-66-1

Amount

Nu::iber

$

19,941.85

Cle.ime.nt

Ralph E. Doney

Date
__r~

Nature

::>f

1

Cls.im

7.. 28-65

Airplane d~stroyed

J'uz'isdictio11 denied.

R~c~end $~0,000 Relief Bill

66-2

26,200.00 · .Janet R. Men'=ley

lO-ll.-65

Fatal automobile accident

66-3

Da.n~l and R-..ttb Sawyer

James M~ Sm.ii;h

12-3-65
12-3-65

Damages - Cay

66-4

85.,274.69
7~.00

66-5

1;,200.00

C&r!'ie F. Kall

66-6

225,597.00

A.T.

66-7

594,858.00

ta.ma.r Fs.:rm.s ( a. pa..-rtnership) s.nd

&

S.F. Railway Compe.ey

Di=nosition
..

~~ ~

Creek Dai:i:.

'Re~a:imiend sttit b,.-. ;: D,m,;,,;..:,

Damages

- Clay Cr~k Je.m

·:--.-:;cau::nend suit be ili0wed

12-13-65

Damages

- Clay Creek Dam

P.~~c::::!:!end suit be a:;_1_~

12-14-65
12-14-65

Damages - Clay Creek Dam

:::~cor.,-nend silit be ru.lo~

Damages - Clay C~eek D::..m.

Re command su.1t be a..tlow":!d

Brent and Gary Hofmeister (Minors)

I
~

°"

66-8

14,000.00

William Walker

12.. 28-65

Dama.gos

Clay Creek Dt".:.:l

Eec0?:m1end suit b-e allc:•~d

66-9

37,257.83

Rich2-"'"d. I. and Bertha I. Moss

Damages - Clay Creek Dam

Recommend suit be e.llo.ea.

66-lO
66-ll

1,500.00

Arapahoe Be.sin, Inc.

l-17-66
3-24-66

Damages from

ties.ring pend.ing

10,790.00

Lamar Canal and Irrigation Company

4-20-66

Dall!B.ges - Clay Creek Dam

Recon..miend suit bn allO".red.

66-12

2,oo4.93

Trailer did not clea~ unde~a~s

Hea:ri.ng pexxling

Damages - Clay Creek De.m.

Rec~nd. suit be allow.ea.

Bid.ding sp~cilications changed without

Jurisdiction denied

E.B. Ketchum, d/b/a Ca.non Vegete,ble 4.. 2.1-66 ·

~

"shooting" sl.ide

Growers

I

66-13

900.00

66-14

1,250.00

66-15
66--16
66-17
66-18

25,000.00

4-27-66

William H. Dawson

5-26-66

notice

z.

Steele

6-30-66

Fe.te.l automobile e.ccident

Heaz-i.r1.g pending

George and Georgia Hoopes

6-29-66

Automobile accident

Hearing pending

15,660.00

Cecil and Amelia Thombleson

Damages - Clay Creek Dam

Recommend suit be allowed

31,095.00

Fort Bent Ditch_company

7-5-66
7-5-66

De.ma.ges - Clay Creek Dam

Recommend suit be

Alexander 11hi~l.e

9-12-66

Injured when State Patrol.ms.n's gun
discharged

Has.ring pending

Earl Sanders

ll-8-66
10-11-66

Property a.long highway destroyed

Hearl!'~ pending

Auto stolen by Reformatory "trustees"

Recommend $174.19 Relief Bill

2_~020.00

66-19

(not e.Ueged.)

66-20

1,500.00

66-21

174.19
$l 2lll 1019.49

*

Wesley Sage, d/b/a Plains Outdoor
Advertising Company

Source:

Elnora

Jerald C. Rich
TOTAL ~"iOONT OF CIAIMS FILED

Report of the Colorado Claims Commission, January 7, 1964

a.l.Jg.fl!d

Claims filed with the commission in 1967 are listed in
Table V below.
TABLE V

Claims Filed with Colorado Claims Commission January 1, 1967 to October, l967
Docket
Number
67-1

Amount
$

1,000.00

Claimant

Date
Filed

Nature of Claim

Donna Manley - a
minor by mother Barbara L. Davis

1-5-67

Injured in collision with station
wagon of Children~
Home - no Colorado
drivers license.

Edith Crusick

1 .. 10-67

Windshield of auto
broken by State
Hospital patient

67-2

115.54

67-3

26,753.05

Virgil R. Madsen,
by parents Virgil
R. Madsen and Nina
Madsen

1-25-67

Four year old
claimant burned
while playing on
Highway Dep't aggregate pile which
was on fire.

67-4

15,000.00

Golden
Homes,
Mi-arv
ments,

3-21-67

City of Denver has
sued petitioners
for discharging
water into Highline Canal - petitioners hold
state should indemnify.

67-5

208.30

William R. Mackie

4-24-67

X-ray unit damaged
- alleged due to
negligence in inspection.

67-6

161.03

Stanley Haynes

6-14-67

Hit boulder in
center of Highway
40 on Berthoud
Pass - alleged
negligence of
grader.

67-7

90.00

Floyd Ellis
Leopold

7-25-67

State patrolman
ran into claimants
parked car.

Key Manor
Inc. and
InvestInc.
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TABLE V
(Continued)
Docket
Number
67-8

Amourt

Claimant

$45,166.17

Rep. G~orge
Fe~tress - fo~ app:,~..oxlmatel y 24
claimants

Date
Filed
9-5-67

Nature of Claim
Residences clamaged
by flooding due to
inadequate drainage of Highway.

· During the 1967 session, the General Assembly adopted HnB.
No. 1127, which granted to perso.ns who sustained injury by the diversion of Clay Creel~ flood water by Clay Creek dam in June, 1965,

the right to initiate a civil action against.the state to recover
damages. The General Assembly in 1967 d:i.so passed H.B. No .. 1114
which grantee' $20,000 to Mrs. Janet R. Meneley for damages sustained when her husband was killed as a result of negligent. repairs
of a state highway.

Q_t,her cJ_aims against· the sta..:.tn,. The division of accounts
and control is authorized to receiv~, hear and settle all claims
against the state and issue warrants for payment thereof from the
treasury.171 Warrants for the payment of duly audited and approved claims shall be ~repared, signed and transmitted to the
state treasurer by the controller or his authorized agent.172 It
is also provi.ded that "The attorney general shall be the legal advisor of the controller and the division of accounts and control
and to him shall be rererred any question concerning the legality
of any obligation by or claim against the state~l73 Whether these
provisions relate to the presentation of tort claims against the
state is not quite clear as there are no cases in which this question has been decided or the provisions construed. In the light
of the Colorado C~aims Commission Act, however, it would appear
that these provisions relate only to the presentment of claims on
contract, and not tort claims, which are presented to the claims
commission.
Claims handled by independent agencies or deeartments.
Section 24-2-1 et seq., c.ff.s. !963, establishes a procedure for
the presentation of claims for compensation benefits of volunteer
workers injured in civil defense activities. These claims are
presented to the Industrial Commission and the procedure thus established is similar to the procedure for the presentation of
claims for workmen's compensation benefits.

111.

3_j.! (Is), C.R.S. 1963.

172.

3-3-2 (6), C.R.S. 1963.

173.

3-3-2 (10), C.R.S. 1963~
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Claims for damages for injuries by wild.animals which are
protected by the game and fish laws of the state are presented to
the Game, Fish and Parks Commission pursuant to the procedure extablished by sections 62-2-32 through 62-2-38, CaR.S. 1963. Any
person who has sustained damages by wild animals must notify the
commission of such loss and claim for damages within 10 days and
file proof thereof. Within 30 days from the filing of notice the
commission, if possible, shall agree with such person upon a settlement. If no settlement can be reached, the claimant and the
commission shall each appoint an arbitrator, in which event the
two arbitrators shall agree upon a third arbitrator. Within 60
days from the appointment of the arbitrators, an award must be
made. The arbitration award shall be finalo Payment of the award
is out of the game and fish fund. 174
All claims against the University of Colorado must be audited.and allowed by the Board of Regents pursuant to 124-2-17,
C .. R. S .. 1963 .
Claims against counties. All claims against a county shall
be presented for audit and allowance to the board of county commissioners of the proper county before an action in any court can be
maintained against the county. When allowed by the board, the
claims shall be paid by a county warrant, or order, drawn by said
board on the county treasury, upon the proper fund in the treasury,
for the amount of such claim. When the claim is disallowed, in
whole or in part, by the board, such person may appeal the decision
of the board to the district court for the same county within 30
days after the making of such decision. 175 Provision i~ made for
the proceedings and pleadings upon appeal to the district court.176
Claims against special districts. There are several provisions ot the Colorado statutes which provide for the presentation, audit and payment of claims against special districts.177

174.

62-2-32 to 62-2-38, C.R.S. 1963; see also note 152, supra.

175.

36-2-10 et seqo, C.R.S. 1963.

176.

36-2-13, CaR~S. 1963, as amended

177.

E.g •• 89-1-25, C.R.S. 1963 (water ork districts); 150-1-25,
C.R.S. 1963 (irrigation district of 1905); 150-2-29, C.R.S.
1963 (irrigation district of 1921}; 150-4-37, C.R.S. 1963
(internal improvement district); and 29-6-4, C.R.S. 1963
(conservancy districts).
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TABLE VI

Provisions Relating To
Claims Against GovernmentaJ Entities

C.R.S. 1963
3-3-1 (18)

Authorizes division of accounts and control to
receive, hear~ and settle all claims against
the state and i~sue warrants for payment thereof from the treasury.

24-2-1 et seq.

Establishes procedore for presenting claims for
compensation benefits of volunteer workers injured in civil ~efe1'se activitieso Claims are
presented to Industr~al Commission~ Procedure
is similar to procedure established for the
presAntment of claims for workmen's compensation benef .L ts.

36-2-10 et seq.

All claims and demands held by any person against
a county shall be presented for audit and allowance to th~ board of county commissioners of
the proper county, in due form of law, before
an action in any court shall be maintainable
thereon, and ~11 claims, when allowed, shall be
paid by a county warrant, or order, drawn by
said board on the county treasury, upon the proper fund in the treasury, for the amount of such
claim.
The nature of the claim, the name of and the
amount paid to each individual, disclosure of
the fund charged with the claim, etc., must be
published by the board according to the provisions in 36-2-11~
When any claim of any person against a county
shall be disallowed, in whole or in part, by
the board, such person may appeal from the decision of such board to the district court for
the same county, by causing a written notice of
such appeal to be served on the clerk of such
board within 30 days after the making of such
decision, and executing a bond to such county,
with sufficient security, to be approved by the
clerk of said board, conditioned for the faithful prosecution of such appeal, and the payment
of all costs that shall be adjudged against the
appellant. See section 36-2-12.
Section 36-2-13, C.R.S. 1963, as amended, provides
for the proceedings and pleadings upon appeal.
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TABLE VI
(Continued)

C.R.S. 1963
62-2-32 to
62-2-38

Establishes a procedure for the presentation of
claims to the game, fish and parks commission,
and for the determination and payment of such
claims for damages for injuries by wild animals.

89-1-25

Establishes procedure for the presentation, determination and payment of claims against waterworks districts.

124-2-17

All claims against the University of Colorado must
be audited and allowed by the Board of Regents.

150-1-25

Audit and payment of claims against Irrigation
District of 1905.

150-2-29

Audit and payment of claims against Irrigation
District of 1921.

150-4-37

Audit and payment of claims against Internal Improvement District.

29-6-4

Provides remedy for the recovery of damages to
property caused by acts done by conservancy
districts.

130-10-1
et seq.

Provides for the establishment of the Colorado
Claims Commission, the jurisdiction of the commission, procedure for the presentation of
claims, etc. See amendments in chapter 280,
1967 Session Laws.

Actions and Judgments Against Governmental Entities
Statutor
revisions relatin to actions and ·ud ments
a!ainst governmental entities. In the preceding section on t e
c aims commission, it was observed that the commission has no jurisdiction over those claims based upon an act or omission of a
state employee for which insurance coverage is provided under the
provisions of 72-16-1 et seq., CsR.S. 1963, or any other statutory
provision. Thus any claim based upon an act or omission of a state
employee for which insurance coverage is provided must be brought
in the courts, but no action shall be brought unless it is brought
within two years from the date the cause of action, if any, shall
accrue.178

11a.

72-16-6, c.RnS.

1963.
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If any judgment is given and rendered against a county,
provision is made for the payment of such judgment"l79 The county board is authorized to pay such judgment by warrant drawn on
the county fund or the j~dgment may be paid by the levy of a tax
upon the taxable property in the county not to exceed one and onehalf per centum on the dollars of assessed property for any fiscal
year. The board is not required to levy such special tax to pay
any such judgment unless in its discretion the board shall so determine. The amount of any such levy necessary to be made for the
purpose of paying any judgment against the county is in no way
limited by the provisions of article 3 of chapter 36, C.R.S.
1963.180
The statutes contain provisions relating to the bringing
of an action against a city for the recovery of compensation for
personal injury or death.181 The statute provides that written
notice must be given to the town or city within 90 days after the
happening of the accident which gave rise to the cause of action.
The action must be commenced within two years from the occurrence
of the accident causing the injury or death. Cities and municipal
corporations, like counties, are alsn authorized to levy a special
tax to pay judgments rendered against them.182 Like a county,
there is no limit on the amount of any levy necessary to be made
for the payment of any judgment rendered against the cityol83
All actions against sheriffs or other officers for the
escape of persons imprisoned on civil process shall be commenced
within six months fro~ the time of such escape, and not afterwards.184 In addition# all actions against sheriffs and coroners
upon any liability incurred by them by the doing of any act in
their capacity or by the omission of any official duty, except in
relation to accounting to the county for fees earned or collected,
and except for escapes, shall be brought within one year after the
cause of action shall have accrued.185

179.

36-2-4, C.R.S. 1963.

180.

36-3-5, C.R.S. 1963.

181.

139-35-1, C.R.S. 1963.

182.

77-10-1, C.R.S. 1963.

183.

36-3-5, C .. R.S. 1963.

184.

87-1-1, C.R.S. 1963.

185.

87-1-3, C.R.S. 1963,.
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TABLE VII

Provisions Relatinq To Actions and Judgments
Against Governmental Entities
C.R.S. 1963
36-2-4

Provides for the payment of a judgment given and
rendered against a county. County board can
pay judgment by warrant drawn on county fund
or may be paid by the levy of a tax upon the
taxable property in the county not to exceed
one and one-half per centum on the dollars of
assessed property for any one fiscal year. The
board is not required to levy any special tax
to pay any judgment unless in its discretion
the board shall so determine.

36-3-5

The provisions of article 3 of chapter 36 shall
in no way limit the amount of any levy necessary to be made for the purpose of paying any
judgment against any county, city, town or
school district, or the interest on such judgmento

72-16-6

No action arising against an officer, employee,
or agent of the state or state governmental
subdivision for which insurance coverage is
provided pursuant to 72-16-1, shall be brought
unless the same is brought within two years
from the date the cause of the action, if any,
shall accrueo

77-10-1

Authorizes municipal corporations to levy a special tax to pay judgments rendered against them.

87-1-1

All action against sheriffs or other officers for
the escape of persons imprisoned on civil process, shall be commenced within six months from
the time of such escape, and not afterwards.

87-1-3

All actions against sheriffs and coroners upon
ary liability incurred by them by the doing of
a, y act in their capacity or by the omission
of any official duty, except in relation to accounting to the county for fees earned or collected, and except for escapes, shall be brought
within one year after the cause of action shall
have accrued, and not after that period.

94-1-46 and
94-1-47

Provisions relating to the bringing of an action
against an officer of the military forces or an
enlisted man acting pursuant to an order of any
such officer.
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Tfl.BI..E VII

(Continued)
C.R. S ') 196.3

139-35-1

Provides relating to the bringing of an action
againJt a city for the recovery of compensation
for personal injury or death. Written notice
must 11e given to town or city within 90 days
after accident. Action must be commenced with:i.P b'l. 0 Y':'ars from the occurrence of the accident cauring the injury or death.
1

Insurance
Statutory provisions relati_ng to insurance, generally.
Pursuant to the provisions of section 13-10-3, C.R.S. 1963, the
state, counties: municipalities or quasi-municipalities may cover
their liabilities and shall cover the liabilities of their motor
vehicle drivers in whole or in part through the procurement of
insurance from any insurance company authorized to do business in
this state, or, in their discretion, may self-insure and may set
aside necessary public funds to create proper reserves against
contingent and anticipated liabilittes, or may effect a combination of the two methodso The state, counties, municipalities or
quasi-municipalities are thus made liable for injuries caused by
the negligent operation of government-owned vehicles to the extent
of the following limitations: bodily injury liability limited to
$10,000 for each person and $20,000 for each accident; and property damage liab.:.lity limited to $5,000 for each accident.
The state, its 2gencies, cities, counties, or city and
county, are authorized to procure insurance for the purpose of insuring their officers, employees, and agents against any liability
for injuries or damages resulting from their negligence or other
tortious conduct du~ing the course of their service or employment.
The extent of the insurance coverage is limited to $50,000 for
bodily injury liability for each person, $100,000 for bodily injury liability for each accident, and $25,000 liability for property damage.186
School district. A school district is authorized to expend funcrs--fo pay premiums to procure liability and property
damage insurance covering such district, its governing body, officers and employees, and others while participating in civil de-
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fense activities. Immunity is waived to the extent of the amount
as is covered by an existing and valid policy of insurance.187
Boards of education and boards of cooperative services.
Boards of education and boards of cooperative services are authorized to procure public liability insurance covering the school
district, directors, employees, and others.188 They are also authorized to procure liability and property damage insurance on
school busses or motor vehicles owned or rented by the school districts. Each policy of liability insurance purchased by a school
district or a board of cooperative services is to contain a condition to the effect that said insurer or carrier shall not assert
the defense of sovereign immunity otherwise available to the school
district or employee thereof within the maximum amounts payable
thereunder. The failure to procure such insurance or the failure
to procure any such insurance in an amount sufficient to satisfy
the entire claim or claims is not to be construed as creating any
liability against the school district, director, or employee, or
against the board of cooperative services.189
TABLE VIII
Provisions Relating to the Purchase of
Insurance By Governmental Entities
C.R.S. 1963
13-10-3

The state, counties, municipalities or quasimunicipalities authorized to purchase insurance
to cover liabilities of motor vehicle drivers.

24-4-4

A School district is authorized to procure insur-

72-16-1 et seq.

Authorizes the state, its agencies, city, county,
city and county to procure insurance to insure
officers, employees and agents against their
liability.

ance to cover liabilities arising from the exercise of civil defense activities.

187.

24-4-4, C.RoS. 1963.

188.

123-30-10 (23) & (24), C.R~S. 1963, as amended (boards of
education); 123-34-7, C.R.S. 1963, as amended (boards of cooperative services).
.

189.

123-30-11, C.R.So 1963, as amended.
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TABLE VIII
(Continued)
C.R.S. 1963
J.23-30-10 (23)
and (24)

Boards of education authorized to procure public
liability insurance.

123-30-11

Provides that contract of insurance entered into
by board of education pursuant to section 12330-10 (23) and (24) is to contain condition
that carrier shall not assert the defense of
sovereign immunity within the maximum amounts
payable under the policy.

123-34-7

Boards of cooperative services authorized to procure public liability insurance.
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
. The.doctrine of soverei9n immunity has become firmly established in the states. Despite condemnation by legal writers
and scholars in terms of the history, the legal theory and the
philosophies that bear on the problem, or the procedur; and decisions in particular jurisdictions, the fact of the doctrine's
existence remains and the general rule continues to be that there
is no state liability for tort unless consent is given. In all
of the states, however, consent has been given, to a greater or
lesser extent, and in a variety of forms.
It is the purpose of this part to explore the condition of
the law on the problems raised by the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the other states and the solutions to these problems
which have been formulated, in the hope that trends, procedures,
progress, or the lack of it, and state policies as revealed by
state action will be made clearer and more significant as illustrating the alternatives open to the state of Colorado in rationalizing our law on the subject.
For this purpose the existing immunities and liabilities
in each of the several states are surveyed and examined in terms
of the extent to which government entities are immune from liability and the extent in which they are liable. In addition, the
various remedies that have been formulated by the states in providing procedures for adjudicating claims against the state, its
agencies and subdivisions when immunity has been waived, or the
courts have declared the doctrine to be inapplicable, are set out
in summary fashion.
Immunities and Liabilities in Other Jurisdictions
There is, of course, great variation from state to state,
and reference has been made to the law in each jurisdiction rather than a random sampling. A summary of the law in each jurisdiction is contained herein~ This summary is by no means detailed
and complete and it is probable that some relevant statutes or
lines of judicial decision in some of the states have been overlooked. Nevertheless, a fair picture of the way each state handles the problem of tort claims against it is presented.
The states. The common law doctrine of governmental immunity is the basic rule throughout most states. Few states have
broken away from the immunity rule in any substantial degree.
New York has done so more completely than any of the other states,
and a few others, such as Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, Michigan, Utah, Vermont, and Washington,
have gone most but not all of the way. 190

190.

See notes 191, 192, 193, and 194, infra.
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Alaska and Hawaii adopted at statehood statutes patterned
after the Federal Tort Claims Act.191 Only Iowa, Nevada, New
York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have done away with the immunity of the state for tortious acts by statute.192 Arizona is
the only state which 5.s presently liable for its torts at common
law as a result of judicial decision.193 California, Michigan
and Utah have enacted leglslation which continues to make the
state immune, except as otherwise provided by statute, and these
exceptions are very broad, which in effect makes the state liable
in most circumstancesrl94 Thus 1 with the exception of the 12
states enumerated, in every other jurisdiction the states enjoy
general immunity for their tortious acts either at common law or
by constitutional provision, subject, in certain states, to specific statutory or judicial exceptions.
Immunity Qf states. In 24 states this immunity is either
reinforced by or derived from constitutional provisions. Four of
these states have constltutional prohibitions against the-state
ever being made a defendant in its own courts.195 It is interesting to notep however, that all four have provided ~dministrative procedures for the adjudication of tort claims.196 In 19
states, constitutional provisions to the effect that suits may be
brought against the state only as ~he legislature shall direct

191.

Alaska Stat. § 09.50.250 et seq. (1952, Supp. 1965); Rev.
Laws of Hawaii§ 24~A-l et seq. (1965 Supp.).

192.

"Iowa Tort Claims Act! 61 G.A., ch. 79 (1965) and Iowa Code
§ 25A.l et seq. (1966J; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 (1965);
N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act§ 1 et seq. (1963); Oregon Laws, ch. 627
(1967); Vt. Stat. Ann. T.12, § 5601 et seq (1961, as amended
1963); Rev. Code Wash. § 4.92.010 et seq. (1963).

193.

Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d
107 (1963).

194.

Calif. Govt. Code Ann. § 810-996.6 (Supp. 1965)j Mich. Public Act 170 (1964) and Mich. Stat. Ann§ 3.996 \Supp. 1965);
Laws of Utah, Ch. 139, § 1 et seq. (1965) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-1 et seq. (Supp. 1965).

195.

Alabama, Ala. Const. Art. 1, § 14; Arkansas, Ark. Const. Art.
V, § 20; Illinois, Ill. Const. Art. IV, § 26; West Virginia,
W. Va~ Const. Art. VI, § 35.

196.

Code of Ala., tit. 55, §§ 333, 334 (Supp. 1963); Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 13-1401 et seq. (Supp. 1965); Ill. Ann. Stato Ch. 37
§ 439.1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 1143 et seq. (1961).

0
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have been construed to mean that the state is immune in the absence of legislative action consenting to suit or liability.197
Four states have constitutional boards of examiners which are
given sole jurisdiction over claims against the state.198 This
means that the state is immune except for those claims which are
presented and allowed by the board of examiners. Nineteen states
includi~g Colorado, have no constitutional provisions directly
'
concerning the matter but have been made immune from liability by
judicial decision.199
197.

California, Calif. Const. Art. XX, § 6; Delaware, Del. Const.
Art. 1, § 9; Florida, Fla. Const. Art. III, § 22; Indiana,
Ind. Const. Art. IV, § 24; Iowa, Iowa Const. Art. III,§ 31;
Kentucky, Ky. Const. § 231; Louisiana, La. Const. Art. 3,
§ 35; Nebraska, Neb. Const. Art. V, § 22; New York, N.Y.
Const. Art. VI, § 23; North Dakota, N.D. Const. Art. I,
~ 22; Ohio, Ohio Const. Art. I, § 16; Oregon, Ore. Const.
Art. IV, § 24: Pennsylvania, Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11; South
Carolina, S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 2; South Dakota, S.D.
Const. Art. III, § 27; Tennessee, Tenn. Const. Art. 1, § 17;
Washington, Wash. Const. Art. II, § 26; Wisconsin, Wis. Const.
Art. IV, § 27; Wyoming, Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 8.

198.

Idaho, Idaho Const. Art. 4, § 818; Montana, Mont. Const.
Art. VII, § 20; Nevada, Nev. Const. Art. IV, § 22; Utah,
Utah Consto Art. VII, § 13.

199.

Colorado, Ace Fl in Service Inc. v. Colo. De t. of A riculture, 136 olo. 19, 314 P.2d 278
957 · Connecticut, nse no
V:-Cox, 135 Conn. 78, 60 A.2d 767 (1948); Georgia, National
Distributing Company v. Oxford, 103 Ga. App. 72, 118 S.E.2d
274 {1961); Kansas, Phillirs v. State Highway Commission,
148 Kan. 702, 84 P.2d 9271938); Maine~ Austin W. Jones Co.
v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 A. 577 (1923J; Maryland, Davis v.
State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944); Massachusetts, Executive Air Service, Inc. v. Division of Fisheries and Game,
342 Mass. 356. 173 N.E.2d 6I4 (1961); Minnesota, Youngstown
Mines Corp. v. Prout, 124 N.W.2d 328 (1963); Mississippi,
Horne v. State Buildin Commission, 233 Miss. 810, 103 So~2d
~1958; Missouri, Gas Service Co. v. Morris, 353 S.W.2d
645 (1962; New Hampshire, St. Re is Pa er Co. v. N.H. Water
Resources Board, 92 N.H. 164, 26 A.2d 832 1942; New Jersey,
McCabe v. N.J. Turn ike Authorit , 35 N.J. 26, 170 A.2d 810
1961 ; New Mexico, State v. Burs, 75 N.M. 19, 399 P.2d 920
1965 ; North Carolina, State Highway Commission v. Batts,
265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 {1965); Oklahoma, Mountcastle
v~ State, 193 Okla. 506, 145 P.2d 392 (1943); Rhode Island,
Rhode Island Turnfike and Bridge Authority v. Nugent, 95 R.I.
19, 182 A.2d 427 1962); Texas, Allen v. State, 410 S.W.2d
54 (1966); Vermont, Town of Stockbrid e v. State Hi hwa Bd.,
125 Vt~ 366, 216 A.2d 44 1965 ; and Virginia, Elizabeth
River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 117 S.W.2d 685
(196l)ft
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hlability of states. Although the states in general enjoy
governmental immunity, most of ~hem have made statutory exceptions to the doctrine and have consented to be liable in particular instances. The twelve states which provide liability to the
greatest extent are listed ~bove. Also a total of 19 states, including Colorado, are made liable for injuries caused by the negligent operation of go·,.rernment-owned motor vehicles .200 Twenty
states are liable for ~njuries caused by the defective conditions
of public highwdys, bridges, etc.201

200.

Alaska, Alaska Stat:§ 09.50.250 et seq. (Supp. 1966); Arizona, Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381
P.2d 107 (1963); California, Calif. Govt. Code Anne § 815 et
seq. (Suppo 1965); Colorado, C.R~S. 13-10-1 et seq. (1963);
Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-556 (1958l; Hawaii, Rev.
Laws of Hawaii, § 245A-l et seq. (1965 Supp. ; Iowa, Iowa
Code§ 25A-l et seq. (1966); Kansas, K.S.A. 12-2601 et seq.
Supp. 1966); Michigan, Mich_ Stat. Ann. § 3-996 (1)-(15)
1948 as amended 1964); Nevada, Nev~ Rev. Stat.§ 41-031
{ 19651; New York N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act (1963); Oregon, Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 278.090 1,1965); Pennsylvania, Pa. Statp Ann. T. 71
§ 634 (Purdon 1962); South Carolinar S.C. Code Ann.§ 33-229
(1962); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-801 et seq. (1956. as
amended 1965); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq (Supp.
1965); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 12 § 5601 et seq. (1961,
as amended 1963); Washington, Rev. Code Wash.§ 4.92.010 et
seq. (1963); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 345.01 (1965).

201.

Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 09.50.250 et seq. (Supp. 1966); Arizona, Stone v. Arizona Hi~hway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381
P.2d 107 (1963); California, Calif. Govt. Code Ann. § 815 et
seq. (Supp. 1965); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 13a-144
(Supp. 1966); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 95-1710 (1958); Hawaii,
Rev. Laws of Hawaii, § 245A-l et seq. (1965 Supp.); Iowa,
Iowa Code§ 25A-l et seq. (1966); Kansas, K.S.A. § 68-419
(1964); Louisiana, Kilgatrick v. State, 154 So.2d 439 (1963);
Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. h. 17 § 1451 (1964); Massachusetts,
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 81 § 18 (1961); Michigan, Mich.
Stat. Ann. 3-996 (1)-(15) (1948, as amended 1964); Nevada,
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 (1965); New.Hampshire, N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 245:20, 247:17 (1966); New York, N.T. Ct. Cl.
Act (1963); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 366.430, 373.060, and
105.760 (1965); South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 33-229
(1962); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-801 et seq. {1956, as
amended 1965); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. (Supp.
1965); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 19 § 29, 33 (1959); Washington, Rev. Code Wash. § 4.92.010 et seq. (1963).
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The purchase of liability insurance constitutes in some
states a waiver of immunity. Eleven states authorizing the purchase of general liability insurance,202 and six states authorizing only automobile liability insurance,203 have express provisions waiving their immunity to the extent of the insurance. Six
other states, including Colorado, are also permitted to purchase
either general or automobile liability insurance, but the statutes do not indicate that the purchase constitutes a waiver of
the defense of sovereign immunity.204
Other Factors affecting immunity or liability. Several
states have constitutional prohibitions against the enactment of
special acts giving legislative relief.205 Another significant
fact is that enactment of procedural statutes authorizing suits
against the state or its subdivisions by all persons having claims
against them has very little bearing upon the substantive tort
liability of the government entity. In many states, these enactments have been interpreted as merely permitting the filing of
suits or claims, but as having no effect upon the state's substantive tort liability, the theory being that these statutes
merely permit actions to be brought when liability independently
exists.206

..

202.

Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3240 et seq. (1963 Supp.);
Idaho, Idaho Code§ 41-3501 et seq. (1962); Indiana, Ind.
Stat. Anno § 39-1819 (Burns 1963); Iowa, Iowa Code§ 517.l
(1966); Montana, Mont. Rev. Code§ 83-701 et seq. (1965
Supp.); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.037, 41.038 (1965);
New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412:3 (1955, as amended
1961); New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-6-18 et seq. (1966
Supp.); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 243.110, 278.090 (1965);
Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. (1965 Supp.); Vermont,
Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 29 § 1403 et seq. (1959).

203.

Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-556 (1958); Florida, Fla.
Stat.§§ 234.03, 240.191, 455.06 (1965 Supp.); Georgia, Ga.
Code Ann. §§ 32-429, 32-431 (1965 Supp.); Kansas, Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 12-2601 et seq. (1964); North Dakota, N.D. Rev. Code
§ 39-01-08 (1965 Suppe); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. T. 47
§§ 157.1, 158.l (1962, as amended 1963).

204.

California, Calif. Govt. Ann. §§ 990-991.2 (Supp. 1965);
Colorado, C.R.S. § 13-10-1 (1963); Kentucky 1 K.R.S. § 44-055
(1962); Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 3.996 \1)-(15) (1948,
as amended 1964); Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. T. 71 § 364
(Purdon 1962); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 66.18 (1965).

205.

E.g., Neb. Const. Art. III, § 18.

206.

E.g., Lauritzen v. Chesa eake Ba
259 F. Supp. 633 1966; Va. Code
amended 1966).
-61-

Tunnel Dist.,
seq. 1957, as

TABLE IX

States In Which Liability Is General Rule
New Yo~k 2
Oregon
Vermont2
Washington2

Alaskal
Arizona3
Hawaiil
Iowa2
Nevada2

l Adopted at statehood statutes patterned after the Federal Tort
Claims Act.

2

Enacted statutes which have abolished sovereign immunity.

3

Is liable at common law as result of judicial abrogation of
doctrine.

TABLE X

States Where Immunity Is Derived From Constitution
Group I
Alabama
Arkansas
Illinois
West Virginia

Group 2
California
Delaware
Florida
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Nebraska
North Dakota

Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Group 3
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
Utah

Group 1.

Constitutional provision takes an affirmative form to the
effect that the state is immune from suit.

Group 2.

Constitutional provisions construed by courts to confer
immunity in the absence of express legislative action.

Group 3.

Constitution establishes a board of examiners to hear and
determine claims against the state.
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TABLE XI
States Where Immunity Is Conferred By Statute*
California

*

Michigan

Utah

These states are immune generally, but have broad statutory
exceptions to their immunity.

TABLE XII
States Where Immunity Is Derived From Common Law
COLORADO
Connecticut
Georgia
Kansas
Maine
Maryland

Massachusetts
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
New Hampshire
New Jersey

New Mexico
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
Texas
Vermont
Virginia

TABLE XIII

States Which Are Liable For Negligent Operation
of Motor Vehicles
Alaska
Arizona
California
COLORADO
Connecticut
Hawaii

Iowa
Kansas
Michigan
Nevada
New York
Oregon
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Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin

TABLE XIV

States

B

Alaska
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Georgia
Hawail

Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
New Hamp·shire

New York
Oregon
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Washington

TABLE XV

States Authorizing Purchase of Liability Insurance And
Expressly Waiving Immunity to the Extent of the Insurance
Arkansasl
Connecticut2
Florida2
Georgia2
Idahol
Indiana!

Iowal
Kansas2
Montanyl
Nevada
New Hampsh!re 1
New Mexico

North Dakota2
Oklahoma2
Oregonl
Utahl
Vermontl

1 General liability insurance.
2

Automobile liability insurance only.

TABLE XVI

~tates Authorizing Purchase of Liabilitr Insurance
But Not Expressly Waiving Immun ty
California 1
COLORADO~

Kentucky2

Michiganl
Pennsylvania2
Wisconsinl

I General liability insurance.
2

Automobile liability insurance only.
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Inverse Condemnation. Some states have acknowledged liability by classifying some types of property harms as sounding in
condemnation for eminent domain purposes. The form of recovery
for this type of damage is often referred to as inverse condemnation and is usually supported by the self-executing constitutional
prohibition against the taking or damaging of private property for
a public purpose. This is done when a tort action for property
damage would not succeed because of the immunity doctrine.207
The term inverse condemnation in its most general sense is
used to indicate an action instituted by a landowner for the purpose of compelling the state to compensate for any taking or
damaging of his property. It is distinguished from a tort action
in trespass or negligence in that it proceeds on the constitutional theory that private property may not be taken or damaged
for public purpose without compensation.208 More particularly,
the term inverse condemnation has been applied to liability for
purely consequential damage, i.e., damage in the absence of actual
physical taking.
Not all states give relief by way of actions for damages
when consequential property harms occur ·1n connection with public
uses. In seventeen states there is some liability under a theory
of inverse ~ondemnation for purely consequential damage in the
absence of an actual takingo209 In fifteen states there is no

207.

See gen~rally, Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse
Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 Stan. L.
Rev. 727 (1967); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L.
Rev. 3; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36
( 1964) .
.

208.

"Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public
or private use, without just compensation." Colo. Const.
Art. II § 15; "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law." Colo$ Const. Art.
II§ 25; Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game and Fish Commission,
149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962); Faber v. State, 143 Colo.
240, 353 P.2d 609 (1960), distinquishing'Colo. Racing Commission v. Brush Racin9 Ass'n., Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d
582 (1957) and Ace Fl in Service Inc. v. Colo. De artment
of Agriculture, 36 o o. 9, 3 4 .2d 278
957; Box er~er
v. State Highway Dept., 126 Colo. 438, 256 P.2d 1007 (l95).

209.

Ariz. Const. Art. II§§ 4,17 and State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz.
44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958); Ark. Const. Art. II§§ 8,13,22 and
Hot S rin s Count v. Bowman, 229 Ark. 790, 318 S.W.2d 603
958; Ca if. onst. Art. I§§ 13,14 and Frustuck v. City of
Fairfax, 212 Cal. App.2d 345, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1963); Colo.
Const. Art. II§§ 6,25 and Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game and
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such liability.210 In addition, the authorities in six states

Fish Commission, 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962); Ill.
Const. Art_ II§§ 2, 13, 19 and People v. Rosenstone, 16 IlL
2d 513 (1959); Minn. Const. Art. II§ 13 and State v. Ander.!Q!!, 220 Minn. 139, 19 N.W.2d 70 (1945}; Mo. Const. Art. I
§ 26 and Lewis v. Cit~ of Potosi, 348 S .. W.2d 577 {Mo. 1961);
Neb. Const. Art. I§ I and Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164
Neb. 196, 82 N.W.2d 274 (1957); N.M. Const. Art. II§ 20 and
Board of County Commissioners of Lincoln County v. Harris,
69 NaM. 315, 366 P.2d 710 (1961); Penn. Const. Art. I§§ 10,
11 and Laws of Penn. 1963, No. 6, §§ 502(e), 612; S.C. Const.
Art. I§§ 5, 17 and Chick S rin s Water Co •. v. State Hi hwa
Dept., 178 S.C. 4~5, 183 S~E. 27 1935; Tex. Const . Art.
§§ 13, 17 and Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1963);
Vt. Const. Art. I§§ 2, 4 and Griswald v. Town School Dist.,
117 Vt . 224. 88 A~2d 829 (1952); Va. Const. Art. IV§ 58 and
Hicks v. Anderson, 182 Va. 195, 28 S.E.2d 629 (1941); Wash.
Const. Art. I§§ 3, 16 and Peterson v. Kint County. 41 Wash.
2d 907, 252 P.2d 797 (1953); W.Va. Const. \rt. III§§ 9, 10,
17 and Morqan v. Logan 125 W.Va 445, 24 S.E.2d 760 (1943).;
Wyo. Const. Art. I§§ 6, 33 and Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57,
103 P.2d 394 (1940).
210.

Conn. Const4 Art. I§§ 11, 12 and Benson v. Housing Authority of City of New Haven, 145 Conn. 196, 140 A.2d 320 {1958);
Fla. Declaration of Rights§§ 4, 12 and City of Tampa v.
Texas Co., 107 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1958); Ind. Const. Art. I§§
12, 21 and State v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.2d 342
(1960); Iowa Const. Art. I§§ 9, 18 and Anderlik v. Highway
Commission, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (1949); Kan Bill of
Rights§ 18 and Richert v. Board of Education of the City of
Newton, 177 Kan. 502, 280 P.2d 596 (1955); Me. Const. Art. I
§§ 6, 21 and Opinion of the Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 A.
627 (1908); Mass Declaration of Rights§ 10 and Connor v.
Metro olitan Dist. Water Su 1 Commission, 314 Mass. 33, ·49
•. d 593 1943 ; • ~Const.Art. I§ 20 and N.J. Bell
Telephone Co. v. Delaware River Joint Commission, 125 N.J.
235, 15 A.2d 221 (1940); N.C. Const. Art. I§ 35 and Snow v.
N.C. State Highwaf Commission, 136 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. 1964);
Ohio Const. Art.
§§ 16 19 and Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio
St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958); Okla. Const. Art. II§§ 7,
24 and State v. Alford, 347 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1959}; S.D. Const.
Art. VI§§ 2, 13 and Vesely v. Charles Mix Countr, 66 S.D.
570, 287 N.W. 51 (1936); Tenn. Const. Art~ I§§ 7, 21 and
Hawkins v. Dawn, 347 S.W.2d 480 {Tenn. 1961); Utah Const. Art.
I§§ 7, 11, 22 and Fairclou9h v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah2d
417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960); Wis. Const. Art. I§§ 9, 13 and
Wisconsin Power and Li ht Co. v. Columbia Count , 3 Wis.2d,
87 .W.2d 279
958.
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indicate,211 but do not hold, that there is liability; and five
states indicate,212 but do not hold, that there is no liability.
The political subdivisions. The traditional common law
rule applicable to municipal corporations is that there is no
liability for injuries caused in the performance of "governmental" functions, whereas liability is imposed for similar injuries
caused in the performance by the municipality of "proprietary"
functions.213 This distinction is often referred to as a distinction between activities of employees· which are "ministerial"
or "discretionary. 11 214 Liability attaches when an employee is
engaged in the performance of 11 ministerial" duties, but not when
he is performing 11 discretionary" duties. This distinction has
not in general been applied in tort suits against the state, because they are usually deemed immune regardless of what kind of
functions they are performing. The distinction is not always
applied to counties, which in some jurisdictions are treated at
common law as arms of the state, but in general counties are also
subject to the distinction.215 T~ese distinctions are also applied to s~hool districts, special districts and other political
entities.216

211.

Ala. Const. Art. I§ 23, Art. XII§ 235 and Cf. McClunI v.
Louisville and N.R.R., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So.2d 371 (195); Ga.
Const. §§ 2-103, 2-301 and Cf. Sheehan v. Richmond Count ,
100 Ga. App~ 496, 111 S.E.2d 924 1959; La. Const. Art. I
§§ 2, 9 and Cf. Beck v. Boh. Bros. Construction Co., 72 So.
2d 765 (La. 1954); Miss. Const. Art. III§§ 14, 17 and Cf.
Quin v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 194 Miss.4Il,
11 So.2d 810 {1943) (dictum); Mont. Const. Art. III§§ 14,
27 and Cf. State v. District Court, 48 Mont. 614, 139 P. 791
(1914) (dictum); N.D. Const. Art. I§§ 13 14, 22 and Cf.
Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603 1lN.D. 1957).

212.

Idaho Const. Art. I§§ 13, 14, 18 and Cf. Turcotte v. State,
84 Ida. 451, 373 P.2d 569 (1962); Ken.c;'onst. § l3 and Cf.
Danville v. Smallwood, 347 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1961); Md. Const.
Art. III§ 40 and Cf. Feldman v. Star Homes, Inc., 199 Md.
1, 84 A.2d 903 (19°5IT (dictum); N.Y. Const. Art. I§§ 6, 7
and Cf. In re East 5th St. Borou h of Manhattan, 146 N.Y.S.
2d 794 ( 955
dictum; Ore. onst. Art. I
O, 18 and Cf..
Tomasek v. State, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952).

213.

See notes 14, 21-35, supra.

214.

See notes 37-47, supra.

215.

See notes 10-12, supra.

216.

See notes 15, 16, supra.
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Immunity of subdivisions~ In 35 states, including Colorado,
counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions
are immune from tort liability, at least for "governmental" and
"discretionary" functions, either at common law or by statute.217
In three of these states general immunity is conferred by stat-

217.

Alabama, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 151 So.2d 240 (Ala.
1963): Arkansas; Kirksey v. City of Fort Smith, 300 S.W.2d
257 (Ark. 1957) ; California, see note 218, infra . ; Colorado,
County Commissioner v. Bish, 18 Coloo 474, 33 Paco 184
(1893, City and County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1,
351 P~2d 826 (1960); Connecticut, Pluhowsky v. City of New
Haven, 197 A. 2d 645 (Conn .. 1964); Delaware, Pruett v. Dayton,
I68A.2d 543 (DeL 1961;; Ger,rgia, t-rrs v. Franklin County,
73 Ga. App~ 207, 36 S.E.2d 110 (1945, Ga. Code Ann. § 231502 (Supp~ 1965), City of Thompson v. Davis, 92 Ga. App.
216, 88 S.E.2d 300 {1955), Ga. Code Ann. §§ 69-301, 69-303
(1957); Idaho, ~ord v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321
P.2d 589 (1958); Indiana, Sherfey v~ City of Brazil, 213 Ind.
493,. 13 N.E.2d 568 (1938), Flowers v. Board of Commissioner
of County of Vanderburgh_~ 240 Ind. 668, 168 N. E.2d 224 ( 1960);
Kansas, Wilburn v. Boein Air lane Co., 188 Kan. 722, 366 P.
2d 246 ( 1961
P al:"ker v. City of Hutchinson• 196 Kan. 148,
410 P.2d 347 (1966); Louisiana, Hamilton v. City of Shreve12.Qtl, 247 La. 784, 174 So . 2d 529 (1965); Maine, Dugan v. Cit_y
~£-Portland, 157 Me. 521, 174 A~2d 660 \1961); Maryland,
Irvine v. Montgomery County, 210 A.2d 359 (Md. 1965); Massachusetts, Moschella v. City of Quincy, 196 N.E~2d 620 (Mass.
1964); Michigan, see note 218, infra~; Missouri, Fette v. City
of St. Louis, 366 S~W~2d 446 (Mo. 1963), Smith v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 2, 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1966); Montana,
Barovich v. City of Miles City, 135 Mont. 394, 340 P.2d 819
(1959), Jacoby v. Chouteau County, 112 Mont. 70, 112 P.2d
1068 (1941); Nebraska, McKinney v. County of Cass, 180 Neb.
685, 144 N.W.2d 416 (1966); New Hampshire, Gossler v. City
of Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966); New Mexico,
Andrade v. City of Alburguergue, 74 N.Me 535, 395 P.2d 597
(1965); North Carolina, Mosseller v. City of Asheville, 267
N.C. 104, 147 S.E.2d 558 (1966); North Dakota, Belt v. City
of Grand Forks, 68 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1955); Ohio, Hyde v. Cit~
of Lakewood; ~ Ohio St,,2d 155, 207 N.E.2d 547 {1965); ok!a·homa, Chica o R.I. and Pac~ R.R. Co. v. Board of Count Commissioner, 389 .2 476 Ok a. 1964 ; ennsy vania, Esposito
v. Emery, 249 Fff Supp. 308 (E.D.Pa. 1965), Dillon v. York
City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896 (1966); Rhode
Island, Mais v. Ilg, 199 A~2d 727 (R.I. 1964); South Carolina,
Chilton v. Cit of Columbia, 247 S.C. 407, 147 S.E.2d 642
1966; Sout Dakota, Conway v. Humbert, 145 N.E.2d 524
1966; Tennessee, Johnson v. City of Allison, 50 Tenn. App.
532, 362 SoW.2d 813 (1962); Texas, City of San Antonio v.
Ramundo, 411 S.Wo2d 428 (Tex. 1967); Utah, see note 218, infra;
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ute.218 In the majority of these jurisdictions the proprietarygovernmental distinction is applied both to municipalities and to
counties. In five states only the counties enjoy immunity, municipalities having been made liable either by statute or at common law.219 In eleven states, both counties and municipalities
appear to be liable at common law, and by statute.220
Liability of subdivisions. The broadest general category
of liability is that of municipalities for injuries caused in the
performance of so-called "proprietary" functions. Although·the
criteria for distinguishing proprietary from governmental functions vary from state to state, there is general agreement that a
city may be liable in the former but not the latter area. As
previously indicated, this distinction is also generally applied
to counties.

Virginia, Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 125 S.E.2d
808 (1962); West Virginia, Jones v. Cit of Mannin ton, 148
W.Va. 5830 136 S.E.2d 882 (1964 ; Wyoming, Chavez v. City of
Laramie, ~89 P.2d 23 (Wyo~ 1964 , Fanning v. City of Laramie,
402 P.~d 460 (Wyo. 1965).
218.

California Calif. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966);
Mich. Comp. Laws§§ 691.1401-1415 (Supp. 1965); Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10 et seq. (Supp. 1965).

219.

Florida, Koulakis v. Boyd, 138 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1962), Hargrove Ve Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957);illinois, Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18
Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), Hutchings v. Kraject, 34
Ill.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966); Kentucky, Haney v. City
of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Mississippi 1 Logjn
v. City of Clarksdale, 340 Miss. 716, 128 So.2d 537 \1961 ·
New Jersey, Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (19661,
Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48 N.J. 214, 225
A.2d 105 (1966).

220.

Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 09.50.250 et seq. (Supp. 1966), Scheele
v. City of Anchora9e, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963); Arizona,
Stone v. Arizona Hi hwa Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d
07 1963; Hawaii, Rev. Laws of Hawaii§ 245A-l et seq. (1965
Supp.l, Carter v. County of Hawaii, 47 Hawo 68, 384 P.2d 308
(1963; Iowa, Iowa Code§ 25A-l et seq. (1963); Minnesota,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.01 et seq. (1963), Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.031-.038 (1965), Walsh v. Clark
County School Dist., 419 P.2d 775 (Nev. 1966); New York, N.Y.
Ct. Cl. Act§ 8 (1963), Hefele v. City of New York, 267 N.Y.S.
2d 946 (1966); Oregon, Ore Laws 1967, Cho 627; Washington,
Rev. Code Wash. § 4.92.010 et seq. (1963), Provins v. Bevis,
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As not~d above, in the area of "governmental" activities,
eleven states hold their subdivisions liable at common law and/or
by statute for their torts.221 Although California, Michigan and
Utah have by statute enacted the rule of governmental immunity as
applicable to subdivisions, these three states have made broad
statutory exceptions to the rule which, in effect, makes the subdivisions liable for most activities involving the possibility of
injury to private persons.222 In five states municipalities but
not counties are generally liable at common law for their torts.2 2 3
Liability for road defectso By far the most specific exception to the immunity rule is statutory or common law liability for
injuries arising from defective conditions of public streets and
sidewalks. In 26 states both counties and municipalities are so
liable224 and in six additional states only municipalities are
liable.225

70 Wash. Dec.2d 127, 422 P.2d 505 (1967); Wisconsin, Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 895.43 (1966)_
221.

Sae note 220, supra~

222.

See note 218, supra.

223.

See note 219, supra.

224.

Alabama, Code of Ala~ T. 37 § 502 (1958), Code of Ala. T. 23
§ 57 (1958) Densmore v, Birmingham, 223 Ala. 210, 135 So.
320 (1931) {limits the statute's impact to ministerial functions); Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 09.65.70 {Supp. 1966); Arizona,
Talor v. Roosevelt Irri ation Dist., 71 Ariz. 254, 226 P.2d
54
950 ; Ca ifornia, Calif. Govt. Code Ann.§§ 815-996.6
(Supp. 1963); Connecticu~, Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 13a-149 (Supp.
1966}; Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 95-1001, 69-131 (1958);
Hawaii, Rev. Laws of Hawaii§ 245A-l et seq. (1965 Supp.);
Iowa, Iowa Code§ 25A.l et seq. (1966); Kansas, Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 68-301 (1964), Bisho v. Board of Count Commissioners,
188 Kan. 603, 364 P.2d 65 196 ; a ne, e. ev. Stat.
•
313 § 3651 et seq. (1964), Beging v. Bernard, 160 Me. 233,
202 A.2d 547 (1964); Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Law~ Ann. Ch.
84 § 15 (1961, as amended 1965), Souza v. City of New Bedford,
22 Mass. App. Dec. 106 (1961); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws§§
691.1401-.1415 (Supp. 1965); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§
466.01-.17 (1965); Nebraska, Nev. R.R. Stat. §§ 14-801~ 39-809
(1943); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 et seq. (1965}; New
Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 245:20, 247:17 (1966); ·New
York, N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act (1963); North Dakota, N.D. Rev. Code
§ 40-42-01 et seq. (1960); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 305.12
(Page 1953); Oregon., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 368.940 (1965), Oregon
Laws 1967, Ch. 627; South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann.§§ 33-234,
47-70, 47-71. 14-401 et seq., 33-921 et seq. (1962); South
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Liability for negligent o eration of motor vehicles.
Another area in which a number o states have imposed liability
upon their political subdivisions, either by statute or by court
decision, is the area of injuries caused by the negligent operation of motor vehicles. In 19 states, including Colorado, municipalities and counties both are liable for damages caused by the
negligent operation of motor vehicles.226 In five additional

7

Dakota, S.D. Code§ 28.0913 (Supp. 1960); Utah, Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-8 (Supp. 1965); Washington, Rev. Code Wash. §
4.92.010 et seq. (1963); West Virginia, W.Va. Code Ann.§
1597 (9) (1961) Cunnin ham v. Count Court of Wood Count,
134 S.E.2d 725 1lW. a. 1964 ; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. §
81.15 (1965), Dunwiddie v. Rock County, 28 Wis.2d 568, 137
N.W.2d 388 (1965).
225.

Florida, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla.
1957), Koulakis v. Boyd, 138 So.2d 505 {Fla. 1962); Illinois,
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 34 § 301.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961),
Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 111.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966);
Kentucky, Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky.
1964); Louisiana, Carlisle v. Parrish of East Baton Rou e,
114 So.2d 62 (1959 ; Mississippi, Logan v. City of
arksdale, 240 Miss. 716, 128 So.2d 537 (1961); North Carolina,
N.c. Gen. Stat. § 160.54 (1964), Faw v. North Wilkesboro, 253
N.C. 406. 117 S.E.2d 14 (1960); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 19
§ 1371 ( 1959).

226.

Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 09.65.70 (Supp. 1966); Arizona, Stone
v. Arizona Hi hwa Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107
963; California, Calif. Govt. Code Ann.§§ 815-996.6
1963 ; Colorado, C.R.S. § 13-10-1 et seq. (1963l; Hawaii,
Rev. Laws of Hawaii§ 245A-l et seq. (1965 Supp. ; Iowa, Iowa
Code§ 25A.l et seq. (1966); Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. 3.996
(1)-(15) (1964); Minnesota, S}anel v. Mounds View School Dist.
No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.0l et
seq. (1965); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 (1965); New
York, N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act (1963l; North Carolina, N.C. Stat. Ann.
§§ 153.9.44, 160.191.1 (1964 ; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§
307r44, 701.02 (Page 1953); Oregon, Oregon Laws 1967, Ch. 627;
Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. T. 75 § 623 (Purdon _1960); South
Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 33-234, 33-921, 47-70, 47-71, 14401 (1962), Clawson v. City of Sumter, 148 S.E.2d 350 (1966);
Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7 (Supp. 1965); Washington, Rev.
Code Wash. § 4.92.010 et seq. (1963), Kelso v. CitW of Tacoma,
63 Wash.2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964); West Virginia, V.Va. Code
Ann. § 494 (6) (1961); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 345.01
(1965).
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states only the municipalities are so liable.227
Insurance. In 25 states, including Colorado, the political
subdivisions are authorized to purchase some form of liability insurance,228 and in 14 of these states the statute indicates that
such purchase eonstitutes a waiver of immunity to the extent of
the coverage$229

227.

Florida, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla.
1957); Illinois, Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 34 § 301.1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1966) Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d
274 (1966) {held statute unconstitutional); Kentucky, Haney
v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (1962); "Mississippi,
Logan v. City of Clarksdale, 240 Miss. 716, 128 So.2d 537
(1961); New Jersey, Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42
N.J. 541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964), Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81,
222 A.2d 649 (1966).

228.

Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 66-3240 et seq. (Supp. 1963);
California, Calif. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 990-991.2 (1965 Supp.);
Colorado, C.R.S. § 13-10-3 (1963); Florida, Fla. Stat. §§
234.03, 240.191~ 455.06 (1965 Supp.); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann.
§ 56-2437 (1960J Ga. Const. Art. 2-5902; Idaho,Idaho Code§
41.3501 et seq. 1ll962), Dewea v. Keller, 86 Idaho 506, 388
P.2d 988 (1964); Indiana, In. Stat. Ann. § 39-1819 (Burns
1965), Hardbeck v. Anderson, 209 N.E.2d 769 (Ind. 1965); Iowa,
Iowa Code§ 517.1 (1966); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-2601
et seq. (1964), Caywood v. Board of Count~ Commissioners, 194
Kan. 419, 399 P.2d 561 (1965}; Michigan, ich. Stat. Ann. §
3.996 {lJ-(15) (1964); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.01
et seq. (1965); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 (1965); New
Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412:3 (1955, as amended
1961) Cushman v. Grafton Count*, 97 N.H. 32, 79 A.2d 630
(1951J; New Mexico, N.M. Stat.on. § 5-6-18 et seq. {Supp.
1966); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153.9.44 (1964),
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160.191.1 (1964); North Dakota, N.D. Rev.
Code§§ 39-01-08, 40-43-07 (Supp. 1965); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 307.44 (Page 1953); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. T. 11
§ 16.1 (1959); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 243.110 (1965),
Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282
(1961); Pennsylvania, P~. Stat. Ann. T. 53 § 65713, T. 16 §§
2303 5502 (1956); Utah, Utah Code Ann.§ 63-30-28 (Supp.
1965f; Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 29 § 1403 et seq. (1959)
T. 24 § 1092 (1959); West Virginia, w.va. Code Ann.§ 494 (6)
(1961); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 66.18 (1965); Wyoming,
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-4 (1965).

229.

See note 228, supraa Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming.
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TABLE XVII
Political Subdivisions Immune From
aw and
Statute Both Counties
Alabama
Arkansas
Californial
COLORAOO
Connecticut

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan!

North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania

Delaware
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Mexico

Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

Utahl
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wyoming

1 Statutes which make subdivisions immune generally, but have
broad exceptions to immunity rule.

TABLE XVIII
Political Subdivisions Liable at Common
Statute Both Counties and Mun1c1
Alaska
Arizona
Hawaii
Iowa
Minnesota

Nevada
New York
Oregon
Washington
Wisconsin

TABLE XIX
States In Which Counties Are Immune and
Municipalities Are Liable
Florida
Illinois
Kentucky
Mississippi
New Jersey
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or

TABLE XX
Liable For In
Streets,

Caused b
s, etc.

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
California
Connecticut

Kentuckyl
Louisianal
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan

North Carolinal
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
South Carolina

Floridal
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinoisl
Iowa

Minnesota
Mississippi!
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

South Dakota
Utah
Vermontl
Washington
West Virginia

Kansas

New York

Wisconsin

1 Only municipalities are liable; counties are immune.

TABLE XXI
peration o
Alaska
Arizona
California
COLORADO
Florid al

Minnesota
Mississippil
Nevada
New Jersey 1
New York

Hawaii
Illinoisl
Iowa
Kentucky!
Michigan

North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina

Caused
es
Utah
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

1 Only municipalities are liable; counties are immune.
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TABLE XXII
Political Subdivisions Authorized to Purchase
Liability Insurance*
Arkansas
California
COLORAD02
Floridal
Georgial&2

Minne sot al
Nevadal
New Harnpshirel
New Mexico!
North Carolinal

Idaho 1
Indianal
Iowa
Kansasl&2
Michigan

North Dakota
Ohio2
Oklahornal
Oregon!
Pennsylvania

Utahl
Vermontl
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyomingl

*

Includes either general liability insurance or automobile liability insurance, or both.

1

Statutes authorizing purchase of liability insurance expressly
waive the subdivisions immunity to the extent of the insurance
coverage so obtained.

2

Statutes authorize purchase of automobile liability insurance
only.

Remedies and Procedures For Adjudicating Claims
Introduction. In those states in which liability for torts
is the general rule, either as a result of judicial decision or
legislative enactment, a claimant may usually bring an action
against the state in any proper court the same as if he were suing
a private person. However, there are generally provided by statute certain procedures that the claimant must follow. In those
states i.n which immunity from liability is the general rule the
state may either not be sued at all, or may be sued only in the
manner and courts prescribed by the legislature. The manner in
which tort claims may be enforced against the states and their
subdivisions, either in those situations in which responsibility
has been undertaken or in those situations in which the state and
subdivisions remain immune, varies widely.
Summar~ of remedies in states. Twelve states provide for
recovery int eir regular courts by all or most tort claimants.230
230.

See note 191, 192, ~93, and 194, supra. These states are
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada,
New York, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
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The regular courts of eight additional states, including Colorado,
are presumably open to enforce the statutory liability of those
states, i.e., for defective highways and/or negligent operation of
motor vehicle$.231 Nine states have administratiyj? claims tribunals or officers whose determinations are fina1o2::S2 Ten states,

231.

These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Fl~rida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, and South Carolina.

232.

Alabama, Code of Ala~ In 55 §§ 333, 334 (Supp. 1963) (Board
of Adjustmentb The Board hears claims for damages to persons or property caused by the state or its agencies. Relief for injuries caused by counties or municipalities may
not be had before the Board.)· Arkansas, Ark. Stat~ Ann.§
13-1401 et seq. (1965 Supp*) (state Claims Commission); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat~ § 4-141 (Supp. 1963) (Claims Commission. The Commission's determination is final as to
claims less than $2,500. Larger claims require legislative
approval and the Commission's action is merely. recommendatory to the legislature~ The Commission may also ·authorize
suits against the st~te in the regular courts, but the st~te
cannot be sued without the consent of the Commission.); Kentucky, KoR.S. § 44-070 et seq. (1962) (Board of Claims. The
Board has jurisdiction to hear and to allow claims for damages as a result of negligence on the part of the state and
its agencies. The jurisdiction of the Board is exclusive
and a claim shall not exceed $10,000. The Board's findings
of fact, where based on substantial evidence, are conclusive
upon review by the courts and the awards are enforceable as
court judgments.l, Foley Construction Co. v. Ward, 375 S.W.
2d 392 (Ky. 1964 · Massachusetts, Mass. Gen~ Laws Ann. Ch.
12 § 3A-D (1966) (Attorney General. The Attorney General has
authority to investigate and determine claims against the
state not otherwise provided for by law. The Attorney General's determination is final up to the amount of $1,000.
Upon a determination that the claimant is entitled to damages in excess of $1,000, the Attorney General's decision is
only recommendatory to the general court.); North Carolina,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143.291 (1964, as amended 1965) (The Industrial Commission is authorized to hear and determine tort
claims.against the state. The Commission determination may
be appealed on questions of law, but findings of fact are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. The amount
of damages awarded cannot exceed the amount of $12,000.);
Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 127.11 (Page Supp. 1966) (Sundry
Claims Board. The Board has jurisdiction to hear claims
against the state for the payment of which no money has been
appropriated. The Board has authority to deter~ine and order final payment qf claims not exceeding $1,000. All
claims over $1,000 are reported to the following session of
the legislature for action.); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann.§
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including Colorado, have administrative tribunals or legislative
committees whose determinations are merely recommendatory to the
legislature.233 In addition, several states have passed private

9-801 et seq. (1956, as amended 1965) (Board of Claims. The
Board has jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims
against the state for personal injuries or property damage
~aused by defective highways and negligence in the operation
of motor vehicles. The decision of the Board upon any claim
is final.); West Virginia, W.Va. Code Ann. § 494 (6) {1961)
(Attorney General. The Attorney General is authorized to
act as a special instrumentality of the legislature for the
purpose of considering and determining claims against the
state and recommending the disposition thereof to the legislature.).
233.

Colorado, C.R~S. § 130-10-3 (1965 Supp.) (Claims Commission.
The Commission was established to aid the General Assembly
in the consideration and evaluation of tort claims against
the state. The determination of the Commission is recommendatory to the General Assembly.); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 47504 et seq. (Supp. 1965) (Claims Advisory Board. The Board's
determination of claims is recommendatory to the General Assembly.); Idaho, Idaho Gonst. Art. 4 § 818, Art. 5 § 10.
(The constitution provides that a Board of Examiners consisting of certain state officials shall have exclusive jurisdiction and power to examine all claims against the state
and that no claim shall· be passed upon by the legislature
without having been first so presented. Another section of
the constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to hear claims against the state, but
its decisions shall be merely recommendatory to be reported
to the legislature for action. The courts have reconciled
the two sections by requiring claims to be submitted to the
Board before the court may hear them. Thomas v. State, 16
Idaho 81, 100 Pac. 761 (1901), Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho
93, 369 P.2d 590 (1962). The legislature has also set up
procedures for presenting claims to the Board. Idaho Code
§§ 67-1008, 67-2001 (1947). The word "claims" has not been
held to include tort claims so that there can be no recovery
for torts of agents or employees of the state or its instrumentalities, unless the immunity is expressly .waived by
statute.); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 3.66 et seq. {1965)
(State Claims Commission. The Commission was created in
1953 and given jurisdiction to adjudicate and hear claims
against the state, its determination being only recommendatory to the legislatire.); Montana, Mont. Const. Art. VII§
20, implemented by Mont. Rev. Code§ 82-1101 et seq. (Supp.
1965) (Board of Examiners. The Board has the duty of examining all unliquid~ted claims against the state, its final
determination being recommendatory to the legislature.);
Nevada, Nev. Const. Art. IV§ 22. (The constitution creates
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legislation compensating individuals having tort claims against
the state. Fourteen states are authorized to purchase general
liability insurance and nine more are authorized to purchase automobile liability insurance.234 When insurance is in force, there
is of course a right to recover against the insurer. In three
states, a claimant must. bring his action against the state in a
special claims court.235

a Board of Examiners with the duty of exam1n1ng all unliquidated claims against the state.-· The conclusion and
determination of the Board is only recommendatory to the
legislature.); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws§ 22-7-1 et seq.
(1956) (The legislature has established a joint committee on
accounts and claims, consisting of four Senate members and
five House members, with the responsibility of investigating
all claims against the state. The committee's determination
is recommendatory to the leqislature.); South Dakota, S.D.
Code§ 33.4301 et seq. (Supp. 1960) (The state has established a Commission of Claims, with each senior circuit
judge in the state to serve as commissioner in the respective counties, to hold hearings on tort and contract claims
against the state, and to transmit advisory recommendations
concerning them to the next session of the legislature.);
Utah, Utah Const. Art. VII§ 13, Utah Code Ann. § 63-6-10
(1953) (Claims against the state must be filed with the governmental entity or its insurance carrier, and upon its
denial an action may be brought in the courts. If payment
by the entity is not authorized by law then the judgment or
claim shall be presented to the Board of Examiners.}; Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 32 § 935 (1959) (A Claims Commission
has been established to hear and determine claims when the
amount claimed does not exceed $1,000. An appeal from the
decision of the Commission is granted by petition of the
claimant to the General Assembly.).
234.

See notes 202, 203, and 204, supra.

235.

Illinois, Ill. Stat. Ann. Ch. 37 § 439.1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1966) (In 1903 the legislature created a Court of
Claims, which in 1917 was given jurisdiction of matters in
contract, and in 1945 was given jurisdiction in actions concerning the negligence of the state's officers, agents and
employees in the course of their employment. The determination of the court is final and conclusive and awards for damages for torts may be granted only up to $25,000. The entire
enactment has been interpreted as "a complete waiver by the
state of its immunity from liability in tort for the negligent exercise of a governmental function." Rickelman v.
State, 19 Ill. Ct. Cl. 54 (1949); Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 27A.640l-.6475 ('1962) (Claims against the state authorized
by Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 3.996 (1)-(15) (1964) are brought in
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Summar of remedies in subdivisions. With respect to
politica subdivisions, they are general y liable for injuries
caused in the course of performing a proprietary activity and
this liability can be enforced in the regular courts. In addition, the courts of 13 states enforce the general liability of
their subdivisions in tort.236 Five more states enforce the liability of municipalities only in the regular courts,237 and the
courts of 17 states, including Colorado, are open to enforce the
specific statutory liabilities of subdivisions.238 Twenty-five
states authorize their political subdivisions to purchase general liability insurance and/or automobile liability insurance.239
To the extent that such insurance is in force, an injured party
has a legal remedy against the insurer. In addition to the
foregoing, it is probable that in many cases informal administrative remedies are available to a person injured by a subdivision.

the Court of Claims created pursuant to the Court of Claims
Act. This act has been construed as not waiving the defense
of goverrnmental immunity which is applicable unless prohibited by the 1964 legislation.); New York, N.Y. Const. Art.
VI§ 23. (New York's constitution provides for the establishment of a court of claims to hear claims providing that
"the state • . . waives its immunity from liability and action
and . . . assumes liability and consents to have the same
determined in accordance with the same rules of law asapplied to action • • . against individuals and corporations • .
N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act§ 8 ll963). New York has thus made itself
and all its agencies and political subdivisions generally
liable for torts.).
236.

See notes 218 and 220, supra.

237.

See note 219, supra.

238.

See notes 224, 225, 226, and 227, supra.

239.

See note 228, supra.
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II

TABLE XXIII

Mal iabili
be Brought
ty

States In Which Action Against. State
In Re·gular Courts to Enforce General
Alaska
Arizona
California
Hawaii
Iowa

Nevada
New

York

Oregon
Utah
Vermont

Michigan

Washington

TABLE XXIV

States In Which Action Against State May be Brought
In R~gular Courts to Enforce Statutory Liability
COLORADO
Connecticut
Florida
Kansas

Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
South Carolina

TABLE XXV

States.In Which Claims Must be Presented To-An Administrative
Tribunal Or Officer Whose Determination Is Final
Alabama - Board of Adjustment
Arkansas - State Claims Commission
Connecticut - siate Claims Commission~ final determination not
to exceed $2,500
Kentucky - Board of Claims - final determinatiQn not to exceed $10,000
Massachusetts - Attorney Gnneral - final determination not to
exceed $1,000
North Carolina - Industrial Commission - final determination not
to exceed $12,000
Ohio - Sundry Claims Board - final determination not to
exceed $1,000
Tennessee - Board of Claims
West Virginia - Attorney General
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TABLE XXVI

States In Which Claims Must Be Presented To An Administrative
Tribunal or Legislative Committee whose Determination
Is Recommendatory To The Legislature
COLORADO
Georgia
Idaho
Minnesota
Montana
Nevada
Rhode Island

-

Claims Commission
Claims Advisory Board
constitutional Board of Examiners
State Claims Commission
constitutional Board of Examiners
constitutional Board of Examiners
Joint Committee on Accounts and Claims - Legislative
South Dakota - Commission of Claims
Utah - constitutional Board of Examiners
Vermont - Claims Commission - hears claims not in excess
of $1,000

TABLE XXVII

States In Which Action Must Be Brought In A Special Court
Illinois - Court of Claims
Michigan - Court of Claims
New York - Court of Claims

TABLE XXVIII

States In Which General Liability of Subdivisions
Is Enforced In Regular Courts
Alaska
Arizona
California
Hawaii
Iowa

Michigan
Minnesota
Nevada
New York
Oregon
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Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

TABLE XXIX
States In Which General Liability Of Municipalities Only
Is Enforced In Regular Courts
Florida
Ill:tnois

Kentuckr
Mississ ppi
New Jersey

TABLE XXX

States In Which Statutory Liabilities of Subdivisions
Are Enforced In Regular Courts
Alabama
COLORAOO
Connecticut
Georgia
Kansas

Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Montana
Nebraska

North Carolina
North Dakota
Oregon
South Carolina
South Dakota

New Hampshire

West Virginia

Methods of providing remedies. As can be seen from the
above summary, the several st~tes have accepted responsibility
for their wrongs to some degree and have provided various methods
for the redress of such grievances. The method of redress may
take the form of allowing the state to be sued in the regular
courts of the state, in a specially created court of claims, before an ex officio board or a board created for that purpose,
allowing the presentation of claims directly to the legislature,
providing for the purchase of liability insurance with a right of
action against the carrier, or a combination of all or any of
these.
Thus the method of redress for injuries cause~ by torts of
the state and its agencies may be legislativ~, administrative,
judicial, or by the use of liability insurance. Although most
states use one or two methods generally, and several use all three
methods, very few states use only one method exclusively. For
example, New York is the only state which uses the judicial method
exclusively and gives its court of claims jurisdiction broad
enough to include almost any claim against the state and its in-
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strumentalities, including political subdivisionsJ40 Alabama
is probably the only state using the administrative method exclusively for claims against the state, but claims against the
subdivisions are specifically exempt from the jurisdictional
coverage of the Board of Adjustment~241
Le{islative methoq. Historically, the first agency for
the adjud cation of claims against the state was the legislature.
In fact, private tort claims are still made the subject of individual legislative consideration and appropriation in many states,
including Colorado.242 The legislative procedure for the adjudication of claims ls usually patterned after the following procedure. The claimant requests a legislator to i.ntroduce a bill
which appropriates an amount sufficient to satisfy his claim.
After introduction the bill is referred to the appropriate committees of the House and Senate. The committees hold hearings and
examine the documentary materialo The committees then make their
decisions~ Final approval by two-thirds of the members of each
house and by the Governor is necessary before the claim can be
paid.243 Only a majority vote is necessary for final approval in
Colorado .
With little variation~ the above procedure is essentially
the same in all states using the legislative method . The committees to which a claim bill is referred may vary from state to

240.

N.Y~ Const4 Artu VI§ 23; NoY. Ct. Cl. Act§ 8 (1963);
Granger v. State, 14 A.D.2d 645, 218 N.Y~S.2d 742 (1961);
Shaw Vo Village of Hempstead, 177 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1958); Hefele
v. City of New York, 267 N.YcS~2d 946 (1966) (New York has
thus made itself and all its agencies and political subdivisions generally liable for their tortss Since the Court cif
Claims is a court of record with appeal permitted, the number of reported opinions in suits against the state, its
agencies or subdivisions far exceeds those from any other
state~ Most cases turn on ordinary questions of tort law.).

241.

Code of Alao Tc 55 §§ 333, 334 (Supp. 1963); State Board of
Adjustment v~ Lacks, 247 Ala. 72, 22 So.2d 377 (1945).

242.

See Governmental Immunity, Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, Research Report Noe 30, pe 24 (1965); e.g •• Senate
Bill No. 4, House Bill No~ 1061, 1968 Session of the Fortysixth Colorado General Assembly, and House Bill 1114, 1967
Session of the Forty-Sixth Colorado General Assembly.

243.

See Claims Against the State, Florida Legislative Council
and Reference Bure~u, Pn 5 (1957); Payment of Claims Against
the State, Minnesota Legislative Research Committee, p. 17
(1954).
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state.244 Also, in some states the request in the bill is for
permission to sue the state in a specific case rather than a request for an appropriation to satisfy a claim.245 However, the
constitutional prohibition of special acts may make this impo~sible in some stateso246
Role of legislative method in relation to other methods.
Generally, tFierole played by the legislature is limited to claims
which may not be adjudicated in any other fashion. This duty of
the legislature may by law be vested in an administrative agencr
or in the courts to whatever degree the legislative body is wil ing to relinquish the sovereign immunity of the state.24 7 Claims
covered by liability insurance have been the first to be severed
from legislative control~248 In states which have established an
administrative agency or board to hear and determine claims, the
legislature has often declared that the board's or commission's
determination shall be final.249 Other states have provided that
the determination is recommendatory and the legislature retains
final approval over the board's recommendations.250
Administrative method. This method of creating a board or
commission with authority to hear and determine claims brought
against the state is employed in 19 stateso The composition, extent of authority and jurisdiction, and methods of making awards
vary from state to state.

244.

See Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29
N.Y.U$L. Rev. 1363 (1954).

Eeg., House Bill No. 1005, 1968 Session, Forty-sixth Colorado General Assembly, and House Bill No. 1127, 1967 Session,
Forty-sixth Colorado General Assembly.
246.

E.g., Neb. Consto Art. III§ 18, Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751,
279 NoW. 482 (1938); Okla~ Const. Art. V § 59, Duncan v.
State Highway Commission, 311 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1957); Lowry
v. Commonwealth, 365 Pa. 474, 76 A.2d 363 (1950); Ind. Const.
Art. IV§ 24; State ex rel Davis v. Love, 99 Fla. 333, 126
So. 374 (1930).

247.

See Claims Against the Statef Fla. Legislative Council and
Reference Bureau, p. 6 (19571.

248.

See notes 202, 203, 204, 228, and 229, supra.

249.

See note 232, supra~

250.

See note 233, supra.
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Composition. The board or commission may function ex
officio or the membership may be appointed for the sole purpose
of adjudicating claims and have no other state duties. The most
prevalent form used is the ex officio board composed of all or
some of the principal officers of the state. Its membership
varies among the states but three is the number most commonly
used. In Colorado, the Claims Commission is made up Qf the state
auditor, state controller, and state budget director.251 Two
states, West Virginia and Massa~husetts, use the attorney general
as a one-man instrumentality.252 Instead of an ex officio board,
the legislature of North Carolina has designated an existing
state agency, the Industrial Commission, as its claims board.253
Some states, such as Arkansas and Minnesota, have an ad hoc
claims commission.254 In South Dakota the senior circuit judge
of the cou~ty where the alleged claim arose is the commissioner
of claims. 55 Instead of an administrative board or commission
the state of Rhode Island has created a permanent legislative
Joint Committee on Accounts and Claims, consisting of four Senate
and five House members~256
In addition to the reqular members of the board, some
states provide for investigators whose duty it is to investigate
the facts, receive complaints, take depositions, receive testimony, and report his findings to the board.257 To facilitate its
investigation, the board may also be authorized to administer
oaths, subpoena witnesses, and take depositions. The proceedings
of the board are usually informal and authority is usually given
for the board to draft its own rules of procedure and evidence.

251-

C.R.S.

252.

Mass. Gen. Laws Anna Ch. 12
§ 1143 et seq. (1961).

253.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143.291 (1964, as amended 1965).

254.

Ark. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401 et seq. (Supp. 1965); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 3.66 et seq. (1965).

255.

S.D. Code§ 33~4301 et seq. (Supp. 1960).

256.

R.I. Gen. Laws§ 22~7.l et seq. (1956).

257.

Ark. Stat. Ann. § 13-1402 (Supp. 1965) (The comptroller is
designated as the investigator.); Iowa Code§§ 25.1-.8 (1966)
(special assistant attorner general); Tenn. Code Ann. § 9803 (1956, as amended 1965 (special assistant attorney general).
·

§

130-10-1 et seq. (1963, as amended 1967).
§
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3A-D (1966); W.Va. Code Ann.

Jurisdiction~ The jurisdiction of the administrative
claims board is limited to the degree of delegation of legislative
authorityo The legislativ~ delegation of authority and jurisdiction in some states is stated in language broad enough to include
all claims against th~ stJte for which relief is not otherwise
provided by law~25U This broad jurisdiction is mitigated in some
states by judicial interpretations,259 and in others by statutes,
which allow tertain types of claims to be adjudicated in the
courts or by other ~clministrative agencies.260 These statutes
often give a de,talled Ii.sting of the categpries of claims over
which the bo,1 rd is granted jurisdiction.261 In some instances,
including Colorado, the act creating the board or commission, instead of enumerating the specific areas of jurisdiction, will give
the board general jurisdiction to hear claims with enumerated exceptions c262
·
· Re.cori1i:nendd:~g,ry action. In ten states using this method,
includingColorado'/ the boa:rd merely recommends to the legislature

258.

Iowa Code§ 25.l et seq. (1966) (The State Appeals Board is
granted jurisdiction to hear all claims against the state
for which"~ • ,the state would be liable except for the fact
of its soverelgni:y,, • ~11 ) ; Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 13-1401.et seq.
{Supp. 1965) (All types of claims, both in contract and tort,
are heard and may be allowed by the Claims Commission·.) •
.

259.,

Idaho Const. Art. 4 § 818. The Board of Examiners is given
exclusive jurisdiction to hear all claims against the state.
The wo1:d ei claims", however, has not been held to include
tort claims so that there can be no recovery for th~ torts
of agents or employees of the state or its instrumentalities,
unless immunity is expressly waived by statute. pigg v.
Brockman, 79 Idaho 233, 314 P.2d 609 (1957); Carlon v. State,
la Ill. Cto Cl. 167 (1949), holding that the Court of Claims
has no jurisdiction over the torts of local school boards
and municipal corporations under Ill. Stat. Ann. Ch. 37 §
431.1 et seq. (Smith~Hurd Supp. 1966).

260.

Some states limit the jurisdiction of its administrative
claims board to claims which do not exceed a specified amount.
E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 4.141 (Supp. 1961) (claims over
$2,500 require legislative approval); e.g., Neb. R.R. Stat.§
24.324 (1943) (allows claims on contract to be sued in courts).

261.,

E.g., Code of Ala. T. 55 § 334 (Supp. 1963); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 9-801 et seq. (1956, as amended 1965).

262.,

E.g., C.R.S.

§

130-10-4 (1963, as amended 1967).
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that the claim be paid. 2 63 In this case, the liability of the
state attaches only when the legislature approves the claim and
an appropriation is made. The usual procedure is for the board
to investigate the claim and to transmit all the facts together
with its approval or disapproval and recommended award to the
legislature. In some states the recommended awards are included
in the budget and in others the approved award must be reported
to the legislature in bill form.264 An aggrieved claimant may
generally appeal the board's determinatioo to the legislature,
except in those states in which the claimant may bring an action
on a rejected claim against the state in designated courts.265
The determination of the legislature is usually final.
Final action. In nine states using this method, the board
is given authority to hear and make a final determination of the
claim~266 This final determination may be unlimited as to amount
or the determination may be final if it does not exceed a certain
amount. If the board determines that the claimant is entitled to
an amount above the statutory limit, the board's determination
then becomes recommendatory to the legislature.267
Awards. In states which have a contingent appropriation
for the payment of claims against the state, the claim when finally approved by the board may be paid through the regular channels
without further approval of the legislature until the appropriation is exhausted, in which case the board's determination theo
becomes recommendatory to the next session of the legislature.i68
Also, a recommendation for the payment of an award above the statutory limit may be recommendatory to the le~islature while those
awards below the statutory amount may be paid from the contingent
appropriation. In some states the awards are paid only through an
appropriation made by the legislature after the claims have been

263.

See note 233, supra.

264.

E.g., C.R.So § 130-10-1 et seq. (1963, as amended 1967). See
Claims Against the State 1 Florida Legislative Council and
Reference Bureau, p. 22 \1957).

265.

E.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 32 § 935 (1959); Rev. Code Wash. §
4.92.010 et seq. {1963). Ibid, at p. 24.

266.

See note 232, supra.

267.

See notes 232 and 233, supra.

268.

See Claims Against the State 1 Florida Legislative Council
and Reference Bureau, p. 23 \1957).
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passed upon by the board, in which case the liability of the state
attaches only when the legislature approves the claim and an appropriation is made.269 In some states in which the board's determination is final, no appeal to either the courts or to the
legislature is allowed and the decision of the board may be enforced as a judgment at law.270
Judicial method~ Although most states utilize their courts
in varyrng degrees for suits against the state, the jurisdiction
of the court is usually limited to a specific category of claims,
such as actions on contract" 271 If actions are permitted· ·on
torts, they are usually limited to specific causes.,·such as cases
arising out of defects in hignways or inju'ries caused by the negligent operation of motor vehicles, but generally ordinary torts
are excluded.272 As mentioned above, only 12 states provide for
recovery in their regular courts by all or most tort claimants.273
The regular courts of eight additional states are open to enforce
the statutory liability of those states.274
With respect to the political subdivisions of the states,.
the regular courts are open to enforce liability caused by negli-

269 .

Ibid.

270.

Ibid .

27L

"Persons having claims on contract. • . , which have been

disallowed, may bring action thereon against the state and

prosecute the action to final judgment." Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 12-821 et seq. (1956); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 4.1501 (Burns
1946) (The statute provides for suits on claims against the
state but covers only contract matters.); La. Rev. Stat. §
1305101 et seq. (Supp. 1962, as amended 1966); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. Ch. 258 §§ 1-4 (1959) (The statute permits the
superior court to hear . . . . . all claims at law or in equity
• . . " against the Commonwealth. However, the term 0 all
claims" has been construed not to include tort claims.
Arthur A. Johnson Cor. v. Commonwealth, 306 Mass. 347, 28
.E.2d 465
940 ; Ne • • R. Stat. § 4-319 (1943) (This
statute has been ineefectual as far as tort claims are concerned. Gentry v. State, 174 Neb. 515, 118 N.W.2d 643 (1962);
Va~ Code§ 8-752 et seq. (1957, as amended 1966) (Pursuant to
.this provision, proceedings based on contracts will lie
against the state but actions based on torts are not authorized.).
272.

See notes 200 and 201, supra.

273.

See note 230, supra.

274.

See note 231, supra.
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gence in the performance of proprietary functions. In addition,
3
1
;~~d~~~!i~n~fi~ t~;~:~,5en:~~~ea~~!ti~~:ra!t!!:~i!~i~r~:
f1ability of municipalities only in the regular courts,276 and the
courts of 17 are open to enforce the specific•statutory liabilities of subdivisions~277

i~:

A state may consent to be sued in one of two ways: (1) by
general act which authorizes suits in cases falling within a general category, and (2) by special act which authorizes a designated party to bring suit on a particular claim. As has been
previously pointed out, there may be constitutional provisions in
the particular state which prohibit either the state from being
made a defendant in its own courts,278 in which case the administrative or legislative methodt or both, is the only alternative,
or provisions which prohibit special legislation~ in which case
permission to sue must be given by general act.2,9
Procedure. Suits against the state may be brought in one
of several courts as designated in the act which consents to suit.
States which have waived their immunity usually have granted jurisdiction of claims cases to trial courts already in existence,
usually the trial courts of the county or district where the cause
of action arose. However, in some states suits against the state
may only be brought in a court in the county or district in which
the state capital is located.280 In some states the constitution
empowers the state supreme court or other state courts ·with original jurisdiction of suits against the state. The conclusion of
the court is usually final although some states declare that the
decision of the court is recommendatory in naturP. only and must
be reported to the legislature for final action. 2 8 1 Also, some
states having administrative boards or commissions require that

275.

See notes 218, 220 and 236, supra.

276.

See notes 219 and 237, supra.

277.

See notes 224, 225, 226, 227 and 238, supra.

278.

Ala. Const. Art. 1 § 14; Ark. Const. Art. V
Art. IV§ 26; W.Va. Const. Art. VI§ 35.

279-

See note 246, supra.

280.

See Claims Against the State, Florida Legislative Council and
Reference Bureau, p. 25 (1957).

281.

E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 258 §§ 1-4 (1959); Idaho Const.
Art. V § 10; N.C. Const. Art. IV§ 9.
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§

~O; Ill. Const.

the claim be submitted to .the board or commission before going to
the courts for a hearing.282
The procedure in claims suits generally is the same as when
an individual sues another individual, including the method of appeal and the rules of evidence. However, special rules of procedure and evidence may be established.
Special claims court. Jurisdiction of claims cases may be
vested in a special court created for that purpose. Three states,
Illinois,"~ ~ York, and Michigan have established a special court
of claims. 8
The composition of the court varies. In New.York,
the Governor appoints five full time judg~s to .serve for·nine-year
terms,284 and in Illinois, the Governor appoints ~he three judges
of the court to serve a term concurrent ·with his. 85 In Michigan,
the circuit judges alternately sit on the bench·of the court·of
claims.286
·
In Michigan, the act creating the court of claims has been
construed as not waiving the defense of governmental immunity
which is applicable unless expressly waived by st9tute. Its jurisdiction.is limited to claims against the state.287
The Illinois court of claims has jurisdiction over cases
against the state involving general liability for torts·where the
damages claimed do not exceed $25,000. If the court determines ·
that the claimant is entitled to an amount which exceeds $25,000,
the award is recommendatory only and requires a subsequent appropriation by the legislature. A deci~ion of the court· is not appealable.288
·
broad.

The jurisdiction of the court of claims in.New York is very
The waiver of immunity from liability for torts extends to

282.

Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 4-141 (Supp. 1963); Idaho Const. Art. 4 §
818, Art. 5 § 10, Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93, 369 P.2d
590 (1962); Miss. Code Ann. § 4387 et seq. (1942).

283.

See note 235, supra.

284.

N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act§ 8 et seq. (1963}.

285.

Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 37

286.

Mich. Stat. Ann.§§ 27A.6401-.6475 (1962).

287.
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439.l et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
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the state, its departments and agencies, and the counties and municipalities. The court of claims is a court of record with appeal permitted to the appellate division and ultimately to the
court of appeals.289
No attempt has been made in this summary to detail the procedures followed before the various court of claims, claims commissions, and legislative committees. The procedures are various,
sometimes simple and sometimes complex. In general a rigid compliance with the procedures is insisted ·upon. The tendency is to
establish a regular system of investigation and hearing and in
almost all states which have standardized procedures for presentation of claims, one feature is the imposition of time limits,
often fairly short, within which claims must be filed or be forever lost.

289.

See note 284, supra., § 24.
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CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Trends Toward Sovereign Responsibility
The basic doctrine that the sovereign cannot be sued or_
held liable without its consent continues to be the general rule,
not the exception. We have seen, however, that consent has been
given in many cases 1 and in a variety of forms. This consent has
taken the form of (1) private laws enacted as a matter of legislative grace, (2) general or limited public legislation creating
liability, (3) indirect liability through such means as insurance,
(4) liability of governmental units under the judge-made doctrine
concerning proprietary or ministerial functions, and (5) judicial
abrogation of the doctrine of immunity, in whole or in part, by
various courts. All of these forms of assuming responsibility for
governmental torts combine to support the conclusion of most legal
writers that there is a trend toward governmental responsibility
and away from governmental immunity.
Private laws. Several states have assumed liability by
passing private legislation compensating individuals having tort
claims against the state. Several states have also consented to
suit by passing a special act which authorizes a designated party
or parties to bring suit on a particular claim. These procedures
have been followed in Colorado.290
As has been previously pointed out, there may be constitutional provisions in the particular state which prohibit either.
the state from being made a defendant in its own courts, in which
case the administrative or legislative method for the adjudication

290.

In the 1967 Session, Forty-sixth Colorado General Assembly,
the general assembly adopted_H.B. No. 1114, which granted
$20,000 to a widow for damages sustained when her husband
was killed as a result of negligent repairs of a state highway. The general assembly also adopted H.B. No. 1127, which
granted to persons who sustained injury by the diversion of
Clay Creek flood water by Clay Creek Dam in June, 1965, the
right to initiate a civil action against the state to recover damages. In the 1968 Session, the general assembly
adopted H.B. No. 1905, which granted to persons in Jefferson
County who sustained property damage the right to bring a
civil action against the state to determine the state's negligence. These actions are to be conducted in accordance
with the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the laws of
the state applicable to actions for damages to property.
The state is to have all rights to which any other defendant
would be entitled.·
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of claims is the only remedy,291 or provisions which prohibit special legislation, in which case permission to sue must be given by
general act,292
In some cases, the legislatures consider the claims directlye Nine states have delegated their authority to consider claims
to an administrative claims tribunal or officer whose determination is final.293 Ten states, including Colorado, have administrative tribunals or leqislative committees whose determinations
are merely recommendatory to the legislature.294 The legislature,
if it approves the recommendation of the tribunal, can then either
pass an appropriation bill for the amount of the claim, or pass a
bill authorizing the particular claimant to sue in the courts.
The extent to which the state legislatures have moved toward the assumption of state liability through special acts and
private bills has not been ascertained, as it would call for a
complete survey of the session laws of each state and is beyond
the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to say
that the various state legislatures appear to be using this method
of assuming liability more than ever before.
Public legislation creating liability. Some public legislation provides for the payment of claims within limited areas.
This legislationp which provides an inroad upon sovereign immunity by way of statutory exception to the immunity rule, has usually been of a piecemeal character. Nevertheless, this piecemeal
legislation has accumulated to the extent that it provides a substantial ground for tort liability.
The most common types of limited legislation are statutes
creating liability for the negligent operation of motor vehicles
and for injuries caused by defective sidewalks, streets, etc. A
total of 19 states, including Colorado, have made themselves liable for injuries caused by the negligent operation of governmentowned motor vehicles.295 Twenty states are liable for injuries
caused by the defective conditions of public highways, bridges,
etc.296

note 278, supra~
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In 19 states, including Colorado, municipalities and coullties both are liable for negligent operation of motor· vehicles,?97
and in five additional states only municipalities are liable.2~8
In 25 states both counties and municipalities are liable for injuries arising from defective streets and sidewalks 299 and in six
additional states only municipalities are liable.30c:J In Colorado,
the state, by statutory provision, has accept e d liabill ty for injuries sustained in civil defense activitie~0 1 and for damages
caused by wild game.302
·
.
General legislation of a comprehensive nature dealing with
governmental tort liabilities and immunities has been enacted in
recent years in several states.303 This legislation undertakes
government responsibility in most cases. New York has adopted legislation which purports to make it liable for substantially all of
its torts.304 Alaska and Hawaii have ~dopted statutes patterned
after the Federal Tort Claims Act.305. Iowa, Nevada, O~egont Vermont and Washington, in addition t8 New York, have done away with
immunity of the state by statute.3 6 California, Michigan and
Utah have enacted legislation which continues to make the·state immune, except as otherwise provided by statute, and these exceptions
are very brQad, which in effect makes the state liable in most circumstances, 307

note 226, supra.
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C .. R.S. § 24-3-1 (1963).
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C.R.S. § 62-2-31 (1963).
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Calif. Govt. Code Ann.§§ 810~996.6 (1966); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 691.1401-.1415 {Supp. 1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 466.01.17 (1963); Nev. Rev. Stat.§§ 41.031-.038 (1965); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to 63-30-34 (Suppo 1965); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
895.43 (1966).
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N.Y. Ct_ Cl. Act§ 8 (1963).
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Alaska Stato § 09.50.250 et seq. (Supp. 1965); Rev. Laws of
Hawaii, § 254A-l et seq. (Supp. 1965.).

306.

Iowa Code§ 25A.l et seq. (1966); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031
(1965); Oregon Laws 1967, ch. 627; vt~ Stat. Ann. T. 12 §
5601 et seq. (1961, as amended 1963); Rev. Code Wash. § 4.
92.010 et seq. (1963).
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See note 194, supra.
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Although these states appear to be few in number, it is
significant that the statutory assumption of liability by these
states has occurred in recent years. Several states are now in
the process of modifying their sovereign immunity,308 and several more are in the process of study.309 It thus appears that
the trend toward assumption of responsibility by legislation will
continue, whether it be in a limited form or in a general comprehensive form.310
Indirect methods of creatin9 liability. The most important
indirect method by which tort liability of governmental units is
created is the use of public liability insurance.
Legislators who are wary of making state or
local units liable for torts are increasingly
willing to provide for payment of premiums for

H.B.

308.

No. 119~ 28th Legislature, 1st Regular Session 1967,
State of Arizona. This is one of several comprehensive
bills dealing with governmental immunity and liability which
has been introduced in the Arizona Legislature. To date,
none of these btlls have been adopted. See Hink and Schutter,
The Need for a egislative Solution to Government Tort Liability in Arizona, Public Affairs Bulletin, Ariz. State Univ.,
Vol. 5, No. 4.

309.

E.g., Public Laws of Maine 1965, ch. 202, and ch. 425 § 8-A.
This is a legislative resolution requiring the Attorney General of Maine to conduct a two-year study of sovereign immunity and to report his findings to the legislature. It is
understood by this writer that a study is being conducted in
Texas.

310,

For the background study and policy evaluations which underlie the California Legislation, see Cal. Law Revision Comm'n,
Recommendations Relating to Sovereign Immunity: Number 1 -Tort Liability of Public Entities and Public Employees, in 4
Reports, Recommendations and Studies 801 (Cal. Law Revision
Comm'n ed. 1963). For background information on the Utah
legislation, see Utah Legislative Council, Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee, (1964). See also Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, Governmental Immunity, Research
Report No. 30 (1965); Governmental Immunity Interim Commission of Minn~sota, Report of the Governmental Immunity Interim Commission, (1965); State Legislative Research Commission of South Dakota, Staff Memorandum: The Feasibility of
Abolishing or Modifying the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
in South Dakota, (1967).
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liability insurance, either insurance protecting the units and waiving immunity to the extent
of the insurance coverage, or insurance protecting the officers or employees • • • The typical
statute and policr provide that the insurer may
not set up sovere gn immunity as a defense, for
in the absence of such provision some courts have
held that the insurer is no; \iable unless the
governmental unit would be& 1
Some cases
ance is a limited
the extent of the
that the immunity

have held that the carrying of liability insurconsent, or waiver of the immunity, at least to
insurance coverage.312 Other cases have held
is not waived by the insurance.313

Eleven states authorizing the purchase of general liability
insurance, and six states authorizing the purchase of only automobile liability insurance, have express provisions either waiving
their immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage obtained or
denying the defense of immunity to the insurer.314 Six other
states, including Colorado, are also permitted to purchase either
general or automobile liability insurance, but the statutes do not
indicate that the purchase constitutes a waiver of the defense of
sovereign immunity.315 In 25 states, including Colorado, the political subdivisions of the state are authorized to purchase some
form of liability insurance,316 and in 14 of these states the stat-

311.
312.

3 Davis, Administrative Law§ 25-04 (1958).
Marshall v. Cit

of Green Ba, 18 Wis.2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715

TI%2; Vendre 1 v. School Dist,, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282

(1961; Flowers v. Board of Commissioners, 240 Ind. 668, 168
N.E.2d 224 (1960); Ginter v. Montgomery eounty, 327 S.W.2d
98 (Ky. 1959); Ballew v. City of Chattanoo a, 205 Tenn. 289,
326 S.W.2d 466 (1959); Moreno v. Aldrich,13 So.2d 406 {Fla.
App. 1959); Lynwood v. Decatur Park District, 26 Ill. App.
2d 431, 168 N.E.2d l85 (1960).
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utes indicate that such purcha~e constitutes a waiver of immunity
to the extent of the coverage.317 It appears that more states are
following this trend or at least considering this approach.318
Common law exceptions to immunity. As has been indicated
before, one of the central ideas in the law of governmental tort
liability is that a government entity is liable for its torts in
the exercise of proprietary but not governmental functions.319
This distinction between governmental and proprietary functions
has been severely criticized, for it has caused confusion not only
among the various jurisdictions but almost always within each jurisdiction.320 The United States Supreme Court, in speaking on the
distinction, has stated that."A comparative study of the cases in
the forty-eight states will disclose an irreconcilable conflict.
More than that, the decisions in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply
a rule of law that is inherently unsound. 11 321
It has been declared that governmental immunity from tort
liability is shrinking as time goes on, and that the tendency of
the courts is to restrict the immunity doctrine, to construe it
strictly against the governmental entity, and to move away from
the somewhat artifirial distinction between governmental and proprietary functions.322 The courts are more inclined to find a
particular activity as being proprietary in nature, rather than
governmental, thus making the entity liable. This trend has further eroded the sovereign immunity doctrine and will probably
continue to dos~.
Judicial abrogation of the doctrine~
Sovereign immunity in state courts is on the
run. State courts are taking the offensive against
it. The development during the period 1957-1965
is deep and dramatic. The movement seems to be

3174

See note 229, supra9

318.

Note, Municipal Tort Liability; Purchase of Liability Insurance As a Waiver of Immunity, 18 Wyo. L.J. 229 (Spring
1964) .

319.

See notes 21-35, supra.

320.

See note 2 and 14, supra.

321.
322.

Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct.
48 (1955).

122, Ibo L.Ed.

3 Davis, Administrative Law§ 25107 (1958).
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gaining momentum. The states in which judicial
action has been taken to abolish large chunks of
immunity, although some have wavered, are,
chronologically, Florida, Colorado, Illinois, New
Jersey, California, Michigan, Wisconsin, Alaska,
Minnesota, Arizona, Nevada, and Washington~ The
District of Columbia has also abolished the immunityo The action of these thirteen jurisdictions should make it easier for other states to
do the job. One may confident!~ expect that
others will follow~ The state courts that have
recently considered overruling sovereign immunity but have left the task to the legislature
include Utah, Maine, Oklahoma, Ohio, Iowa, and
New Mexico. The Oregon court brands immunity as
'not defensible' but is forced to bow to an explicit constitutional provision.
The story of what each court has done is
especially interesting. The barriers relate to
stare decisis, not to a belief that the immunity doctrine deserves to be continued. The
scope of the abolition varies from court to
court, and so do the remarks about location of
new limits on liability.323
These decisions will be examined in order to demonstrate the
trend toward sovereign responsibility and to understand any problems involved in judicial abrogation of the doctrine, as opposed to
legislative abolition or modification.
Judicial Abrogation of Immunity
Widespread dissatisfaction with the doctrine of immunity
and judicial impatience with legislative inaction have led many
courts to repudiate the doctrine in whole or in part.324

323.

3 Id.

324.

Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963);
Stone v. Arizona Hi hwa Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d
107 1963 ; Muske
v. Cornin Hos. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211,
359 P.2d 457, 11 Ca • Rptr. 89 1961 ; Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957 ; Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist., 19 111.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So.2d 529 (1965) (construing article
3, § 35 of the Louisiana Constitution); Williams v. City of

§
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State court decisions which abolished immunity. Chronologically, the direct attack upon governmental immunity itself began
in 1957 with the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach,325 The court declared that since the judiciary had originated the doctrine, legislative action was not
necessary to abollsh it, and held that no municipality should have
immunity from tort liability, even in its governmental capacity.
However, the opinion admonished against construing the decision as
imposing liability on municipalities in exercising their judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative, or quasi-legislative functions. The
court soon made a judicial retreat by holding that it had not
overruled tort immunity as to the state, its counties, or other
political entities_326 In both of these later cases the court said
that it was the job of the legislature to abrogate immunity as to
the state and its agencies.
Also in 1957 Colorado permitted an action against the State
Racing Commission in Colorado Racin Commission v. Brush Racin
Association, 327 in wh1.c was coine the much-quoted phrase, "In
tolorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject for discussion by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this
court." Later the court declared: "The doctrine of soverei~n immunity in Colorado is in limbo, only the memory lingers on." 2 8
These decisions were believed by many to be a judicial abrogation
of the doctrine, but three years later the court backtracked by
invc.,king immunity with respect to gove~nmental functions of a county, municipality and school districto3 9
·

Detroit, 364 Micho 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 {1961); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 {1962); Rice
v. Clark County, 79 Neve 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); McAndr~
v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960); Schuster v.
City of New York, 5 N.Yo2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d
265 {1958); !S,_elso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash.2d 913, 390 P.
2d 2 (1964); Holytz v. Cit! of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115
N.W.2d 618 (1962 .
325~

96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957)
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Buck v. Mclean 1 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1959); Moreno v. Aldrich,
113 So.2d 406 ~Fla. 1959).
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136 Coloo 279P 316 P.2d 582 {1957).

328.

Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 334 P.2d 740 (1958).

329.

Liber v. Flori; 143 Colo. 205, 353 Po2d 590 (1960); City and
County of Denver v. Madiron, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960);
and Tesone v. School Dist. No. RE-2, 384 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1963).

o
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The next case to attempt judicial abrogation of immunity was
an Illinols case in 1959.330 Th~ court prospectively abolished the
doctrine as applied to school districts and stated that: "We
closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can
likewise open them. 0 331 As to whether this decision will be applied to other governmental units in Illinois, the question has not
expressly been decided, although there are several cases in which
the court has implied that it would abolish municipal immunity.332
Shortly after the Molitor decision, the Illinois legislature
enacted five statutes reestablishing sovereign immunity for various
governmental entities~ Apparently, counties are still immune although a statute declaring counties to be immune was recently declared unconstitutional as violating the prohibition against special legislation.333
New .Jersey in 1960 took a step forward in discarding the
last vestiges of municipal tort immunity by broadening the rule of
respondeat superior with respect to agents of municipal corporations. The court brushed aside the question of stare decisis and
the objection that this was exclusively a legislative prerogative
by saying that: "Judicial and not legislative action closed the
courtroom doors, and the same hand can, and in proper circumstances
should, reopen them. 11 334 Another bite into sovereign immunity WJ.J
taken in New Jersey in McCabe v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority,33~
holding the Turnpike Authority liable when snow and ice fell from
the superstructure of a bridge on plaintiff's car. Also, liability was imposed for wrongdoing by a township "in planning, constructing and maintaining the sewer line" in Fagliarone v. Township
of North Bergen,336 but a township was immune from liability be-

330.

Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d ag (1§59).

331.

!,Qig.

332.

Peters v. Bellinger, 22 Ill. App. 2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528

333.

Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966).
~or a criticism of the entire Molitor decision, see Huff, Tom
Molitor and the Devine Right of Kings, 37 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
44 (1960).

334.

McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820, 88 A.L.R.

335.

35 N.J. 26, 170 A.2d 810 (1961).

336 •.

78 N.J. Super. 154, 188 A.2d 43 (1963).

(1959).

2d 313 (1960).
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cause the activity was "governmental" in Kent v. Hamilton Township.337
California was the next state to follow the trend of 1udicial abrogation. In Muskopf vft Corning Hospital District,338
immunity was abolished as to hospital districtso The court traced
the doctrine of immunity and concluded that it is "an anachronism
without rational basis and has existed only by force of inertia."
In reply to the objection that it was the legislature's duty to
abolish it, the court held that it was a court-made rule initially
and its "requiem has long been foreshadowed." The California Assembly promptly declared a moratorium on this and other claims
similarly situated so that the problems could be analyzed and
reasonable provisions made for suits against the government. In
1963 the Assemblyp after an exhaustive study by the California Law
Revision Commission, enacted a series of laws which set forth the
c·ondi ti9ns under which public entities and employees are to be liable for their tortso
Michigan followed shortly after California by holding that
immunity as to all governmental bodies within the state was abolished in the case of Williams v. City of Detroit,339 In prospectively overruling the doctrine the court declared: "From this
date forward the judicial doctrine of governmental immunity from
ordinary torts no longer exists i., Michigan. In this case, we
overrule preceding court-made law to the contrary. We eliminate
from the case law of Michigan an ancient rule inherited from the
days of absolute monarchy which has been productive of great injustice in our courts. By so doing, we join a major trend in
this country toward the righting of an age-old wrong. 11 340 Subsequent opinions have made it clear that the Williams decision was
limited to the abrogation of municipal immunity only, the tort
liability of the statP ~nd other subdivisions being controlled by
statutory provisions.341 On the basis of the Sayers decision, the
court in 1965 held that the school districts were immune from liability and declared that, despite the holding in Williams, the
" .•. doctrine of governmental immunity in tort actlons arising from

337.

82 N.J" Super. 113, I96 A.2d 798 (1964)

338.

55 Cal.2d 211, 359 Pe2d 457 (1961).

339e

364 Micha 231, 111 N.We2d 1 (1961).

340.

Ibid.

341.

McDowell v. State Highway Commissioner, 365 Miehe 268, 112
N.W.2d 491 (f962) and Sayers v. Schoo! District No. 1, 366
Miehe 217, 114 N.W~2d 191 (1962).
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o

the performance of a governmental function is still with us. 11 342
By legislative enactment vn1ich became effective on July 1, 1965,
the Michigan legislature granted immunity to the state, its agencies and subdivisions and enumerated exceptions-thereto.
.
The courts of Wisconsin were next to abolish the doctrine
of immunity in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee . 343 After tracing the
history of the doctrine of governmental immunity ~nd reviewing
the authorities, the court held that"· •• the doctrine of governmental immunity having been engrafted upon the law of this
state by judicial dacision, we deem that it may be changed or abrogated by judicial provision.u The decision was applied to the
state, its agencies and local political subdivisions. As to the
scope of the change, the court said that the decision "does not
broaden the government's obligation so as to make it responsible
for all harms to others; it is o:,ly as to •those harms which are
torts that governmental bodies are to be liable by reason of this
decisiori. This decision is not to be interpreted as imposin~ liability on a governmental body in the exerclse of its legislative
or judicial or quasi-legislative· or qu_asi-judicial functions. 11
Supplementing the Holvtz case in overruling sovereign immunity, the Wisconsin court also holds that purchase of liability
·insurance constitutes a waiver of immunity.344 As a result of
these decisions, the legislature has enacted statutory provisions
which provide a procedure for the bringing of tort actions and
limit the amount that can be recovered.
The Alaska Supreme Court is the only state court that has
been able to impose sovereign tort liability on historical grounds.
as distinguished from policy grounds and ari overruling of precedents. Congress in 1884 enacted that the _general laws of Oregon
should govern the district of Alaska, and at that time a statute
of 1862 imposed liability upon cities and other local units in
Oregon. The Alaska court accordinglr held: CIA municipal corporation in Alaska does not enjoy immun ty from tort liability,
·
whether the act or omission giving rise to the liability is connected with either a governmental or proprietary function." 345 .

342. P!card v. Greisinger, 138 N.W.2d 509 (Mich. 1965( ) and) Myers
v. Genesee County, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 1965.
343.

17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 ,(1962).

344. Marshall v. Cit! of Green Bay, 18 Wis.2d 496, 118. N.W.2d 715
(1962) and Wohl eben v. City of Park Falls, 23 Wis.2d 362,
127 N.W.2d 35 (1964).
345. City of Fairbanks v~ Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962).
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The Minnesota court.was next in holding that the defense of
sovereign immunity was abolished with respect to school districts.
municipal corp~rations and other subdivisions of government.346
The court prospectively overruled the doctrine but added that"···
we do not suggest that discretionary as distinguished from ministerial activities, or judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
quasi-legislative functions may not continue to have the benefit of
the rule. Nor is it our purpose to abolish. sovereign immunity as
to the state itself."
In anticipation of legislative action subsequent to its decision, the Minnesota court suggested a number of procedural and
substantive proposals for the orderly processing of claims. Among
them are: 11 (1) A requirement for giving prompt notice of the
claim after the occurrence of the tort, l2) a reduction in the
usual period of limitations, (3) a monetary limit on the amoun\ of
liability, (4) the establishment of a special claims court or commission, or provision for trial by the court without a jury, and
{5) the continuation of the defense of immunity as to some or all
uni ts of government for a limi t.ed or indefinite period." 347 Acting upon the views expressed by the court, the 1963 Minnesota legislature enacted statutes which, subject to certain limitations,
swept away the doctrine as applied to all political subdivisions
and s&t forth the procedure for presenting claims against the
lesser units of government.
In 1963 Arizona abolished the doctrine in Stone v. Arizona
Highway Commissiori. 348 The court declared: "We are of the opinion that when the reason for a certain rule no longer exists, the
rule itself should be abandoned. After a thorough re-examination
of the rule of governmental immunity from tort liability, we now
hold that it must be discarded as a rule of law i~ Arizona and all
prior decisions to the contrary are hereby overruled." The court
concluded that " ••. the substantive defense of governmental immunity is now abolished not only for the instant case, but for all
other pending cases, those not yet filed whi~h are not barrerl by
the statute of limitations and all future causes of .action." 34 9
In 1964 Kentucky abolished the doctrine with respect to municipal corporations in Haney v. City of Lexington.350 The court

346.

Spane! v. Mounds View School District No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795
t Minn . 1962} •

347.

Ibid.
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93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).

349. ,!bid.
350.

386 S.W.2d 738 (Ken. 1964); see al)so City of Louisville v.
Chapma~, 413 S.W.2d 74 (Ken. 1967 •
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did not consider the liability of any governmental unit other than
that of a municipal corporation ~nd its agents. The court declared
that its holding was " ••• applicable not only to this case, but to
all cases which may have arisen within the proper time of limitation."351
·
Nevada in 1963 declared that county immunity was abolished
in Rice v. Clark Counti.352 In 1965 the legislature enacted iaws
which waived the immunity of the state ~nd all political subdivisions from liability. Subsequently the co~S~ extended the holding
in Rice to the state and all subdivisions.
In Washington a statute consenting to suits against the
state has been held to abolish immunity of municipalities. "Municipal corporations enjoy their immunity for torts only in so far as
they partake of the state's immunity. They have not sovereighty
of their own . '' 354
State court decisions which refused to abolish immunitv.
Although most legal scholars have concluded that the trend is to-,
ward judicial abrogation of the doctrine, there are several recent
state court decisions in the various states .in which the courts
have refused to abrogate the doctrine,·concluding that this is
solely a legislative function.
·
The majority of the Supreme·Court in Utah ~as consistently .
followed long-standing precedents of ·sovereign immunity and refused
to abolish the doctrine when it examined the question in State·of
Utah v. Parker,355 and again in Campbell~. Pack,356 Later in
1964 the Supreme Court of Utah. ·continued t~ refuse to abolish the ·
doctrine. declaring that "If this doctrine, so long firmly em~
bedded in the structure of our law,· is to be changed,-such change
should come from the rep9sitory of the sovereign power itself,.the
people, speaking through their chosen representatives in the legislature.11357 Subsequently the legislature did enact laws waiving
its sovereign immunity.
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357 •· Hurst v. Highway Dept., 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 P. 2d 71 ( 1964) •
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In 1961, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine refused to
abolish the doctrine, declaring that whether..,governmental immunity
from liability for tort should be discarded or··destroyed is a policy question for the Legislature and not for the courts.358
Two years later, New Mexico also refused to abolish the doctrine in Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hospita1.359 In discussing
the cases in which the courts have abolished the doctrine, the New
Mexico court said that "The basis of these decisions is that the
doctrine of immunity is a court-made rule and should, therefore,
be abrogated by the courts, because the reason upon which the entire theory was based is erroneous. These same courts declined to
follow their previous holdings, and disposed of stare decisis by
saying that the rule of law should not be followed which no longer
has a valid basis; that therefore, the entire question should be
reexamined. However, Michigan, Florida, Colorado and Washington
seem to.have had some second thoughts on the subject, to the extent that they apparently have modified their rulings in subsequent
cases; in California the legislature suspended the effect of the
decision, and in Illinois the legislature promptly reinstated tort
immunity as to certain governmental subdivisions. There are, however, many other jurisdi.ctions which have, in recent years, declined to overrule their prior decisions, and continue to follow
the rule of sovereign immunity, ... " The court concluded: "If the
people of this state desire any change in this policy, it can be
and should be done through the legislature and not by judicial fiat.
The not-too-satisfactory experience in most of those jurisdictions
which have attempted to overrule the immunity doctrine by court decision should make it obvious that legislative action on the subject is the preferred solution. 11 360
In 1963 the Supreme Court of Missouri was asked to follow
the cases from other states which abolished the doctrine. The
court refused to do so, declaring that: "While the complexity of
modern government may require a relaxation of present rules of absolute nonliability, undoubtedly this is a matter for the legislature to provide in the interest of more complete justice to the
individual but under strict regulations and with very definite
limitations to protect the public interest. 11 361 The court concluded by saying that " .• &whatever is done to change the doctrine
••• should be done by the legislature and not by the courts."

358.

Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d
687 (1961).

359.

22 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963).

360.

Ibid.

361.

Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Missuori 1963).
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma also refused to abolish the
doctrine in Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Comgany v,
Board of Couiity Commissioners of the County of ~tephens.~ 2 In
Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 63 the Supreme
Court of Iowa, after carefully considering the decisions in other
states which abolished the doctrine, concluded that legislative
Action was a better solution and refused to abolish the doctrine.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion and stated that~ •.• this Court should not undertake, by
judicial pronouncement, to abrogate a legal principle which has
through~ long period of years been so basic in the laws,of this
state." 364
In Fetzer v. Minot Park District,365 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota declared that: "The courts cannot legislate, regardless of how much we might desire to do so. Our power is limited
to passtng on law enacted by the Legislature, and, if the Legislature fails to act, we cannot change the law by judicial decision."
On this basis the court refused to abolish the doctrine.# In Maryland, when asked to overrule its prior decisions and abolish sovereign immunity, the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to do so,
saying that: "If there is to be a change, we think the Legislature
should make it. 11 366
In the New Hampshire case of Gossler v, City of Manchester,367 the court ruled that any expansion of the scope of municipal liability is a matter for legislative rather than judicial
determination. In refusing to abolish the doctrine, the Supreme
Court of South Dakota declared that: ''Judicial abrogation in itself would make for uncertainties and would not •.. diminish inequalities . " 368

362. 389 P.2d 476 (Okla. 1964).
363.

256 Iowa 337, 127 N.E.2d 606 (1964).

364.
365.

366.

Court of Wood Count, 148 W.Va. 303,
138 N.W.2d

Board of Education
9 5 .

367.

221 A.2d 242 (N.Hn 1966).

368.

Conway v. Humbert, 145 N.Wo2d 524 (S.D. 1966).
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Summaryo Thirteen jurisdictions have taken judicial action
to abolish, in whole or in part, the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The signs are that the movement is still in its early stages,
that the momentum for overruling is strong, and that other states
will probably follow this movement. Yet despite this trend or
movement, many jurisdictions, in c9nsidering whether or not some
portion of sovereign immunity should be overruled, have decided
to leave the question to the legislaturese These decisions were
usually by divided courts and this deference by the judiciary to
the legislature should not be taken for granted because similar
intimations by several courts, when ignored repeatedly by the
state legislatures, have finally led to the judicial conviction
that the initiative had to be undertaken by court decision.369
A most significant fact that is shown by a review of the
above cases is that in the many opinions, including concurring
and dissenting opinions, hardly a word has been written in favor
of the doctrine itself. It appears that a majority of those who
have considered the questions, both those who favor and those who
oppose judicial abrogation of the doctrine, assume that the doctrine should be abolished. The main debate is over the question
whether judges or legislators should do the job . The point has
been summarized by saying that the demise of the inconsistencies
and injustices of governmental immunity" . . . is now clearly
foreordained. The real issue is who will preside at the wake -courts or legislatures. 11 370

369.

The latest state court decision abrogating the doctrine was
the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the case of Parrish v. City
of Little Rock, 244 Ark. 1239 (1968). "However, the Court
felt that even though it might agree that the present rule
of municipal immunity from tort actions should be replaced
with a stricter, more complete rule of responsibility, it
was a matter of public policy and therefore, for consideration for the Legislature, not ·the Court. Kirksey v. City of
Fort Smith, 227 Ark. 630• 300 SeW .. 2d 257 (1957). The legislature's broad investigative powers to determine facts and
its greater flexibility in dealing with complex problems indicate a preference for a solution by statutory action.
Despite the Court's invitation for legislative action ten
years ago there has quite understandably been no comprehensive legislative solution, or action on this troublesome
question.•§ • . Considerations of public policy are not and
never have been for determination by the Legislature alone.
Especially is this so when the individual's rights are put
in question by governmental activity as here. We are now of
the opinion that re-examination of the principle of governmental immunity from tort action is the duty of this Court
and should be undettaken at this time." Id. at 1242.
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LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO CHANGING THE OOCTRINE
Apparently no state legislature has acted to change the
g~neral rule of sovereign immunity except after a state court has
done so. All states have responded to judicial abrogation of the
doctrine, with the exception of Arizona, in one statutory form or
another. For those state legislatures, such as the Colqrado General Assembly, which are considering a change in the doctrine,
without being faced with a court ruling abolishing the common law
rule of immunity, seven alternative approaches are available.
These seven approaches are listed below.
1.

Take no legisl~tive action;

2.

Enact the immunity rule as applied to
all governmental entities, whether engaged in governmental or proprietary
functions;

3.

Enact legislation which waives all immunity of governmental entities and ·
d~clares that liability ~hall be determined as if the entity were a private person;

4 •. - Provide for the purchase of liability
insurance by all governmental entities
and waive the immunity up to the ex~·
tent of the coverage so obtained;
5.

Enact legislation which reaffirms the
immunity rule in general and sets out
exceptions where the entities are to
be liable;

6. -Enact legislation which waives the
immunity of certain entities, retaining immunity for the remainder; or
7.

370.

Adopt the approach wherein the specific
liabilities and immunities of all. governmental entities are set out in the
legislation.

Van Alstyne, The Decline of Governmental Immunity, State Government, 36 (Winter 1966). In addition to the cases cited
above which refused to abrogate the doctrine, leaving such
action to the Legislatures, see Maffei v. Incorp. Town of
Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959}; Parker v. City of
Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966).
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These seven approaches are evaluated here for the purpose
of demonstrating the advantages and disadvantages of each approach
and the experience in the various states under each of the different approaches.

1.

Take no le9islative action and wait for abolishment of immunity by decision of the Supreme Court.

· Immunity in general has been abolished by judicial decision
in California, Arizona, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, and to a
limited extent in Florida, New Jersey, Minnesota, Kentucky, Nevada, and Washington.371 In disregarding the sovereign immunity
rule, which they regard as unjust and outmoded, these courts appear to be motivated by a desire to provide just recompense for
those injured by government. They have usually justified judicial
abrogation of the rule on the ground that it was originally judicially created and since "We closed our courtroom doors without
legislative help, . . . . we can likewise open them. 11 372
These courts have declined to follow their previous holdings that, because the immunity rule has existed for such a long
period of time, only the legislature can now change it. They have
disposed of stare decisis by saying that the rule of law should
not be followed when it no longer has a valid basis. Some feel
that this is the best method of change, believing that since the
doctrine was originally court-made it should now be abolished .by
the courts .373

371.

See note 324, supra.

372.

Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d
11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).

373.

A reading of the opinions in the various cases abolishing
immunity suggests the conclusion that the courts, aware of
their responsibility for having originally created the rule,
are attempting to rectify their error, but at the same time
are attempting to force legislatures into action fixing governmental responsibilityo Williams v. City of Detroit, 364
Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1961). Government liability,
they assert, is the modern trend. The majority of state
courts, however, holding that the immunity question is a policy matter to be resolved by the legislature, do not accept
this view. See Annot. 60 A.L.R.2d 1198, 1199-2200 (1958).
A game of quasi-legal basketball could exist, wherein the
courts, hoping for legislative action defining governmental
responsibility, are reluctant to act, while members of the
legislature, feeling that since the rule was judicially
created the judici~ry should assume the responsibility in
modifying it, with responsibility being tossed back and forth
between judges and legislators, with no visible effort on the
part of either to secure a decisive result.
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Critics of the decisions abrogating immunity contend that
such decisions violate the separation of powers principle.by
usu~ing the legislature's prerogative to determine public policy.374 Further, judicial abrogation appears to be a slow and tortuous process, and not nearly as satisfactory a method of solving
the immunity problem as legislative enactment of a carefully drawn
ggvernmental responsi.bility statute.375 Indeed, in almost every
instance where immunity has been judicially abolished, the situation has been satisfactorily resolved only through subsequent
legislative action defining governmental responsibility, -such action being necessary to safeguard the interests of both government and the injured individuale376 In addition, some courts have

374.

See the dissenting opinions in Haney v. City of Lexington,
386 S.W.2d 738, 743 {Kye 1964) 1 and Parrish v. City of Little Rock, 244 Arkn 1258, 1268 \1968).

375.

It is even conceded by courts abolishing immunity that the
legislature is the logical agency to accomplish abolition,
since it alone is in a position to $Upply the necessary
corrective legislationo The legislature is also in a position to declare a logical and consistent philosophy re~
specting the liability of all governmental units. Judicial
~~gencies, because of the n~ture of their role, cannot satisfactorily do this. For instance, some courts make their
rulings applicable only to the governmental unit involved
in the instant case, whereas other courts render broad rulings affecting all units. Occasionally, rulings are so
vague and confused that subsequent rulings are necessary to
clarify the judicial position. Sometimes, .in view of the
state-local legal relationship, decisions are illogical and
inconsistent. For instance, courts of Michigan, Kentucky,
and Florida hold municipalities liable, but not the state
and counties; and the Minnesota Supreme Court holds all local units liable, but not their parent, th~ state. In contrast, in the states of New York and Washington, where the
legislature has waived the state's sovereign immunity, the
state and local units alike are held accountable.

376.

Since judicial abrogation, some state legislatures, such as
that of Illinois, have ·restored considerable immunity for
local governmental entities. Legislative restoration of immunity may suggest that the legislature f~vors it as public
policy. On the other hand, through abrogation of the rule
of local immunity, the courts are at least placing the duty
of determining governmental responsibility on the legislature.
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modified or receded from their original rulings abrogating immunity.377
In Illinois, the legislature promptly reinstated tort immunity as to certain governmental units after the decision in
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302.378 In Michigan,
after a decision abolishing immunity,379 the legislature in 1965
enacted legislation which granted immunity to the state, its
agencies and subdivisions and enumerated exceptions thereto.380
In the wake of a decision in Wisconsin which abolished immunity, 3 8 1
the legislature quickly enasted leqislation which provided a pro-

377.

This is particularly true in the Michigan case of Williams
v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961). Although one justice did note that the decision applied to municipalities only, it was certainly not apparent from the
major opinion~ Subsequent decisions, however, made it clear
that Williams abrogated municipal immunity only. See Sa ers
v. School Dist. No. 1, 366 Mich. 217, 114 N.W.2d 191 (1962 ;
McDowell v. State Highway Comm'n, 365 Mich. 268, 112 N.W.2d
491 (1961). See notes 339 to 342, supra, and related dis·cussion in text~ See also Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush
Racing Association, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957) (court
adopted)~ and Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590
(1960) (court retreated); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (court adopted), and Kaulakis v.
Boyd, 138 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1962) (court retreated).

378.

See note 372, supraa Immediately following judicial abrogation, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a series of acts
granting immunity to a number of local governmental units.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, voided one of the acts
granting immunity to such districts, because it violated
Article IV§ 22, of the Illinois Constitution which forbids
special legislation granting immunity to any corporation.
See Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573·
(1965). Following this decision, the legislature repealed
the previous acts and enacted the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, approved August 13,
1965 (House Bill Noo 1863). This Act, which grants limited
immunity to all local governmental units eliminates the objection raised by the Harvey case. See also notes 330-334,
supra, and related discussion in text.

379.

Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1
(1961).

380.

Micho Public Acts 170 (1964), Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 3.996 (107)
(Supp. 1965).

381.

Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962).
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cedure for claims and limited the amount of recovery.382 Minnesota restored school district and drainage district immunity for
a five-year period ending January, 1968.383
As a result of court action in California,384 the state was
deluged with suitso In the face of such an increase in claims,
the California legislature in 1961 passed legislation requiring a
two-year moratorium on claimso385 After a two-year moratorium
study period, the California legislature in 1963 enacted legislation by which sovereign immunity was re-established and exceptions
made theretoA386
In Arizona, a similar increase in claims was experienced.
A survey, complete through August lA 1965, reveals that, since the
court decision abolishing immunity,~87 49 lawsuits were filed
against the state and its entities asking for more than $9,177,000.
There was much displeasure with the decision but legislative action has not followed to correct the situation.388
These legislative reactions to judicial decisi~ns which
abolished the immunity rule serve to focus attention upon the need
for legislative development of appropriate procedures for processing liability claims and suits efficiently and for funding the liabilities without undue strain upon governmental fiscal resources.
Noteworthy in this connection also is the fact that in some states

382.

Wis. Stat. Annp § 895.43 (1965).

383.

Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 466.12 and 466.13 (1963).

384.

Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.

2d

457

(1961).

385.

Calif. Session Laws, ch. 1404 (1961).

386.

Calif. Session Laws, ch. 1681 et seq. {1963).

387.

Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d

388.

Heinz R. Hink & David C. Schutter, "The Need for a Legislative Solution to Government Tort Liability in Arizona", Vol.
5, No. 4, Public Affairs Bulletin p. 2, Bureau of Government Research, Ariz. State Univ. {1966). The Kentucky Legislature also has not taken action to define government
responsibility, although the decision in Haney v. City of
Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964) did cause the legislature to authorize a study of the immunity rule. ·See Ky.
Legislative Research Commission, Governmental Immunity, Research Report No. 30 (1965).

107 (1963).
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mandates to abrogate have been delayed for a period to allow enactment of legislation providing the necessary arrangements for
governmental responsibility. The Minnesota Supreme Court suggested guidelines for legislative action and delayed operation of
its mandate until the end of the next legislative session.389
All this experience with judicial abrogation of immunity may well
confirm the validity of one writer's observation that "adequate
reformation can be achieved only by legislation. 11 390 However,
although general agreement exists that the immunity problem can
most satisfactorily be resolved by legislative action, most state
legislatures have neglected to act. As one dissenting Iowa Justice has observed, when the matter of modifying immunity is left
to the legislature, nothing happens.391 Are courts therefore
justified in overruling the doctrine as a means of forcing legislative action? Judicial abrogation, it must be admitted, has
usually produced subsequent legislative action.

389.

Spanel v~ Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minne 279,
292-94, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803-4 (1962).

390.

Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41, 56
"State legislatures, which alone can effectively
(1959)
solve the problem of governmental responsibility, have neglected their obligation to act; and some courts by abrogation have forced them to face the problem. In this respect
the principal contribution of the judicial abrogation movement will very likely be its influence on legislative consideration of the problem. Such consideration is necessary;
legislative help is needed to fix the legal responsibility
of the various governmental units with due regard for the
position they occupy in the total governmental structure.
In overturning immunity, the courts seem clearly to be determining public policy, usually the sole prerogative of
the legislatureo But the legislature has the last word: it
alone can vest or divest the courts with jurisdiction to
hear tort suits against governmental units; it alone can appropriate funds to satisfy tort judgments; and, finally, it
alone can enact laws defining governmental responsibility,
laws which when enacted will be binding on the courts.
Whether governmental liability, now asserted by some courts
as the 'modern trend' will become the rule in most states,
remains to be seen. Judging by remedial legislation enacted
in some states where judicial abrogation has occurred, its
likelihood is certainly not evident. In the long run, however, authority to determine the outcome appears to rest,
not with the courts, but with the legislature." Vanlandingham, Local Governmental Immunity Re-examined, 61 N.W.U.L.
Rev. 263 (1966).
o

391.

Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 127 N.W.2d 606,
6l7 (Iowa 1964).
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Upon survey1.ng what had happened in states where courts had
abrogated immunity, many state courts refused to abrogate the doctrine, concluding that :tt would be more agoropriate for the change,
if any, to emanate from the legislature.392 The Supreme Court of
Missouri, in 1964, declined to discard the immunity rule, reasoning that, if judicial abrogation required subsequent legislation,
the whole matter should be left to the legislature~393
Whether or·not the Supreme Court of Colorado will refute,
change or otherwise amend the rule of governmental immunity is,
of course, not known& To this date the majority of the court has
consistently upheld the doctrine and reaffirmed the position that
any change in the rule should be a legislative matter. A change
in the thinking of the court as a result of decisions in other
states, a change in the composition of the court itself_ or impatience by the court for action by the legislature. could result
in a ch~nge of position by the courto
·
2.

Enact the immunity rule as applied to all governmental entities; whether engaged in governmental or proprietary functions.

Courts and legislatures have advanced a number of arguments
in defense of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. One argument
expresses a concern that the unlimited liability of the state and
its political subdivisions would have an adverse effect on the
proper conduct of governmental services and activities and that
immunity is necessary to protect the government from a rash of
litigation and from unnecessary expensive settlement~. Another
argument against state liability concerns the fiscal integrity of
the state and other public bodies; that unlimited liability could
lead to very serious consequences, including the-risk ~f fiscal
bankruptcy. It is said that there would be a real danger to the
fiscal stability of government, and normal services might be disrupted, since claims could not be expected and could not be budgeted.
There is little doubt that, if it desired to do so, the
legislature could enact a statute giving full governmental immunity to the state and other entities. However, the injustice and
confusion inherent in the doctrine is so manifest· that this action is not seriously considered anywhere. Almost all legal
scholars, and students of government generally, have for years
condemned the principle of governmental immunity and urged its

~92.

See notes 355 through 368, supra, and related discussion in
text.

393.

Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963)
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e

abolition.394 Formerly justified as good public policy because
it prevented diversion of public funds to satisfy tort judgments.
immunity is now frequently condemned because it is at variance
with modern concepts of social justice.395 Payment of liability
claims should not be viewed as diversion of public funds, but
rather as a legitimate part of the cost of performing public
functions.396 Undoubtedly, immunity is unjust, since it causes
the individual harmed by government to bear costs which should
be borne by society. Indeed, it appears that the rule on nonliability, by denying the individual just recompense for a government-inflicted injury, violates the spirit of due process
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and by similar provisions contained in state constitutions.397
The view that government should always be immune and should
never use public funds to redress injuries to private persons is
an extr·eme view. At the opposite extreme is the view which holds
that government should always be liable for wrongs which it inflicts. These extreme positions are the exception . . Very few
states have adopted either of the extreme positions (complete immunity or unlimited liability) because there are many alternatives

394 ..

See note 2 and 14, supra; Davis, Administrative Law 451
(1951).

395.

Determining whether any financial burden is bearable necessarily depends upon social policy. The trend of present-day
policy, reflected in workmen's compensation statutes, the
tort doctrine of strict liability, child labor acts, and
warranties, is based upon the concept that liability should
be imposed on those best able to bear the burdens of liability -- which is often society at large. See Prosser, Torts
§ 74, at 509 (3rd ed. 1964). Also, contrary to the fears of
many, statistical studies and judicial opinions indicate
that the financial burden of liability does not seem prohibitive. Note, The Utah Governmental Act: An Analysis, 120
U. of Utah L. Rev. 122 (1967).

396 .

See Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability
in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 9 Law & Comtemp. Prob. 213
(1942); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 11
Ill . 2d 11, 22-23, 163 N.E.2d 89, 94-95 (1959). Usually,. purchase of public liability insurance is not considered to constitute diversion of public funds.

397.

See concurring opinion of C. J. Moore in Ace Flfing Serv.
Inc. v. Colo. Department of Agriculture, 136 Coo. 19, 28,
314 P.2d 278, 282 (1957).
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to an either-or propositiono A fair and open-minded approach to
the problem of public liability should proceed not from a starting point of either complete immunity or unlimited liability, but
with quest).ons of liability to what extent, under what circum-stances, and subject to what conditions~ in order· to take into
account the legitimate interests of both the citizen and his government. Thus the problems raised by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity are how to reconcile two spheres of interest that are in
competition with each other. First, the interest of the individ- ·
ual citizen, who through no fault of his own sustains an injury
.as the result of governmental action or omission; and second, the
interest of all citizens collectively as taxpayers to be protected
from exorbitant or frivolous claims against the public treasury.

_In the first approach to consideration of sovereign immunity legislation discussed above, in which no action is taken by
the leg_islature and the determination. of whether the doctrine
should be abolished or modified is left to the judiciary, no consideration is given to the sphere of interest of all citizens
collectively as taxpayers to be protected. In the second approach
to consideration of sovereign immunity legislation, in which the
legislature declares that government is always immune, no consideration is given to the sphere of interest of the individual
citizen. The other five approaches discussed bel'ow deal with alternatives to these two positions and attempt to resolve the cortf licting interests between government and the citizen who is injured by government,
Enact legislation which waives all immunity of governmental
entTties and declares that liability shall be determined as
if the entity were a private person.
This is essentially the approach taken by New York and the
United States. By statute in 1929,398 New york generally-placed
public agencies on the same footing as private persons with respect to tort liability and this statute was construed sixteen
years after its enactment to waive immunity of all local entities.399 The liability of the state is a direct-liability and is
not dependent upon any determination that the officer or employee
who actually caused the harm would be personally liable •. There
are no limitations on the state~s liability contained in the Court
of Claims Act. There is no limitation on the amount that can be
recovered in a particular case and there is ~o limitation_ on the
kind of torts for which recovery is permitted. Nonetheless, the
courts have created some imm~nities from liability by judicial·
decision. This liability of the state is determined by the Court
of Claims without a jury~
398.

N.Y.

399.

Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604

Ct. Cl~ Act§

1

et seq. (1963).

(1945).
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The United States government has been subject to tort liability since 1946 when it enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The essential provisions of this act are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(b) and 2671-2680.400 These statutes impose liability on the
United States for negligent or wrongful acts of officers or employees of the United States in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances. The language of the act imposes liability directly on the United States
and does not require any finding that the responsible officer or
employee would be personally liable.
The Federal Tort Claims Act serves as a general waiver of
immunity in suits arising from the negligence of government employees. The act neither repealed existing remedies nor created
new causes of action; but served as a waiver of the privilege
from tort suits allowed the sovereign which could now be pleaded
to the same extent as against private persons, subject to the
limitations contained in the act. It covers claims against departments, agencies, and corporations, whether or not empowered
to sue and be sued, but excepts contractors with the Federal government.
Basically the Federal Tort Claims Act authorizes claims,
"or suits on claims, against the United States on account of
damages to or loss of property or an account of personal injury
or death caused by negligent or wrongful act or omission of an
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his
employment or office,401 which, under the laws of the place where
such injuries were inflicted, would give rise to a cause of action against a private individual,"402 except for interest prior
to judgment, or for punitive damages. If a claimant elects to
sue the government instead of a tortfeasor employee, or obtains
an award or settlement against the government, the judgment will
constitute a complete bar to the right of the claimant against
the employeeo
A number of immunities are provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
The most important immunity is that which provides that the United
States is not liable on any claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused. 11 403 The Federal Tort Claims Act thus provides some stat400.

Ch. 753, 60 Stato 842 (1946) (codified in scattered section
of 28 U.S. C.)
o

u.s.c.A.

28

402.

1 A.L~R.2d 222 (1948).

403.

28 U.S.C.

§

§

921: 8

F.C.A.

401.

Tit. 28, § 921.

2680 (a).
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utory immunities which reduce the scope of.liability of the federal government under the act. This is lacking in the New York
Court of Claims Act. Otherwise, the two statutes are essentially
the same~
The main criticism of this type of approach is that the.
nature of governmental and public activities and functions is not
comparable to private activities and responsibilities. Public
agencies necessarily engage in a broad spectrum of activities·
having no private counterpart, which often involve relatively
high degrees of exposure to injury-producing event_s, and which
the government cannot voluntarily terminate since they are performed as a matter of public duty. Private persons and corporations, on the other hand, are ordinarily free to withdra~ from
activities which entail undue risks of liability. As the.California Law Revision Commission has pointed out: " . • • Private
persons do not make law. Private persons do not issue or revoke
licenses to engage in various professions and occupations. Private persons do not quarantine sick persons and do not commit
mentally disturbed persons to involuntary confinement. Private
persons do not prosecute and incarcerate violators of the law or
administer -prison systems~ Only public entities are required to
build and maintain thousands of miles of streets, sidewalks and
highways. Unlike many private persons, a public entity often
cannot reduce its risk of potential liability by refusing to engage in a particular activity, for government must continue to
govern and is requir$d to furnish services that- cannot be ade.quately provided by any other agency. 11 404 These differences sug:.
gest that it might not be wise to treat public and private entities alike for tort liability purposes.
In order to bring some·fairness both to the government and
the citizen who is injured by government negligence when faced
with tort claims exemplifying the differences discussed above, the
courts have felt constrained to develop-new line~ of ·judicially
recognized tort immunity in order to· avoid the logical consequences
of the statutory language. Thus the courts have formulated rules
which give immunity to public agencies when acting in a "discretionary" or "policy-making" manner and when -conducting purely
"governmental" activities. The decision as to whether an act is
"governmental" or "proprietary", or whether it is a "discretionary" or "ministerial" functi"on always rests with the courts. This
approach, in effect, delegates to the courts the responsibility
for formulating public policy. This in turn leads to unpredictability and confusion in the law, which, so far as possible, should
be clarified and simplified so that persons aff~cted thereby may
with some degree of ~ssurance arrange their affairs accordingly.
It is interesting to note that none of the recent legislative programs resulting from judicial abrogation of governmental immunity
has followed the New York approach.
404.

Cal. Law Revision Comm'n,
munity, p. 269 (1963).
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4.

Provide for the purchase of liability insurance by all governmental entities and waive the immunit u to the extent of
the covera e so obtained and or rovide limitations on the
amount that can he recovered.

This approach places governmental tort liability on a par
with private tort liability, but limits. the amount of damages recoverable from the public entity. This is essentially the approach taken by Minnesota in 1963.405 The Minnesota statute
authorizes the purchase of liability insurance and constitutes a
waiver of immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage. This
approach has also been adopted in several other states, including
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, New
·
Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermonte406
The main criticism of this approach is that it creates unpredictability in the law, since it assumes continued judicial
development of degrees of immunity or liability like the New York
law. In addition, it is said that any dollar limitation is arbitrary and bound to be unfair to some claimants since such limits
will usually have no rational relationship to the amount of actual
damages sustained. On the other hand, this approach does eliminate to a considerable degree the danger of the catastrophe judgment, and provides a sound basis for rational fiscal planning and
the computation of instirance pr~miums.407 The provision for the
purchase of insurance ought to be stated in mandatory language to
have proper effect. If the provision for the purchase of insurance is permissive, as it is in Idaho, Indiana and other states,
the purchase by some but not all of the public entities may result in an unfair and discriminatory law.
Closely related to this approach is the approach adopted
in several states, such as Kentucky, North Carolina, Wisconsin,
Illinois, and Nevada, in which a limit has been placed on the
amount of damages which can be recovered against the state or
other political entity without regard to whether or not there is
any insurance coverage._ This is similar to the approach in the
"wrongful death statute" in Colorado.

405.

Minn. Laws 1963, Ch. 798

406.

Idaho Code, § 41-3501 et seq. (1962); Ind. Stat. Ann.! 391819 (Burns 1965) 1 Iowa Code§ 517.l (1966); Mont. Rev. Code
§ 83-701 et seq. ~1947
Supp. 1965); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-618 et seq. (Supp. 1966J; N.D. Rev. Code§ 39-01-08 (1960,
Supp. 1965); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412:3 (1955, as amended
1961); Ore~ Rev~ Stat. § 243.110 (1965); Vt. Stat. Ann. T.
29 § 1403 et seq. (1959).

407.

Van Alstyne, The Decline of Governmental Immunity, State
Government, p. 33 (Winter 1966).
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Kentucky has been liable for the negligence of its officers
~nd employees since 1946. The liability is limited, however, for
no damages are awarded for pain or suffering, and the total amount
that may be recovered upon any claim is $10,000. The legislature
oas set up an administrative Board of Claims, which consists of
the members of the state's Workmen's Compensation Board, with jurlsdiction to hear and allow claims for damages resulting from governmental negligence. The Board's findings of fact, where based
on substantial evidence, are conclusive upon review by the courts
and the awards are enforceable as court judgments.408
In 1951, North Carolina imposed liability upon the state
government for the negligence of its officers and employees. The
Industrial Commission was authorized to hear and determine tort
claims against the state, in a manner similar to that in Kentucky.
The Commission determination may be appealed on questions of law
but fin_dings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence. The amount of damages awarded cannot exceed the amount
of $12,000.409
The Wisconsin Legislature in 1963 provided a procedure for
bringing tort actions against political corporations, governmental
subdivisions or agencies, and governmental officers and employees.
The amount of ~ecovery cannot exceed $25,000.410 Tort claims in
Illinois are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims which
has the power to determine all claims against the state. The determination of the Court of Claims is final and conclusive and
awards for damages for torts may be granted only up to $25,00Q.411
In 1965 the legislature of Nevada enacted laws which waived the
immunity of the state and all political subdivisions and consented
to have its liability determined in accordance with the same rules
of law as are applied to individuals and corporations. The waiver
of immunity is subject to the conditions and limitations as set
~~~t~x~~e~h~h!t!~~t fa$~s:So~~Jf~ for damages in a tort action may

6

408.

Ken~ Rev. Stat. § 44-070 et seq. (1962).

409.

N.C. Gen. Stat.

§

143.291 (1964, as amended 1965).

410.

Wis~ Stat. Ann.

§

895.43 {1965).

411.

Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37,
1966}.

412.

Nev. Rev. Stat.

§

§

439 .1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp.

41.035 ( 1965).
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5.

Enact legislation which reaffirms the immunity rule in general
and sets out broad exceptions where the entities are to be
liable.

This approach is essentially the one adopted by the Michigan legislature in 1964,413 and by the Utah legislature in 1965.414
Section 3 of the Utah Immunity Act initially grants immunity to all
governmental entities for injuries resulting from the discharge of
a governmental function. Sections 5 through 9 then proceed to
waive that immunity for enumerated types of public activities.
Section 10 generally waives immunity for negligent acts or omissions by employees; nevertheless it reinstates immunity forcertain types of employee-caused injuries through exceptions to that
general waiver.415 The final provision of the act sets forth the
requirements for the purchase of liability insurance by governmental entities, allowing all entities to purchase such insurance
for risks created by the act and setting minimum amounts of coverage.416 · The approach of both Michigan and Utah is to codify the
common law rule of sovereign immunity by declaring public entities
immune when acting in a 11 governmental 11 capacity but liable when
acting in a "proprietary" capacity. Specific exc_eptions to the
immunity rule have been devised to accompany the general principle.
For example, liability is authorized without regard for the governmental-proprietary distinction, in cases arising from highway
defects, dangerous or defective conditions of public buildings,
and negligent operation of governmentally-owned vehicles.
The distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary".
functions is thus given statutory sanction. However, no exact

413.

Mich~ Public Acts 1964, ch. 170; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 3.996
( 1) - ( 15) ( 1948, as amended 1964).

414.

Laws of Utah 1965, ch. 139,
63-30-1 to 34 (Supp. 1965)0

415.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10 (1) - (11) (Supp. 1965) excepts
the following from liability: discretionary acts, certain
intentional tortsp license and permit issuance on demand,
improper inspection, institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, misrepresentation,
riots, and civil disturbances, taxation, activities of the
Utah National Guard, incarceration or legal confinement, and
natural conditions of state lands.

416.

See Utah Code Anna § 63-30-34 (Supp. 1965). This section
limits recovery to the minimum amounts set by§ 29 or the
amount of insurance procured by the entity, whichever is
larger. Section 29 limits recovery for personal injury to
$100,000 per person· and $300,000 per accident. Property
damages are limited to $50,000 per accident.
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1 et seq.; Utah Code Ann. §

definltion or explanation as to what constitutes a "governmental"
or "proprietary" function is given in the statutes. This statutory treatment in effect constitutes a general delegation to the
courts of the power to delineate in case by case decision-making
exactly what activities and functions of government are "governmental" and what activities are "proprietary". This approach has
been criticized because it leads ~o unpredictability since the
courts are continually expanding liability by interpreting "governmental" activities as constituting "proprietary" activities
for which the public entities are not imrnune.417
This creates a serious problem because there is no certainty regarding immunities and liabilities and fr9m the time a
new liability is created by court decision until this area of
liability can be covered by the purchase of liability insurance
there is no insurance coverage or protection. Lack of coverage
during this interim period poses a serious threat to many entities~ Unanticipated liabilities involving large verdicts are not
taken into account in this approach to the problem. The approach
leaves in the hands of the judiciary the responsibility for balancing policy considerations and striking a practical solution to
issues which are essentially political in nature and thus particularly within the competence and experience of legislators.
For the above reasons, it has been suggested that the Utah
Immunity Act be amended to specifically provide for coverage of
proprietary functions and that the governmental-proprietary distinction be abolished by the legislature.418

6.

Enact legislation which waives the immunity of certain entities, retaining immunity for the remainder.

This is essentially the approach taken by the state of Illinois in response to the Molitor case in which governmental immunity of local public bodies was judicially abolished.419_ Subsequent
to the Molitor decision, the Illinois legislature passed several
statutes which reestablished sovereign immunity.for various political subdivision. For example, park districts were declared to be
wholly immune from tort liability; others, such as school districts, were only liable to a limited extent (up to $10,000); and
counties were made liable only in specific circumstances~420
4!7.

Van Alstyne, op. cit. note 407, at 34.

418.

Note, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act:
Utah L. Rev. 127-132 (1967).

419.

Molitor v~ Kaneland Community School Dist. No. 302, 18 111.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959}.

420.

See notes 330 to 333 and note 378, supra.
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An Analysis, 120

There appears to be a grave constitutional problem inherent
in this type of legislation since it could very well be held to be
"special" legislation., There appears to be no logical basis for
distinguishing between governmental entities, "either from the
perspective of the injured party, or from the point of view of
ability to insure against liability. 11 421
The constitutional objections to this approach were borne
out in several recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court in
which it has held several of these immunity statutes to be unconstitutional as special legislation. The latest case was Hutchings
v. Kraject,422 in which a statute declaring counties to be immune
was declared unconstitutional as violating the prohibition against
special legislation.
7.

roach wherein the s ecific liabilities and immungovernmental entities are set out int e statute.

California was the first state to adopt comprehensive legislation in response to judicial abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine by the Muskopf case.423 This approach seeks to
ensure legislative control of the future development of the rules
of liability and immunity.424 As a general rule it is declared
that public entities are liable in tort only to the extent declared by statute~ The statute then proceeds to spell out in detail the circumstances in which liability will be recognized, not
by reference to the "governmental" or "proprietary" nature of the
particular activity, but by practical criteria.425
There are two very important considerations, one legal and
one financial, which speak very strongly in favor of the Califor-

421.

Van Alstyne, op. cit. note 407, at 34.

4220

34 Illo 2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966).
and note 378, supra.

423.

Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d
457 (1961).

424.

It is suggested that in California governmental immunity is
entirely statutory. Van Alstyne, California Government Tort
Liability§· 5.6 (1964).

425.

Claims and Actions Against Public Entities and Public Employees (California Tort Claims Act), Cal. Gov't Code§§
810-99606. This Act was enacted after a two-year moratorium
on the effect of the Muskopf case, during which time a study
was made on the ne~d for sovereign immunity: 5 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Reports, Recommendations and Studies (1963).
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See notes 330 to 333

nia approach. First, in terms of legal draftsmanship, it is far
more difficult to clearly define the exceptions to the general
rule of liability than it is to retain, or where judicially abolished, to re-establish immunity and then set forth exceptions
according to which public entities are liable. Second, the financial consideration is found in the task of obtaining insurance
against governmental liability. Experience in other states has
shown that insurance coverage is more expensive to obtain where
liability is the general rule and immunity the exception. In
situations, such as in the California statute, where immunity is
the general rule and the areas of liability are set forth by way
of exceptions, the risk to which the entities are exposed are ·
more clearly defined and this lends itself to a more accurate
ascertainment as to what the risks actually are. This should result in lower premiums paid for the coverage had.
rhe approach taken by California is thought to be more
readily adapt.able to the realities of public administration because it focuses attention on the facts rather than abstract
ideas. It thus seeks to postulate statutory policy upon experience rather than theory alone, and hence should be more readily
capable of alteration where need exists without damage to the
underlying basic policy. Should experience prove that a change
or amendment would be necessary or advantageous, based upon applicable policy considerations which are made by the legislature,
the legislature can make that change by statutory enactment. The
advantage of this approach is that it is susceptible to changa or
amendment whenever that is found to be necessary. Another advantage of this approach is that it should avoid uncertainties as
to iegal rights and duties. Because of the comprehensiveness and
detail inherent in this approach it is thought that unnecessary
litigation will be reduced~426
The approach taken by .California has been criticized because it is thought that the complexity of the statutory pattern
which has been developed along pragmatic lines will tend to encourage litigation rather than out of court settlements. It is
also criticized because the comprehensiveness of the statute reduces flexibility by.narrowing the range of judicial alternatives
available under the statute, as compared with the common law.427
This very idea is also used in support of this approach. Indeed,
this approach takes away from the courts any chance to make a policy determination in this area. One of the main reasons for the
adoption of this statutory approach in California was to take
away from the courts the policy determination power it had there-

426. Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, A Study Relationg to Sovereign Immunity, p. 271 (1963).

427.

Van Alstyne, 0po cit. note 407, at 35.
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tofore exercised when deciding whether a particular activity was
"governmental" or "proprietary". This decision is now in the
hands of the California Legislature.
Summary. For a legislature faced with the task of formulating legislation with respect to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, there are several alternatives open to it in considering
a solution to the problem. The legislature may choose to adopt
any one of the following courses of action: (1) take no legislative action; (2) make the state entirely immune; (3) make the
state entirely liable; (4) make the state either entirely immune
or entirely liable, with some exceptions to the general rule; (5)
waive immunity up to a certain amount; (6) waive immunity of only
a limited number of jurisdictions; or (7) attempt to spell out in
detail both the liability and immunity of public entities.
The legislative solution appropriate for one state may not
be desirable for another. There are many factors that must be
taken into consideration in determining what the policy should be
in a particular state. In short, the extent to which liability
should be accepted or refused depends upon a careful and conscientious evaluation of competing policy considerations in light of
the special circumstances which may be relevant in each state.
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COMMITTEE PROCEDURE AND ACTION
Introduction
Previous attempts at adopting legislation in the area of
sovereign immunity in Colorado in an effort to abolish or modify
the doctrine have not been successful, except for the adoption of
a law in 1949 making the state and other governmental units liable
for injury caused by the operation of government owned motor vehicles, and several other statutes which impose liability on public entities. However, as was shown earlier in this report,
numerous other jurisdictions have recently changed the doctrine,
either by judicial decision or by legislative action, and there
now appears to be a trend toward modifying or abolishing it. In
addition, much criticism has been leveled at the doctrine by legal
writers .and scholars.
In the light of this trend and criticism, Colorado legislators and various interest groups have considered the problems
attendant to governmental immunity to be of serious and immediate
concerno This concern was expressed in the Forty-sixth General
Assembly by the introduction of House Joint Resolution No. 1023
which directed the Legislative Council to make "a study of the
problem of governmental civil immunity with a view toward developing comprehensive legislation to define and limit the areas of
immunity and to provide procedures for compensation to those affected and to balance the public and private interest involved."
The content of that study resolution was adopted ·by the General
Assembly in Senate Joint Resolution No~ 42. In conformity with
the provisions of S.J.R. No. 42 the Committee on Sovereign Immunity was appointed by the Legislative Council to conduct such
study.
Statement of the problem. The problSM·in~olved in relation
to legislative consideration of the rule of governmental immunity
lies in weighing the need for compensation for individual injury
against the necessity of preserving public funds for general use.
Basic philosophical considerations as to the nature and purpose
of government, its relationship to the individual citizen and the
spreading of the risk of governmental activities are involved.
Arguments for immunity. In the earlies~ expression of the
sovereign immunity rule an unincorporated county was·relieved of
liability for damages on the grounds that (1) the community was
unincorporated and thus did not have funds to pay damages, and (2)
that it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than
that the public should suffer an inconvenience. In further justification of the rule it has been stated that (1) the doctrine
rests on public policy, (2) it is absurd to speak of a wrong committed by an entire people, (3) whatever the state does must be
lawful, {4) an agent of the state is always outside of the scope
of his authority and employment when he commits any wrongful act.
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(5) public funds should not be diverted to compensate for private
injuries, (6) inconveniences and embarrassment would descend upon
the government if it should be subject to liability, (7) there is
a lack of precedent (8) there will be an infinity of actions and
spurious claims, (9f a municipality derives no profit from the exercise of governmental functions, which are solely for the public
benefit and thus there is no fund from which to compensate for
private injuries, (10) in the performance of duties public officers are agents of the state and not of the corporation, so that
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply, and (11) cities and counties cannot carry on their government if money for
public use is diverted to making good the torts of employees.
Arguments against immunitya Critics of the doctrine point
to the injustice of making a private individual suffer for wrongs
inflicted, in effect, by the people as a whole through the government as their agent. They argue that the state is morally obligated, as a simple act of justice, to compensate persons who
have suffered at its hands~ Although a state cannot be sued without consent, it should not act with impunity~ for a rule of law
which denies all relief for negligent or arbitrary action implicitly sanctions it. In addition, these critics insist the burden
should be distributed amongst all the members of society by forcing the government to make compensation for its wrongs and if necessary, providing sources of revenue to finance such compensation.
The current of criticism has been that the torts of public employees are properly to be regarded as a cost of the administration of
government, which should be distributed by taxes to the general
public, and that the purchase of liability insurance adequately
serves to provide compensation for the injured who fall within its
protection.
In theory then, the controversy is as to whether the burden
of injuries inflicted by government should be borne by the injured
individual or by society as a whole. If it is determined that the
interests of justice are best served by spreading the burden to
the whole of society by removing or modifying the immunity of government, the practical questions then arise of how best to administer and finance such a policy and at the same time preserve the
fiscal integrity of individual governmental entities so that they
can carry on the business of government. The crucial question
seems to be whether or not the immunity of governments should be
waived in particular instances or abolished altogether and, if the
doctrine is abolished or limited, how a citizen's claim should be
adjudicated with the least inconvenience and the greatest equity,
both to the citizen and to the publico
Purpose of sovereign immunity study~ The purpose of the
study on sovereign immunity then is to explore the implications of
possible alternative methods of providing governmental tort liability or immunity in the light of existing statutory provisions
and of related case law developments both in Colorado and other
states in an attempt to identify and suggest appropriate applica-
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tions of policy considerations deemed pertinent to the solution
of the problem posed for the legislature.
To accomplish the purposes set forth in the study resolution (Senate Joint Resolution Noo 42, Forty-sixth General Assembly, 1967), the Legislative Council Committee on Sovereign Immunity held thirteen meetings from June 9, 1967 to September 19,
1968. Tp aid the committee in its deliberations, representatives
of vario~s departments of state government (Colorado Department
of Highw~ys, Insurance Department, Attorney General's Office, Division of\Local Government), representatives of various local governmental entities~ and representatives of the insurance industry,
were consulted by the committee. In addition, two questionnaires
were used by the committee to obtain comments and suggestions from
interested persons on the proposals the committee had under consideration.
Early in its deliberations, the committee determined that
any approach which attempts to comprehensively deal with the subject of sovereign immunity should be ba5i~d upon fundamental policy
considerations designed to accomplish two objects or to solve two
problems: (1) to clearly set forth the relevant substantive liability problems, and to delineate the kinds of acts or omissions
for which public entities are or are not to be immune; and (2) to
clearly set forth the policy considerations relevant to the financial administration of government tort liability and the procedural handling of governmental tort liability claims. If the·
public entities are to be held responsible for some or all of its
acts of omissions, the approach must provide some judicial or administrative means for determining and enforcing that liability.
Policy Considerations Relevant to Legislative Approach to Sovereign
Immunity
As indicated earlier in this report, there are seven alternative legislative approaches available to the legislature: (1)
take no legislative action; (2) make the state entirely immune;
(3) make the state entirely liable; (4) make the state either entirely immune or liable, with some exceptions to the general rule;
(5) waive immunity up to a certain amount; (6) waive immunity for
particular jurisdictions and maintain immunity for the remainder;
or (7) attempt to spell out in detail both the liability and immunity of public entities. The advantages and disadvantages of
each approach and the experience in the various states which have
adopted one of the particular approaches were explored earlier in
this report.428 Each of these alternatives was considered by the

428.

See pages 108 to 125.
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committee at some point during the study, as will be discussed
below.429
Need for legislative actidn. At its first meeting, the
committee heard from Associate Justice Edward E. Pringle of the
Colorado Supreme Court. Justice Pringle explained that, to date,
the majority of the court feels that any change, modification, or
abolition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from
the legislature. Since the General Assembly has acquiesced in
the doctrine for so many years, it should be the responsibility
of the legislature, not the court, to decide whether to modify or
abolish the doctrine. Justice Pringle explained that a minority
of the court believes that the court should abolish the doctrine,
since it came into existence through judicial, not legislative,
action. The main debate is not over whether the doctrine should
be abolished, but over the question of whether it should be abolished by the court or the legislature.
The disadvantages of taking no legislative action were
discussed earlier in this report.430 It was there indicated that
there was general agreement that adequate reformation of the doctrine can be achieved only by legislation. Yet in the face of
continued legislative neglect or inaction, several state courts
have abolished the doctrine. This abolishment has, in almost
every instance, led to the subsequent enactment of legislation to
adequately deal with the problems of sovereign immunity. Whether
or not the Supreme Court of Colorado will refute, change or otherwise modify the rule is, of course, not known. A change in the
thinking of the court as a result of decisions in other states, a
change in the composition of the court itself, or impatience by
the court for action by the legislature, could result in a change
of position by the court.
The committee determined that to take no legislative action
and to wait for abolishment of the doctrine by the Supreme Court
would not be wise, just or practicable. The committee decided
that a statutory solution to the problem was needed to give direction and bring some degree of consistency and uniformity to the
applicable statutory and common law principles. To take no legislative action would simply leave in the courts the power through
judicial decision to modify or abolish the. doctrine as it saw fit.
The failure of the General Assembly to take action, in other words,
would constitute a decision to permit the future evolution of the
doctrine to be guided by judicial conceptions of sound public
policy on a case-by-case approach. Because of the uncertainty
that would result from this approach, and because the determina-
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See Minutes of Meeting, pp. 2 to 6, August 17, 1967.

430.

See notes 371 to 393, supra, and related discussion in text.
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tion of public policy is particularly the prerogative of the legislature, the committee concluded that to take no action at all
would be unwise and this alternative was rejected. The committee
thus recommended that a legislative proposal be adopted by the
committee.
.
0 en end closed end le islative a roach. The problem
faced by the comm ttee wast us a quest on of ow and when, not
whether, the doctrine should be changed or abdlished. The problem was one of determining the sphere within which government is
immune and need not answer for the consequences of its action and
.the sphere within which it is liable. The committee determined
that there are two general approaches that may be employed in
.
drafting legislation -- the open end and the closed end approaches.
Open end refers to bills that would abolish or retain immunity
across the board, comprehensively. Closed end refers to legislation that would abolish immunity, subject to certain exceptions
and limitations. This method can involve either totally establishing governmental liability and then listing e.xceptions to it,
or totally establishing governmental immunity· (reaffirming sovereign immunity) and then listing exceptions to that.431
Open end -- retain immunity. With respect to the first
approach, that of retaining the present law of immunity, the committee felt that such an approach was undesirable. Under the
present system the courts are continually expanding governmental
liability by interpreting governmental activities as constituting
proprietary functions for which the entities are not immune. This
creates a serious problem because there is no certainty regarding
immunities and liabilities and from the time a new liability is
created by the courts until this area of liability can be covered
by the purchase of liability insurance there is no insurance
coverage or protection. Lack of coverage during this interim
period poses a serious threat to many entities. It was agreed
that if legislation with respect to sovereign immunity is not enacted, the courts will continue to chip away at the doctrine or
abolish it entirely. For these reasons, the committee .agreed that
to retain the present rule of immunity would be undesirable.432
Ofien end -- blanket waiver of immunity. The committee observed tat the federal government and several states have by
statute or court decision declared that government is not immune
from liability for its torts and that the liability is to be determined as if the government were a private person. The difficulty with this approach is that government is fundamentally
different from private persons. In most jurisdictions where there
has been a blanket waiver of immunity, the courts have recognized
431.

Minutes of Meeting, Nov. 15, 1967, p. I.

432.

Minutes of Meeting, Aug. 17, 1967, pp. 3, 4.
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that the liability of government cannot be unlimited and they have
worked out limits of liability on a case by case basis over aperiod of years8 If no limits on governmental liability are specified, the courts will have to define the limits of such liability.
This, in effect, is an abdication of legislative responsibility.
Under this process, the extent of governmental liability
cannot be determined with certainty. Many cases must be tried
and processed through the courts, many of which may result in the
government defendant not being held liable. The financial stability of many public entities may also be left unprotected because of the unavailability of insurance at rates that they can
afford to pay, resulting from the unknown potential liability.
Few persons would contend that government should be an insurer of all injuries sustained by private persons as a result of
governmental activity, even though such a policy would spread the
losses occasioned thereby over the largest possible base. The
committee believes that the basic problem is to determine how far
it is desirable and socially expedient to permit the loss-distributing function of tort law to apply to public entities, without
thereby unduly interfering with the effective functioning of such
entities for their own publicly approved ends. The blanket waiver
of immunity approach tends to resolve this problem by ignoring it.
For these reasons, the committee rejected this approach as being
undesirable.
Closed end approaches. With the rejection of the two open
end approaches discussed above, the committee determined that it
could adopt either a statute in which liability was the general
rule, with exceptions, or a statute in which immunity was the general rule, with exceptions. In considering which of these two
approaches would be more readily adaptable to Colorado law and
which would be the best approach, the committee directed its attention to the following areas: (1) the approach that would be
the easiest to draft; (2) the effect each approach would have on
the availability of insurance and the cost thereof; (3) the possible effect each approach would have on the performance of duties
by public officials and employees; and (4) the approach which
would allow the most flexibility for future change.
In terms of legal draftsmanship, the committee felt that
it would be far more difficult to clearly define the exceptions
to liability than it would be to retain immunity and then set
forth exceptions according to which public entities can be sued.
Thus the committee concluded that it would be easier to draft a
bill in which immunity is the general rule, with exceptions for
those areas wherein liability should attach to public entities.
With respect to the financial consideration pertaining to
the availability and cost of insurance, the committee-found that
experience in other states has shown that coverage is more expensive to obtain where liability is made the principle and immunity
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the exceptionn In situations where immunity becomes the principle and the areas of liability are set for~h by way of exceptions,
the risk is more clearly defined and lends itself to mdre accurate
assessment, which should result in lower premiums for the coverage
had. If the limits of potential liability are known, public entities may plan accordingly, may budget for their potential liabilities, and may obtain realistically priced insurance.
A statute imposing liability with specific exceptions for
immunity would provide the public entities with little basis upon
which to budget for the payment of claims and judgments for dam-ages, for they would be faced with a vast area of unforeseen situations, any of which could result in costly litigation and a
possible damage judgment. Such a statute could greatly·expand
the amount of litigation and the attendant expense. Moreover,
the cost of insurance under such a statute would .probably be
greater.than under a statute which provides for immunity except
to the extent provided by law, since an insurance company would
demand a premium designed to protect against the indefinite-area
of liability that would exist under a statute imposing liability
with specified exceptions.
Accordingly, the committee decided to adopt a statute which
provides that public entities are immune from liability unless
they are declared to be liable by other statutory provision. The
committee felt that this approach would provide a better basis
upon which the financial burden of liability may be calculated,
since each enactment imposing liability can be evaluated in terms
of the potential cost of such liability.
It is thought by some that a legislative approach in which
liability is determined to be the general rule will dampen the
zeal, interest and enthusiasm of public officials and employees
in the performance of their duties and functionsn This arises
from the desire to protect themselves from possible suit, when
the law is not specific as to their liability or immunity forcertain acts. With liability the general rule, their exposure to
suits is greatly increased. The result of this may be a lack of
morale and enthusiasm among public employees. On the other hand,
if immunity is the general rule, a problem could arise out of the
proper performance of duty for it is possible that a misguided
public official could abuse his office. If immunity were complete
an official could injure individuals by his actions under the protection of the law. However, this problem seems to be more theoretical than actual and the committee thought the best approach
would be for immunity to be the general rule.
The committee concluded that making immunity the general
rule will provide the needed flexibility in the statute. The committee recognizes that the.subject of sovereign immunity is so
vast that it is nearly impossible to spell out in detail all areas
of activity in which either immunity or liability of public entities and its employees is to be applied. Many areas of activity
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will require attention in future years and it can be anticipated
that recommendations may be submitted to subsequent legislative
sessions to deal with these remaining problems. Therefore the
committee felt it necessary that a statute be drafted which will
allow for the addition of new areas of immunity or liability as
experience proves desirable. By providing that liability is an
exception to the general rule of immunity, additional liability
may be imposed by the legislature within carefully drafted limits,
should further study or experience in future years demonstrate
that such liability is justified.
Other approaches. The committee considered and rejected
the approach whereby each type of governmental unit is or may be
treated separately. The committee agreed that all units of government should be treated similarly, as long as there is provision for insurance or arrangements based on ability to pay. for
it makes little difference to an injured person what type of governmental unit caused the injury~ It appears to be unfair to
make an individual's right· to recover damages for injury dependent on whether it was the state or some other political subdivision or governmental unit which was responsible.433
The approaches which involve the authorization to purchase
insurance and provisions for the waiver of immunity up to the
limits of insurance coverage and/or statutory limits on the amount
of recovery that may be had against a public entity, are considered under a later sub-heading in this report.
Utah sovereign immunity bill. The committee, at its first
meeting, decided that it should start with a particular philosophy or proposal on sovereign immunity so that the comments received from those concerned would be focused on a single proposal
rather than directed to the whole problem in general terms. The
committee agreed to begin by considering the recently enacted
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which is contained herein as Appendix A, since the act spelled out a number of provisions and
exceptions which the committee wished to thoroughly explore.434
Without committee endorsement or approval, this bill was sent to
several interested persons and groups in an attempt to solicit
comments and suggestions.
The Utah bill served as a starting point for discussion of
what ought and what ought not to be included in any sovereign immunity bill the committee might eventually wish to propose or endorse. Most of those who responded to the request for comments
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and suggestions on the Utah bill also appeared be.fore the committee at its second meeting on July 28, 1967.435 Various sections
of the Utah bill were discussed in detail and there were many suggestions for improvement and suggestions on how the bill could be
adapted to Colorado's situation.
Committee discussion on the Utah bill pointed out one of
the most basic decisions that had to be made by the committee in
its consideration of sovereign immunity legislation. That decision involved a determination as to whether the c'our-ts should decide the immunities and liabilities of governmental entities or
whether that decision should be made by the legislature. In either case, the committee agreed that it must be careful to formulate language which differentiates between the two approaches .
The committee found that the Utah bill mal.ntains the distinctio.n between governmental and proprietary functions and vests
in the courts a determination whether a particular activity is
governmental or proprietary. The Utah bill provides for this
distinction in Section 3. Sovereign immunity is reaffirmed with
respect to governmental functionsJ while entities are not immune
with respect to proprietary functions. There is no exact definition or clear-cut distinction between governmental and proprietary and, under the Utah bill, the determination is ·made on the
basis of the facts in a specific case. The New York legislation,
although taking a different philosophical approach 1 also maintains this distinctiono Under this type of statute~ the determination and application of sovereign immunity i$ left in the
hands of the court.436
.
.
The committee found that the California legislation, unlike the New York and Utah approach, seeks to ke~p control of the
problem in the hands·of the legislatureo Although the New York
legislation has made governmental entities liable to the same extent as private individuals, there are certain areas of governmental activities which bear no resemblance to the activities of
a private person and in which the government entities may remain
immune. Under the New York law the recognition of these areas
that should remain immune has been left in the hands of the court.
Under the Utah bill, the courts are left to determine whether an
activity is governmental or proprietary. On the other hand, in
California, the decision as to what areas of governmental activity
should be immune or liable remains in the legislature and not in
the courts.437
435.
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The committee was ,in general agreement that it should
attempt to avoid the use of the hard-to-define terms, "proprietary" and "governmental", and that the distinction be abolished
in any legislation the committee might propose. Little will be
accomplished in a statute without abolishing the governmentalproprietary distinction. The areas of liability should be set
forth in the statute. such as was done in the California statute_
Immunity should be preserved as to all other functions so that
there are no unknown areas of liability. The advantages of this
approach, as already indicated, are that new areas of liability
can be added to the list as experience indicates, and insurance
companies would know with some degree of certainty the areas of
liability.438
California statute. In view of the consensus of the committee that (1) some legislation is needed with respect to the
sovereign immunity doctrine, and (2) the liabilities and immunities of governmental units under the doctrine should be made a
matter of statutory determination, the committee decided that the
California statutory approach should be followed.439 Therefore,
the committee directed that a Colorado draft of the California
statute be prepared for committee consideration.440 The next two
meetings of the committee were devoted to a consideration and discussion of the specific provisions of the California statute.441
In light of the committee discussion of the provisions of
the California statute, the committee concluded that its complexity and comprehensiveness made its adaption to Colorado law an
extremely difficult and cumbersome process. In addition, the form
of the California statute had been almost entirely abandonedo The
committee was in agreement, however, that certain substantive provisions and concepts of the California statute should be retained.
The committee therefore concluded that a simpler form of statute,
embodying several of the principles of the Utah and California
statutes, but adapted more to Colorado's needs, would be easier to
understand. With this in mind, the committee decided to draft its
own bill in light of the committee discussion concerning various
policy considerations relevant to the proper legislative approach,
policy considerations relevant to the substantive aspects of liability and immunity in specific tort situations, policy consider-
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ations relevant to the financial administration of government tort
liabi~ity, and policy considerations relevant to the proc~dural
handling of government tort liability claims~442
Policy Considerations Relevant to the Substantive Law of Immunity
or Liability

The committee felt that· it was necessari t6 agree upon the
policies it wished to express in a, statute regarding specific tort
situations before considering a draft bill. The committee thus
·attempted to determine what act$ of negligence it wanted to cover,
or what types of claims it wanted to include. for ·which there would
be a waiver of immunity. With this policy determination, it was
felt that a consideration of the draft bill would be more meaningful because the committee would have an idea of what it wanted and
what to look for, based upon the agreed specific policy considerations to be expressed in the bill. · Therefore, the committee examined areas of possible tort liability and suggested avenues for
appropriate legislative action consistent with the relevant policy
considerations.
Scope of immunity and liability. The committee agreed that
it should be the policy of the statute not to narrow th~ present
common law on liability nor to expand the present common law on
immunity. It should be the intent of the statute not· to undo the
present law, unless otherwise specifically .so stated in the act.
The statute should assure that the doctrine is not imposed in
those cases where it did ·not exist before, unless the statute specifically so provides. The statute should be designed to narrow
the application of the doctrine and not to permit the.expansion of
the doctrine.443
.
Automobile accidents. The committee·agreed that, with respect to injuries arising from automobile accidents caused by the
negligent operation of government-owned motor vehicles, the defense of sovereign immunity should not be available to a public
entity. The committee agreed that there should be an exception
for emergency vehicles. Thus, if an injury_ is caused by the operation of an emergency vehicle and its operation do~s not fall
within the provisions of the exception ~s expressed in 13-5-4 (2)
and (3), C.R.S. 1963, the defense of sovereign immunity should not
apply. If, however, the operation of the emergency vehicle is
within the provisions of the exception, sovereign immunity will
apply.444
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The committee also felt that there may be circumstances
wherein the operator may sometimes be individually liable, i.e.,
sovereign immunity would not be available to him personally. This
would occur when the negligence is outside of the scope of his employmente In other words, if the operator's actions constitute
gross negligence, they are outside of the scope of employment and
the exception for the operation of emergency vehicles does not
apply. On the other hand, if the operator's actions do not constitute gross negligence, they are within the scope of employment
and the exception. Under these circumstances, sovereign immunity
would apply.
Hospitals and jails.' The committee agreed that sovereign
immunity should not be available as a defense to injuries arising
from the negligent operation of a hospital or the negligent performance of hospital activities. The committee also agreed that
this policy should be applied to the operation of jails.445
Public buildings. The committee agreed that public entities should be liable to the same extent as private persons for injuries caused by the dangerous conditions of public buildings.446
Roads and highwayse With respect to liability or immunity
for injuries caused by the negligent construction, operation, or
maintenance of public roads, or by road defects which constitute
a dangerous condition, the committee found that the present law
is in conflict. A county is presently immune from liability. - On
the other hand, a city is presently liable for injuries caused by
defective streets within the city limits, if it had proper and
sufficient notice of the defect and failed to correct it.
The committee agreed that the liability of the municipalities should be expanded to include the counties and the state on
a logical basis. However, the committee encountered much difficulty in determining the extent to which this expansion should
take place, since it is recognized that there are certain types
of roads or conditions of roads which probably ought not to cause
the imposition of the rule of liability on the public entity.
The committee first thought that perhaps a distinction
could be drawn between injuries caused by road defects that were
latent and road defects that were patent~ In the case of patent
defects, or defects which are plainly visible or which can be discovered by such an inspection as would be made in the exercise of
ordinary care and prudence, the entity should be liable for injuries resulting therefrom. It is to be presumed that the entity
has notice of the patent defecto Failure to act when presumptive
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notice exists will result in liability for injuries. caused thereby. In the case of latent or hidden defects, one which could not
be discovered by a reasonably ca~eful inspection using ordinary
care, the entity will be immune, unless it had actual notice of
the defect in which case it will"be held liable.
·
·
The committee agreed that.where a patent dangerous road·
condition exists and the entity has notice of it or should have_
notice of it, the condition should be properly marked or the public properly warned of the condition. If the condition is- not
properly marked to warn the public, the entity will be liable for
injuries resulting therefrom.· Of course, in the case of latent
defects if the entity does·not have notice, either actual or presumptive, it will not be liable.
The committee, however, felt that it. is arguable whether
the state or county should be required to repair defects or to
provide proper markings or warnihgs of their existence-in order
to avoid liability. The vast riumber of miles of state.highways
and roads would i'mpose a tremendous obligation on the state if it
were to meet this requirement. • In other words, it is arguable
whether liability should be the rule with respect to all state
roads, since there are some state roads where liability should
not be the rule. The problem faced by the committee was one of
classifying and defining those highways and roads where immunity
applies and where it does ·not apply. The committee felt that ·
this classification, once agreed upon, would serye to impose varying degrees of liability depending_ upon the ~lassification· of the
road.
_
·
The committee made several suggestions with respect to an
appropriate classification. It was first suggested that perhaps
the state roads could be classified ~nd a d~stinctibn.m~de between
paved and unpaved state highways and roads. - On paved roads, when
the state has notice of a defect and fails t~ act as required to
avoid liability, the state would be liable for injuries caused by
dangerous conditions and defects. On unpaved roads th~ st~te
would not be so liable. It was also suggested that a distinction
might be made by the U$e of traffic count or·use, with a different
rule of liability attaching to each kind of classification. -It
was suggested that all backroads and jeep-roads be excluded from .
that classification which would impose liability, bu,t that not all
non-surf ace roads would necessarily have to be t~eated the same·.
Another suggested approach was to waive immunity as to all
roads and highways and to devise some method of protecting the
state and other public entities from liability in on.usual situations. It was suggested that perhaps the dep~rtment of highways
or other responsible public entity should be ~equired to post
warning signs when there are unusual or dangerous conditions on
the particular highways. Persons who have notice of the dangerous
condition and yet proceed to travel on the highway woul.d bf: considered to have assumed the risk of any injury that may occur to
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them as a result of the dangerous condition warned against.
Another suggestion was that the construction standards used to
classify the primary and secondary roads of the federal interstate
highway system and the standards used to classify state highways
and roads in Colorado could be used to classify roads for the purposes of sovereign immunity.
The committee agreed that there must be a reasonable basis
upon which to make such a classification and that the classification system must be based on standards which are related to the
waiver of sovereign immunityo The system cannot be a completely
arbitrary classification, because such a classification might be
open to constitutional attack on the ground that it is in violation of the equal protection clause of the constitution. The
committee agreed that any attempt to classify by enumeration would
have to be supported by good and substantial reasons due to the
Colorado Supreme Court decisions concerning classifications.
To aid the committee in its attempt to arrive at a reasonable classification system~ the Colorado Department of Highways
was consulted for its recommendations. Mr. Joseph Montano, Chief
Highway Counsel~ reported that the state highways are classified
as follows: (11 Interstate System; (2) Federal Primary System;
(3) Federal Secondary System; (4) Highways that are state highways but are not on either the Interstate, Primary or Secondary
systems; and (5) Urban extensions of the Federal Primary System.
Mro Montano reported that the Interstate, Primary and Urban Extensions are all paved; portions of the Secondary System are paved,
others are not; portions of the system which are neither a part of
the Interstate, Primary or Secondary are paved, others are not
paved.

Mro Montano reported that as of the year 1967, 64.33 percent of the annual vehicle miles traveled on all public streets,
roads, and highways were traveled on the state system. Of this
figure the breakdown of the percentage of vehicle miles traveled
on state highways was as follows:
MILES
OF

HIGHWAY CLASSIFICATION

HIGHWAY

Interstate
Federal-aid Primary
Federal-aid Secondary
Other state highways
ALL state highways

948.2
3434.7
4189.7
102.9
8675.5

% OF ANNUAL

VEHICLE MILES
TRAVELED
20.54 %
33sl9 %
9.97 %
.63 %
64.33

%

In light of this information, it was suggested that perhaps
the defense of immunity could be waived with respect to injuries
occurring on the Interstate, Federal Primary, and Urban Extension
systems, since these are all paved highways. With respect to the
Federal Secondary system, the committee attempted to develop some
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classification system. It was first suggested that counties could
be classified for the purpose of waiving immunity, i.e., the defense of immunity would be waived for damages for injuries sustained on the Fed9ral Secondary highways in particular classes of
counties.
The Department of Highways reported that there appeared to
be no realistic way to sub-classify secondary and other sta~e
highways which would provide a meaningful distinction for the committee's purposes. It was reported that any attempt to classify
the state highways on a car count basis would not be very practical
because the conditions of the various highwars do not vary to any
great extent. In addition, there is no real stic manner in which
to categorize the highways by maintenance standards since the department is charged with the duty of maintaining all highways.
Consequently, the department instructs its maintenance personnel
to maintain all highways in the best manner possible.
The most important consideration in determining which state
highways should not be included in the sovereign immunity waiver
is the fact that the Department of Highways must devote a majority
of its time to design, constructionr maintenance, and supervision
of those highways which carry the vast majority of the traveling
public. With this in mind, the committee concluded that the best
way to classify the highways is by the use of the various construction standards~ i.e., Federal Primary, Interstate, ·etc. With
respect to the Federal Secondary and other state high~ay systems,
the committee determined that immunity should be waived only for
the paved highways which are a part thereof. Therefore, all paved
roads should come under the waiver of immunity provisions.
Public parks, recreational facilities, etc. With respect
to the liability of public entities for injuries caused by dangerous conditions in parks, recreational facilities, etc., the committee originally considered and then rejected the idea that a
distinction be made between parks within the corporate limits of a
city and parks outside the corporate limits, with liability attached to the former but not the latter. The committee agreed that
in this area, with certain exceptions, there should be no immunity.
The committee concluded that a distinction should be made
between (1) injuries caused by negligence in the construction,
maintenance, failure to maintaint etc. of artificial, ·man-made objects (swing sets, buildings, etc.) and (2) injuries caused by the
natural conditions of a park (the Flat Irons in Boulder _or the Red
Rocks west of Denver). In other words, ordinary negligence is
sifficient to impose liability for injuries caused by the dangerous condition of artificial objectso For injuries caused by natural dangerous conditions, immunity should be retained.
If a facility is constructed or built, it must be maintained
at the risk of being liable for a failure to do so. If there is
property which was not constructed, but is natural and unimproved,
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a public entity is not required to maintain it and cannot be held
liable for failure to maintain it. In this case, sovereign immunity is applicable. In short, this means that sovereign immunity
does not apply with respect to man-made objects and does apply to
natural objects.
Water, sewer, trash, and other proprietary activities. The
committee determined that the doctrine of immunity should not apply
to those activities which are determined to be proprietary in nature and that the liability of an entity when engaged in these
functions should be determined as if it were a private corporation
or individual. These functions include but are not limited to the
following: water, sewer, trash and waste disposal, electric and
gas utilities, swimming pools, etc.
Liability and immunity of public employees. The committee
agreed to include in the statute the concept of respondeat superior wherein the entity is liable when the employee is liable, and
the entity is not liable when the employee is not liable. Thus
vicarious liability is imposed on the public entity for the tortious acts and omissions of its employees. In the absence of a
statute, a public entity should not be held liable for an employee's negligence where the employee himself would be immunee In
order to impose liability on the entity it is necessary to show
that the employee's negligence was committed in the scope of pis
employment under circumstances where he would be personally liable.
The committee recognized that there may be atts of employees where the employee should be liable without also imposing
liability on the entity~ This would be an exception to the general rule of respondeat superior. These excepti~ns may include
such acts as intentional torts, gross negligence, fraud, malice,
and false arrest. These acts could be considered to be outside of
the employee's scope of authority, and thus the employee would be
personally liable without liability being imposed on the entity.
All acts of employees, unless excepted or otherwise enumerated,
should be considered to be within the scope of authority.
It was also recognized by the committee that there may be
certain acts of employees that should remain immune from the imposition of liability. These acts may include the adoption or
failure to adopt or enforce a law; the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of a permit, license, etc.; inspection of
property; the institution or prosecution of judicial or administrative proceedings; and other types of discretionary actions
which public officials are called upon to perform.
Defense of public employee. The committee agreed that a
public entity should be required to assume the defense costs of
its employees, whether such defense is assumed by the public entity or not, when they were acting within the scope of their employment and a claim is pressed against them for alleged injuries.
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The public entity should also be required to pay all judgments or
settlements of claims against its public employees in circumstances where the defense of sovereign immunity is waived as to
the public entlty. The public entity, however, -should not be liable where it is not mad~ a party defendant in .an action and is
not notified of the existence of the action within a specified
time after the commencement of the action.
The committee concluded that the public entity should have
discretion as to whether or not it will assume the defense of its
public employee. This is necessary in order to avoid a conflict
of interest situation" The public entity should be required,
where it is made a co-defendant with its public employee, to notify such employee whether or not it will assume his defenses
Where the entity is not made a co-defendant but is notified of
the existence of the action within a specified time, it should
also notify the employee whether or not it will assume his defense.
If the public entity decides to defend the employee and it
is determined that the employee was acting within the scope of his
authority and employment, the entity will be .liable for the judgment. If it is determined by the court that the employee was acting outside of the scope of his employment, the employee, subject
to an agreement with the entity 9 should be required to reimburse
the entity for reasonable attorney's fees~ In addition, the entity should not compromise or settle claims against its employees
until it is established that sovereign immunity has ~een waived.
The committee also concluded that when the entity fails or
refuses to defend one of its employees, it will be liable to said
employee for reasonable defense costs and/or the settlement or
judgment costs if it is subsequently determined respectively that
the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and
the claim arose out of circumstances wherein the defense of sovereign immunity has been waived as to the public entity. If the
~ourt determines that the employee was not within the scop~ of
his employment then the entity is neither liable for costs of defense nor costs of the judgment or settlement.
The above approach was favored by the com~ittee although it
considered an alternative approach. The alternative to the above
policy is the approach wherein there is no requirement that the
entity defend its employees from claims arising out of acts or
omissions within the scope of employmentft Under the alternative
approach, the entity could refuse to defend and even though a
court subsequently establishes that the employee was within the
scope of authority the entity would still not be liable for the
defense cost. The arguments in favor of not, requiring the entities to defend are that (1) it would. probably not encourage as many
law suits, (2) it would probably cost less money, and (3} it would
encourage responsibility on the part of public employees. The
argument in favor of requiring the public entities to defend their
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employees is that the problems created by the case of Liber v.
Flor would not arise again.
The committee emphasized that any provision in the statute
which requires the public entity to defend should not be construed
to be a waiver of immunity in situations wher,~ the sovereign immunity rule would otherwise be applicableo The provision should
not be interpreted as requiring the entity to pay all claims
whether or not sovereign immunity exists.
Defenses. The general rule of any statute should be that
sovereign immunity is retained, except as waived by the statute
or other provision of law. Thus, if sovereign immunity.is not
waived by statutory provision, sovereign immunity shall be available to a public entity as a defense to an action for injuries.
Where sovereign immunity is abrogated as a defense, the liability
of the public entity should be determined in the same manner as
if the public entity were a private person. All defenses available to private persons are also available to public entities.
Policy Considerations Relevant to Financial Administration of
Governmental Tort Liability
The committee felt that the practical fiscal consequences
which might foreseeably flow from any enlargement of tort responsibility deserved to be analyzed for at·least two reasons9 In
the first place, the interests of justice demand that provision
be made for something more than a mere theoretical liability which
an injured plaintiff is authorized to assert. Assurance should be
furnished that meritorious tort claims, when proven, will actually
be paid. A second basis for concern relates to the potential repercussions upon the financial health of the public entity found
to be liable. The public interest demands assurance that prospective, as well as actual, tort liabilities will not disrupt the
orderly administration of public finances nor interfere with the
diligent performance of public functions.
Insurance -- waiver to extent of coverage. The committee
agreed that one of the specific policy considerations should be
that sovereign immunity is waived to the extent of insurance coverage obtained by a public entity. This should be so regardless
of whether the entity would otherwise be liable or immune. Thus,
if a public entity obtains insurance to protect against liability
for injury, then such public entity should be deemed to have
waived the defense of sovereign immunity as to the particular injury or injuries insured against and to the extent of the amount
of insurance provided for the particular injury or injuries. If
the defense of sovereign immunity would otherwise be applicable
to the entity, then the amount of recovery should be limited to
the amount of recovery against the insurer. The com~ittee felt
that by providing that recovery be limited to what is recoverable
against the insurer, the situation could be avoided where the en-
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tity would have to pay an amount to make up the difference between th~ amount of insurance coverage and the ambunt the insurer
actually pays.
Insurance to cover liabilities created under statute. One
of the major concerns of the committee was whether any risks or
liabilities were being created by waiving sovereign immunity which
could not be adequately insured against* The question was whether
or not the state and political subdivisions could purchase liability insurance at reasonable rates to cover any new exposures
created by any sovereign immunity legislation.
In this regard, the September 21, 1967, meeting was devoted to a discussion of the insurance aspects of sovereign immunity
legislation. The committee consulted with Mr. Richard Barnes,
Commissioner of Insurance, who had contacted the insurance people
in New York, Utah and California to determine what problems had
been encountered in those states with respect to the purchase of
insurance to cover their risks. In addition, the committee consulted with Mr. Cecil Munson, Assistant Vice President of Pacific
Indemnity Group, who was responsible for drafting the insurance
policies his company uses for governmental liability coverage in
California. Mr. Munson's jurisdiction also includes Illinois,
Minnesota, and Utah, all of which have statutes on governmental .
immunity and liability.
Mr. Barnes reported that he had contacted the Commissioner
of Insurance in Utah and had solicited his comments on the experience in that -state subsequent to the enactment of the Utah bill.
Mr. Barnes said that in Utah various companies are competing for
bids for insurance coverage by the local governments. On the
state level, onlr the Highway Department is insured. Mr. Barnes
stated that in h s opinion insurance could be obtained in Colorado for any of the risks created by the Utah bill.
Mr. Munson stated that the insurance companies have been
able to provide the coverage desired by the public entities in
California. He felt there would be no serious problems involved
in providing adequate insurance coverage in Colorado if the state
chooses to follow the California approach. In California, premiums are kept down considerably because of the specification of
liabilities and immunities. Mr. Muhson stated that the more liability the statute imposes, the higher the cost for ~he coverage.
In explaining what the insurance companies would look for
in establishing rates, Mr. Munson stated that insurance could be
obtained from several companies which are competitive in the
field and they would look at the total exposure of the entity in
establishing the insurance rates. The company looks at the loss
rates for each entity in determining the insurance rate. The
company also looks at the areas of liability and immunity when
writing a policy.
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Mr. Munson estimated that a policy in California of $50,000
per person and $100,000 per occurrence for bodily injury and
$10,000 to $25,000 for property damage would cost between $8,000
and $9,000 per year, excluding automobile coverage. It was noted
that this is approximately the amount the entities in Colorado
are paying now with the immunity rule in effect. Asked what the
premiums would be assuming the immunity rule were repealed altogether, Mr. Munson replied that the cost would be approximately
25 percent more~
Mr. Munson said that the approach in Utah of limiting the
amount of insurance that may be purchased and limiting any judgment to that amount was a good approach to follow& Mr. Munson
also stated that providing for a standard policy which would be
required to cover everything under the statute was a good idea
because it would avoid many loopholes, would benefit the buyers,
and many good insurance companies will write standard policies.
He also commented that there does not appear to be any great problems in getting a policy without too many riders in it.
As to whether there would be any substantial savings in
cost if limitations on the amount of damages which could be recovered were written into the statute and assuming these limitations were fairly high, Mr. Munson stated that there would be a
savings, but added that there are almost always limits on liability. If there were no limits in the statute and the statute completely waived sovereign immunity, no insurance company would·
cover this kind of risk.
Limitation on maximum amount of recovery. The committee
agreed that a limitation on the amount of recovery when there is
liability should be set forth in the statute. Thus, the state or
other public entity would be liable up to the statutory maximum.
The committee originally agreed that the limits should be set at
$100,000 per person, and $1,000,000 per occurrence. Although the
$1,000,000 may seem high, some entities are presently liable in.
areas where there is no limitation at all. When viewed from this
perspective, the $1,000,000 limitation is really reducing the potential liability of a public entity. The policy behind the
limitations is to give some degree of protection to the entity,
even though basically waiving immunity and allowing more people
to sue for injuries caused by governmental negligence.
At the August 15, 1968 meeting, the committee consulted
with representatives of the D~partment of Insurance. The committee
determined, upon information furnished by the department, that the
difference in the cost of purchasing insurance with limits set at
$100,000 - $1,000,000, and with limits set at $100,000 - $3,000,000,
was not great enough to make a substantial difference. There being
no substantial reason for not increasing the limit to $3,000,000
per occurrence, the committee decided to establish the limits at
$100,000 per person and $3,000,000 per occurrence.
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Authority to obtain insurance. The committee concluded
that all types of public entities should be expressly authorized
to insure themselves against liability~ It is desirable to make
clear that a public entity's authority to insure is as broad as
its potential liability~ Likewise, all public entities should be
expressly authorized to purchase insurance to cover the liability
of their officers, agents, and employees for torts committed in
the scope of their public employment. Not only should public entities be authorized to insure against any liability, but they
also should be authorized to insure against the expense of defending claims, whether or not liability exists on such c.laims.
The committee determined that public entities should be expressly authorized to insure either by" purchasing commercial liability insurance or by adopting a program of self-insurance
through the establishment of financial reserves, or by any combination of the two methods. Full insurance coverage from a commercial insurer may be deemed practically indispensable by many
entitiese Others, however, may determine that adequate protection
at the lowest possible cost can be provided through a program of
self-insurance, or a combination of self-insurance plus an excess
coverage policy purchased from a commercial carrier.
The committee concluded that public entities should be authorized to purchase insurance only from an insurer authorized to
do business in this state and deemed by the state purchasing agent,
or the appropriate governing body of the public entity, to be•responsible and financially sound considering the extent of the coverage required.
The committee does not recommend at this time that all public entities, other than the state, be required to provide insurance covering their liability or the liability of their officers,
agents, and employees. The state, however, should be required to
provide insurance.
Paament of judgments. To ensure that public entities have
both theuty and capacity to pay tort judgments for which they
are liable and, at the same time, to protect them against the disruptive financial consequences of large tort judgments. the committee concluded that all public entities should have a statutory
dutr t6 pay tort judgments for which they are liable. Judgments
aga nst public entities, unlike those against private persons,
ordinarily cannot be satisfied by execution or other legal process against the assets of the judgment debtor, for public property and funds are generally exempt from execution. However, when
a statutory duty is imposed to pay tort judgments~ it will be
clear not only that such entities have authority to pay such judgments, but also that the judgment creditor may bring an action
pursuant to Rule 106 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to
compel the public entity to pay the judgment.

-146-

Accordingly, a public entity should be required to pay any
judgment to the extent funds are available in the fiscal year in
which the judgment is final. The judgment may be paid out of any
funds that are available to the entity from (1) a self-insurance
reserve fundl (2) funds that are unappropriated for any other purpose, and (3J funds appropriated for the current fiscal year for
the payment of such judgments and not previously encumbered.
If the judgment cannot be paid in full in the fiscal year
in which it becomes final, the public entity should be required
to pay the balance of the judgment in the ensuing fiscal year by
levying a tax sufficient to discharge the judgment. The committee
determined that in no event should be levy exceed ten mills, exclusive of existing mill levies. The public entity should continue to levy such tax, not to exceed ten mills, but in no event
less than ten mills if such judgment will not be discharged by a
lesser levy, until the judgment is discharged.
Policy Considerations Relevant to Procedural Handling of Governmental Tort Liability Claims
Notice -- filing of claim. The committee determined that
any person claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity
or an employee thereof should be required to file a written notice with the entity within six months after the d~te"the irijury
is known or should have been knowr. by the exercise of reasonable
diligence. The committee decided that a claim for injury should
be considered to accrue on the date the injury is known or should
have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The
committee considered and rejected a suggestion that the claim be
considered to accrue from the time the injury is sustained. The
committee also considered and rejected a suggestion that the
claimant be required to file a written notice within three months.
The notice should be presented to the attorney general when
the claim is against the state or an employee thereof. When the
claim is against any other public entity or an employee thereof,
the notice should be presented to the governing body of the public
entity or the attorney representing the public entity.
Statute of limitations. The committee concluded that there
should be a two year statute of limitations with respect to tort
actions. An action based on tort should be commenced within two
years after the accrual of such action, or be forever barred.
Compromise and settlement. The committee decided to vest
in the administrative officers of a public entity the discretionary authority to compromise or settle claims.
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Colorado Governmental Immunity Act
The committee drafted a bill embodying the policy considerations discussed above. This bill, without committee endorsement
or approval, was sent to all municipalities, counties, and school
districts in an attempt to solicit comments and suggestions. The
committee devoted four meetings to a consideration of the draft
bill in light of the various policy considerations and the suggestions from interested persons. This bill is contained in the committee report.
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APPENDIX A
UTAH GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY ACT
63-30-1. Short title. --This act shall be known ·and may be cited as the "Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. 11
An Act relating to the immunity of the state, its agencies and political subdivision from actions at law; providing for exemption thereto, for the purchase of
liability insurance, and for the payment of claims and judgments.
63-30-2.

Definitions. --As used in this act:

(1) The word "state" shall mean the state of Utah or·any office, department,
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university
or other instrumentality thereof;
(2) The words "political subdivision" shall mean any county, city, town, school
district, special improvement or taxing district, or any other political subdivision
or public corporation;

(3)

The words "governmental entity 1 ' shall mean and include the state and its
political subdivisions as defined herein;
(4) The word "employee" shall mean and include any officer, employee or servant
of a governmental entity;

(5) The word "claim" shall mean any claim brought against a governmental entity
or its employee as permitted by this act;
(6) The word 11 injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of
property, or any ot_her injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. --Except as may be ot4erwise
provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune from suit for any
injury which may result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity
is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function.

63-30-4.

Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability - Effect
of waiver of immunity. --Nothing contained in this act, unless specifically provided,
is to be construed as an admission or denial of liability·or responsibility in so far
as governmental entities are concerned. Wherein immunity from suit is waived by this
act, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the entity shall be determined
as if the entity were a private person.
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligation. --Immunity from suit of
all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation.
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving property. --Immunity from suit
of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of any property real or personal
or for the possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to for~close mortgages
or other liens thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or secure any
adjudication touching any mortgage or other lien said entity may have or claim on
the property involved.
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63-30-7. Waiver of innnunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles-Exception. --·Immunity fr,.:im suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other
equipment while in the scope of his employment; provided, however, that this section
shall not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while
being. driven in accordance with the requirements of section 41-6-14·, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, ;.,.s amended by chapter 86, Laws of Utah, 1961.
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous
condition of highways, bridge£, or other structures. --Immunity from suit of all
governmental enti.ties is waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other structure located thereon.
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or defective public building,
structure, or other public improvement - Exception. --Immunity f!om suit of all
governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective
condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement.
Immunity is not waived for latent defective conditions.
63-30-10.
employee for injury
within the

Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of
Exceptions. --Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
proximately caused by a negligent act or o~ission of an employee committed
scope of his employment except if the injury:

(1) :arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused,. or
(2) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit,
interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion
of rights of privacy, or civil rights, or
(3) arises out of the :f.ssuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization, or
(4) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, or
(5) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause, or
(6) arises out of a misrepresentation by said employee whether or not such
is -negligent or intentional, or
(7) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence and civil disturbanc~s, or
(8) arises out of or in connection with the collection of an assessment of
taxes, or
(9) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard, or
(10) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county
or city jail or other place of legal confinement, or
(11) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the state land board.
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Claimant's petition for relief. --Any person having a
claim for injury to person or property against a governmental entity or its employee
may petition said entity for any appropriate relief including the award of money
damages.
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63-30-12. Claim against state or agency - Notice to attorney g~neral and agency Time for filing. --A claim against the state or any agency thereof as defined herein
shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed with the attorney general of
the state of Utah and the agency concerned within one year after the cause of action
arises.
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision - Time for filing notice - Claim against
city or town for injury on highways, bridges, or ·other structures. --A claim against
a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within
ninety days after the cause of action arises; provided, however, that any claim
filed against a city or incorporated town under section 63-30-8 shall be governed
by the provisions of section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
63-30-14. Claim for injury - Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance
carrier within ninety days. --Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the
governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deeme~ to have
been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its
insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim.
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury - Authority and time for filing action against
governmental entity. --If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action
in the district court against the governmental entity in those circumstances where
immunity from suit has been waived as in this act provided. Said action must be
commenced within one year after denial or the denial period as specified herein.
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions - Application of Rules of
Civil Procedure. --The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdi~tion
over any action brought under this act and such actions shall be governed by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are consistent with this act.
63-30-17. Venue of actions. --Actions against the state may be brought in the
county in which the cause of action arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against
a county may be brought in the county in which the cause of action arose, or in the
defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a district court judge of the defendant
county, in any county contiguous to the defendant county. Said leave may be granted
ex parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns,
shall be brought in the county in which said political subdivision is located or
in the county in which the cause of action arose.
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. ~-The governmental entity, after
conferring with its legal officer or other legal counsel if it has no such officer,
may compromise and settle any action as to the darnages·or other relief sought.
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action. --At the time of filing
the action the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court,
but in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff
of taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff
fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment.
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity bars action against employee.
--Judgment against a governmental entity in an action brought under this act shall
constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same
subject matter, against the employee whose act or omission gave rise ~o the claim.
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63-30-21. Claims by other governmental entities prohibited. --Notwithstanding
any other provision of this act, no claim hereunder shall be brought by the United
States or by any other state, territory, nation or governmental entity.
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited - Governmental entity exempt
from execution, attachment or garnishment. --No judgment shall be rendered ·against
the governmental ent'ity for exemplary or punit.ive damages; nor shall execution,
attachment or garnishment issue against the governmental entity.
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against state - Presentment for payment.
--Any claim approved by the state as defined herein or any final judgment obtained
against the state shall be presented to the office, agency, institution or other
instrumentality involved for payment if payment by said instrumentality· is otherwise
permitted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or
claim shall be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed as
provided in section 63-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision - Procedure
by governing body. --Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final
judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing
body thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds of said political subdivision unless said funds-are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law or
contract for other purposes.
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision - Installment
payments. --If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the current
fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant.
63-30-26. Reserve funds· for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by
political subdivisions. --Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve
fund or may jointly with one or more other political subdivisions make contributions
to a joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of claims against the
co-operating subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to this act, or for the
purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect the co-operating subdivisions
from any or all risks created by this act.
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of claims or judgments
or insurance premiums. --Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary all
political subdivisions shall have authority to levy an annual P!Operty tax in the
amount necessary to pay any claims, settlements, or judgments secured pursuant to
the provisions hereof, or to pay the costs to defend against same, or for the purpose
of establishing and maintaining a reserve fund for the payment of such claims, settlements or judgments as may be reasonably anticipated, or to pay the premium for such
insurance as herein authorized, even though as a result ·of such levy the maximum
levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded thereby; provided, that in no event
shall such levy exceed one-half mill nor shall the revenues derived therefrom be
used for any other purpose than those stipulated herein.
63-30-28. Liability insurance - Purchase by governmental entity authorized. --Any
governmental entity within th~ state of Utah may purchase insurance against any risk
which may arise as a result of the application of this act.
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63-30-29. Liability insurance - Required policy provisions. --Every policy or
contract of insurance purchased by a governmental entity as permitted under the
provisions of this chapter shall provide:
(a) In respect to bodily injury liability that the insurance carrier shall pay on
behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums which the insured would in the
absence of the defense of governmental immunity be legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident, and arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of automobiles, or arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of premises, and all operations necessary or incidental thereto, or in respect
to other operations and caused by accident subject to a limit, exclusive of interest
and costs, of not less than $100,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, to a limit of
not less than $300,000 because of bodily injury or death of two or more persons
in any one accident.
(b) In respect to property damage liability that the insurance carrier shall pay
on behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums which the insured would in
the absence of the defense of governmental immunity be legally obligated to pay as
damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use
thereof, caused by accident, and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use
of premises, and all operations necessary or incidental thereto, or in respect to
other operations and caused by accident to a limit of not less than $50,000 because
of injury to or destruction of property others in any one accident.
63-30-30. Liability Insurance - Provision for waiver of sovereign immunity d~fense
and for payment by insurer required in policy. --Every contract or policy of insurance
purchased under the terms of this act for any or all risks created by this act shall
include a provision .or endorsement by which the insurer agrees not to assert the
defense of sovereign immunity, and to pay all sums for which it would otherwise be
liable under its contract or policy of insurance.
63-30-31. Liability insurance - Construction of policy not in compliance with act.
--Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereafter issued and purchased to insure
against any risk which may arise as a result of the application of this act, which
contains any condition or provision not in compliance with the requirements of the
act, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but shall be construed and applied in
accordance with such conditions and provisions as would have applied had such policy,
rider or endorsement been in full compliance with this act, provided the policy is
otherwise valid.
63-30-32. Liability insurance - Purchase of policy from lowest and best bidder
required. --No contract or policy of insurance may be purchased under this chapter
or renewed under this act except upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best
bidder.
63-30-33. Liability insurance - Insurance for employees authorized. --A governmental
entity may insure any or all of its employees against all or any part of his liability
for injury or damage resulting from a negligent act or omission in the scope of his
employment regardless of whether or not said entity is immune from suit for said
act or omission, and any expenditure for such insurance is herewith declared to be
for a public purpose.
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63-30-34. Liability insurance - Judgment or award over limits of insurance policy
reduced. --If any judgment or award against a governmental entity under sections
63-30-7, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10 exceeds the minimum amounts for bodily
injury and property damage liability specified in section 63-30-29, the court shall
reduce the amount of said judgment or award to a sum equal to said minimum requirements unless the governmental entity has secured insurance coverage in excess of
said minimum requirements in which event the court shall reduce the amount of said
judgment or award to a sum equal to the applicable limits provided in the insurance
policy.
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APPENDIX B
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WELLER, FRIEDRICH, HICKISCH AND HAZLITT
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DENVER, COLORADO 60203

JOHN R, I-IICKISCH
WILLIAM H. HAZLITT

W, ROBERT WARD
MARTIN J, ANDREW

TEl.EPHONE 222 ·4?2!5

September 16, 1968

AREA CODE 303

JAMES C, F"ATTOR
R. STERLING AMBLER
ARTHUR H, DOWNEY
MICHAl:".L E, OLDHAM
OEOF"F"REY S. RACE

DAVID K, KERR
RICHARD A, BAUER

Mr. Lyle C. Kyle, Director
Colorado Legislative Counsel
Room 341, State Capitol
Denver., Colorado 80203
RE:

Proposed Sovereign Immunity
Legislation

Dear Lyle:
I have now reviewed with the American Insurance Association the rough
draft of the c~ptioned legislation dated August 12, 1968. On the whole., we
believe that this draft is quite good.
However, we continue to be concerned with Section 9 (5) dealing with the
accrual of the cause of action. As that section now stands, we believe it
to be obscure as to precise meaning and that, if enacted as it stands, would
be a potential source of considerable litigation. Conceivably, as the section
is now drafted, an injury could remain undiscovered for six years, a claimant then discover or claim to have discovered the injury thus making the
cause of action accrue a month or so short of six years, and the claimant
would then have an additional two years to commence litigation. This would
certainly seem to controvert the present six year statute of limitations for
personal injury or property damage now existing in the State of Colorado.
It would almost seem that it would be less costly to the state and other
governmental entities involved to leave out the proposed Section 9 (5) altogether.
We also note that Section 15 (2) (c) and Section 16 (2) (c) contain provisions
leaving the determination as to the responsibility of an insurance company
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Mr. Lyle c. Kyle, Director
Colorado Legislative. Counsel
September 16, 1968
Page Two
to the State Purchasing Agent or appropriate governing body of the governmental subdivision. We could easily see where such a provision could
lead to favoritism and pressure in the purchase of insurance coverage.
We would believe that the insurance should be obtainable from any duly
authorized insurance company wh~ch meets the requirements of the Colorado
Insurance Commissioner.
Yours very truly,

Martin J. Andrew, ·Legisl ive Representative
American Insurance Asso ation·

MJA/bd
cc: Senators Hahn, Chairman, Saunders and
Representatives Braden., Cole; Edmonds, Grimshaw, Lamb.,
Sack and Safran
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